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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Introduction to the research 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s ownership of a number of UK firms operating in 
various sectors of the information technology (IT) industry was acquired by Japanese 
firms. These acquisitions attracted attention for a number of reasons:- 
• Until this time, the globalising activities of Japanese firms in this sector had largely 
centred on the use of joint ventures, minority shareholdings and greenfield 
developments (Financial Times 12/4/88; 20/9/91; Emmott 1992; JETRO 1993). 
• Japanese manufacturing firms in general had largely avoided international acquisitions 
for reasons associated with culture (Kester, 1991), corporate governance (Schlosstein, 
1989) and perceived problems with managing non-Japanese (Kish & Vasconcellos, 
1993).  
• The use of acquisitions for strategic (as opposed to financial) reasons is widely 
acknowledged to be fraught with difficulty and is regarded as a high risk form of 
business activity (Cartwright & Cooper, 1990;1992). The percentage of unsuccessfully 
integrated acquisitions is very high, with various studies putting the percentage of 
failed acquisitions between 50% and 80% (Kitching, 1967; Meeks, 1977). 
Given the relative paucity of previous Japanese acquisition activity in this sector and the 
difficulty for any firm attempting to implement such a strategy, the acquisition of the UK 
IT firms raised a wide range of potential areas of research. For example, did these 
acquisitions represent a new model of Japanese foreign direct investment activity? If so, 
how had the Japanese overcome their dislike for using acquisition of majority share 
ownership of non-Japanese firms? Were these acquisitions being carried out for financial 
or strategic reasons? If so, what were the strategic reasons? Was the use of acquisitions 
by Japanese manufacturing firms peculiar to those firms operating in the IT sector? Were 
there specific advantages to acquiring UK firms?  
Focus of the research 
From the wide range of potential research questions presented by these Japanese 
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acquisitions, this research focuses upon the building of an understanding of the role of the 
acquisitions of UK IT firms from the perspective of the Japanese firms’ innovation 
strategy when faced with a changing environment. The dynamic and complex nature of 
this environment was the result of the conditions of technological uncertainty, rapid 
change and increasing internationalisation that typified the IT industry in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. The aim of the research is to answer the following question:- 
How have Japanese firms been able to benefit from the acquisition of UK IT firms to 
enhance their ability to compete in the complex and dynamic environment of the IT 
industry? 
In order to address such a research question, there is a need for a conceptual framework 
to assist our understanding of the complex issues which are believed to support the 
rationale for these acquisitions. As will be seen in later sections, such a framework needs 
to be developed as examination of the pertinent literature raises a number of 
incongruities, and fails to reveal an appropriate analytical approach. The focus of this 
research thus becomes the development of a framework for viewing the rationale for the 
Japanese acquisitions with respect to the organisational processes within the Japanese 
firms as well as the changing industrial and competitive environment. The literature is 
used to provide the basic conceptual constructs which are then combined with the rich 
contextual evidence of the case study material to provide a structure for addressing the 
research question.  
It is important to state that this is a thesis which falls under the umbrella heading of 
management studies, rather than industrial economics. The aim here is to enhance our 
understanding of the role that a particular business process (in this case, corporate 
acquisitions) can play in the growth strategy of firms attempting to compete within a fast-
changing environment driven by emerging technologies. 
Exhibit 1.1 shows the basic structure of the thesis. 
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Exhibit 1.1  Basic thesis structure 
Background 
The issues at the centre of this research need to be examined with reference to certain 
contexts. These are; (1) the economic setting, in particular the patterns of Japanese 
foreign direct investment and the growing use of mergers and acquisitions, and (2) 
changes in the IT industry. Each of these are discussed briefly below to provide the 
setting for the background to this research. 
The economic setting 
The acquisitions which form the basis of this research occurred within a number of wider 
patterns of economic activity.  
Boom in Japanese FDI 
Firstly, during the second half of the 1980s Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) was 
at an all time high and increasing (See Exhibit 1.2) The build-up of cash on Japanese 
corporate balance sheets caused by the enormous trade surplus (See Exhibit 1.3) and 
appreciation of the Yen (See Exhibit 1.4) provided Japanese firms with financial strength 
(as well as the need) to invest internationally.  
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Exhibit 1.2  Japanese FDI activity 1983 - 1994 
Source: Data provided by JETRO (London). 
 
 
Exhibit 1.3  Japanese trade surplus 
Source: Asahi (1994) 
 
 
Exhibit 1.4  Yen/dollar exchange rate 
Source: Data provided by JETRO (London), and Asahi (1993,4,5) 
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The motives for Japanese firms in all industries moving overseas can be grouped as 
follows (Emmott, 1992):- 
• Managerial advantages - There were advantages to be gained from the combining of 
low cost factor inputs with Japanese capital, management techniques and product 
designs. 
• Business obstacles - Avoidance of the perceived or actual barriers to trade that might 
be constructed with the formation of trading blocks such as NAFTA and the EU. 
• Attractive dealing opportunities - With the appreciation of the Yen, foreign assets 
became increasingly attractive to Japanese firms. 
• Mature markets and intensifying competition - As markets matured and competition 
became more complex within international markets, there was a need for a high degree 
of localisation and customisation of products and services. 
• Local technology - Firms may need to acquire technology lacking in the parent 
organisation. 
• Japanese customers - As firms move overseas, so their suppliers and various service 
providers (such as banks) will follow them.  
The latest wave of world-wide M&A activity 
The second component of the wider patterns of economic activity at the time of the 
Japanese acquisitions was the world-wide boom in merger and acquisition (M&A) 
activity in the late 1980s. This wave of activity1 was particularly noticeable in Europe 
and the US (JETRO, 1993). Coupled with this was an awakening of interest in the use of 
M&A by Japanese firms both domestically and internationally (Kester, 1991). Up to this 
time, Japanese firms had largely avoided M&A for reasons which will be discussed in 
Chapter 3. Fuelled by the integration of global markets and Japanese financial liberation, 
Japanese firms began to change the way they viewed M&A activity. 
                                                 
1 Mergers and acquisitions tend to follow distinct ‘waves’ of activity. The frenzied activity of the mid-, to late-1980s 
represented the fourth wave of activity to be observed this century (Warshawsky, 1987). 
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 [..] Japanese business has been experiencing a widening of both the scope and wherewithal for the 
exercise of managerial discretion in the allocation of corporate resources (Kester, 1991:7). 
This change in attitude, coupled with the boom in FDI generally led to a dramatic 
increase in the level of Japanese ‘out-in’2 M&A activity (See Exhibit 1.5). 
 
  
Exhibit 1.5  Japanese overseas M&A activity 
Source: Japan M&A Quarterly, 1996 
The economic factors identified above illustrate that the acquisitions may simply be 
considered in terms of the boom in M&A activity world-wide, and in particular, the 
emergent use of M&A by the cash-rich Japanese firms in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The acquisitions can be considered to have been a result of the economic conditions at 
that time which made M&A a more favourable option for Japanese firms seeking to 
globalise their operations. However, the impact of the structural upheavals in the 
computer industry at this time require us to consider these IT acquisitions from a different 
perspective to the majority of non-IT related Japanese acquisitions implemented around 
that time. 
Changes in the IT industry 
Through the 1980s and into the 1990s, widespread changes were altering the competitive 
environment of the IT industry. These changes represented the latest in a series of 
                                                 
2 Japanese firms acquiring non-Japanese firms. 
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upheavals that had influenced the structure of the industry since its formation some 40 
years before. 
The 1950s had seen the entry of the data processing computer into the world of 
commerce, pushed along by IBM with their large, expensive and proprietary mainframe 
computers. A major upheaval came in the 1960s with the development of minicomputers 
which, although still large and expensive systems, provided data processing power to a 
wider range of users. The 1980s saw the development of open systems based computing 
built around the PC and workstations. These machines made computers available to a 
much wider number of users and when linked to form client-server networks, 
transformed the nature of the computer industry. The industry moved from being 
dominated by a small number of highly vertically integrated producers of large 
proprietary computer systems, to a large number of initially smaller firms who focused 
their efforts on particular sectors of the industry. Such sectors included microprocessor 
design, hardware assembly, operating systems development, application software 
development and systems integration. 
These changes in the computer industry were making themselves felt at the same time as 
broader changes were affecting many markets and industries. A new competitive 
environment for firms was being created, driven by three forces: intense international 
competition; fragmented markets and sophisticated customers; and diversified and 
transforming technologies (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991). The transforming technologies of 
the computer industry were thus not only driving the formation of this new competitive 
environment, but the structure of the computer industry itself was also being influenced 
by the wider changes.  
The nature of the products and services upon which this open systems based ‘new’ 
computer industry was built forced changes in the strategy of the computer firms who had 
grown strong in the ‘old’, mini-computer and mainframe based computer industry as well 
as giving chances to new firms to exploit market opportunities. The products of the new 
industry were typified by four main characteristics:- 
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• Open - Hardware and software from different firms was designed to be used in 
conjunction with hardware and software from other firms. It was no longer possible 
for firms to produce products of a proprietary nature and rely on enforced customer 
loyalty (Morris & Ferguson, 1993). 
• Systemic - The development of new products from one firm relied heavily on the 
output of other firms, i.e., products whose success can only be realised in conjunction 
with related, complementary products (Chesborough & Teece, 1996). 
• Rapidly changing - As von Braun (1990) has identified, the speed of new product 
development in many industries was increasing, and this was especially true within 
the IT industry. 
• International - As the hardware became more generic in nature and margins 
narrower, firms required an international presence to be able to reap the economies of 
scale. In software, the tailoring of products to local demands also required an 
international presence (Japan Development Bank, 1995). 
This ‘new’ computer industry presented opportunities for start-up firms as well as 
challenges for those firms who had grown up within the ‘old’ computer industry. The 
nature of the products of the new industry to a large extent dictated the organisational 
form that was required for effective competition, i.e., that they should be open and able to 
work closely with outside firms, be aware of their position within a systemic industry, 
able to change rapidly, and to have an international presence. This led to a number of 
changes within the industry as firms sought to restructure in the face of rapidly changing 
competitive conditions. 
These were the economic and environmental conditions facing the Japanese firms 
operating in IT-related areas in the late 1980s. 
Japanese innovation strategy and the acquisition of UK IT firms                                                                                             Chapter 1 
 9 
Reported motives for the acquisitions 
Content analysis of press archives from around the time of the acquisitions3 revealed four 
broad categories of motives for the acquisition of UK IT firms by Japanese firms:- 
1. Market share - as competition in the market for IT products became increasingly 
fierce, Japanese firms sought ways of increasing their market share. Acquiring a 
competing firm was one way to achieve this relatively speedily (Financial Times, 
18/10/90). 
2. European integration - with the continued integration of the European Union, set for 
formalisation in 1992, many non-European firms were keen to gain foothold within 
‘Fortress Europe’ before the market became too closed (Investor’s Chronicle, 3/8/90). 
3. Acquisition of technology - for Japanese firms lacking access to a particular 
technology, acquisition provided one route to internalising the missing technology 
(Financial Times, 30/3/91). 
4. Market entry - for Japanese firms attempting to enter the highly competitive and fast 
moving market for IT goods and services, acquisition of a complete ‘business 
infrastructure’ provided one means to achieve this (Asahi News Service, 12/4/90). 
Examination of literature 
Examination of the various bodies of academic literature relating to the four categories of 
motives for acquiring given above revealed that there was a well grounded theoretical 
rationale underpinning each of them. For example, a firm which lacks a specific 
technology has a number of options which include: developing the technology internally; 
licensing the technology from outside; finding a partner to jointly develop the 
technology; or simply buying a company which has this technology (Granstrand & 
Sjölander, 1990). It is implied that if a suitable target company can be found, then it is 
simply a matter of purchasing the majority of shares of this target firm. The technology 
and knowledge of the acquired firm will then becomes integrated into the parent 
                                                 
3 Details of the archives used are given in Chapter 5 and also in Appendix II. 
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organisation.  
To counteract this simplistic view, a large body of literature has grown which attempts to 
highlight the extreme complexity of integrating two organisational cultures and points out 
the very high rates of failure of acquisitions (e.g., emerging from the work of Kitching, 
1967). However, these bodies of literature are based almost exclusively upon the use of 
acquisitions by non-Japanese firms (Matsuura, 1995). Given the additional problems 
associated with cross-border acquisitions undertaken by Japanese firms (as detailed by 
Kester, 1991), it became harder to see why the Japanese firms would choose to use 
acquisitions over other, more loosely binding strategic alliance options.  
For each of the motives detailed in the previous section, there were viable strategic 
alternatives, such as joint venture partnering, greenfield site development and technology 
licensing. It remained unclear as to what additional benefit the Japanese firms would 
obtain through acquisition that would not be more easily gained by some other form of 
alliance partnering or direct investment. One pointer towards less obvious motives for 
acquiring can be seen when the wider environmental and industrial changes are examined 
in more detail.  
Wider reaching changes - Beyond the ‘new’ computer industry 
As mentioned earlier, the competitive environment and structure of the IT industry in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s was undergoing extreme change driven predominantly by 
transforming technologies:- 
• Internal changes - At the time of the acquisitions, there were three key trends having 
a great impact upon the strategies of firms operating within the computer industry. 
These were; ‘downsizing’ (as the power of small computers increased, there was a 
shift in demand among users from large to small computers); ‘networking’ (the 
linking of small computers to form networks); and ‘open systems’ (the emergence of 
standard architectures which allowed hardware and software from different vendors 
to work together). At the time of the acquisitions, the influence of these internal 
changes was being widely felt by all firms operating in the industry. The large 
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Japanese IT firms in particular were struggling to react to some of these changes 
In addition to these internal factors, there were wider changes taking place in a number of 
related industries. The influence of these changes on the strategies of the Japanese firms 
was far from clear at the time of the acquisitions:- 
• External changes - Driven by a combination of technological advances and industry 
de-regulation, the industries of telecommunications, consumer electronics and IT 
were converging to create a new competitive environment. The initial impact of this 
convergence was just beginning to be felt at the time of the Japanese acquisitions. 
One of the main factors driving the formation of this new competitive environment 
was the move from analogue to digital core electronic technologies in a wide range of 
product areas. This was predicted to have the effect of rendering certain barriers 
between the industries of IT, consumer electronics and telecommunications largely 
transparent and would lead to the formation of a new industry - the “digital industry” 
(Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). The formation of the digital industry pointed to the 
restructuring of the industries of IT, consumer electronics and telecommunications 
around three basic areas: devices (the hardware and components), content (everything 
that is displayed, stored, used and transmitted by the devices), and distribution (all 
means of distributing the content to the devices). This combined industry would 
present a highly uncertain and rapidly changing competitive environment. 
The results of the internal changes within the industry were being widely felt at the time 
of the acquisitions. These changes represented not only a shift towards a new 
underpinning group of technologies, but also a change in the structure of the industry 
itself. The manufacturers of large computers were being forced to acquire skills in the 
development of small, networked and open computer systems. These large firms were 
also forced into competition with small firms who were able to access the ‘off-the-shelf’ 
components that comprised the core of the small computers, and were able to respond 
rapidly to the changing demands of consumers.  
The effects of the external changes that were predicted to lead to the formation of the 
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“digital industry” were harder to see. Analysis of news archives at the time of the 
acquisitions did not reveal issues relating to the convergence of telecommunications, 
consumer electronics and computing as being perceived as a visible motive for acquiring 
UK firms.  
Yet, it is clear that the competitive environment presented by the digital industry is one 
which will require firms, particularly those used to operating in more structured, 
domestically-, and product-focused markets, to learn new skills. Such skills encompass 
not only knowledge of new technologies, but also organisational skills such as the ability 
to work with firms from a range of industry sectors. Innovation within this industry 
requires the ability to access a wide range of resources and skills, coupled with the ability 
to reconfigure these resources rapidly in response to changing demand and technological 
advances. 
The requirement for an analytical framework 
This research aims to examine certain aspects of the behaviour of firms faced with a 
dynamic and uncertain environment driven by fast emerging technologies. The discussion 
of the environmental conditions in the lead-up to the acquisitions and the predicted 
influence of convergence upon the strategies of the firms points to the complexities of the 
issues under examination. In order to assist in the understanding of why and how the 
Japanese firms used acquisitions in the early 1990s, it is necessary to have a suitable 
analytical framework. Such a framework should allow the behaviour of firms to be 
viewed not only in terms of the changes within the computer industry itself and the need 
for firms to acquire technologies to respond to that change, but also to view the actions of 
the firms in terms of the wider issues relating to convergence. For Japanese IT firms, 
these wider issues represented a potentially dramatic change in the way that they would 
do business. 
The analytical approach should allow us to examine the way in which changing 
environmental conditions influence the organisational processes within the firms seeking 
to compete in conditions of change and uncertainty. 
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The literature emerging from the resource-based view of the firm on competence and 
capability provides a useful set of components for building such a framework. This 
literature, though lacking clarity and consistency in its use of terminology and units of 
analysis, does provide a rich source of theoretical constructs to help us understand the 
strategies of firms operating in a dynamic environment. 
Once developed, the analytical framework will provide a perspective from which to view 
the research questions which it is hoped will make visible the less apparent motives for, 
and benefits of, the use of acquisitions by the Japanese firms. 
Exhibit 1.6 provides an illustration of the flow of the research and shows the structure of 
the complete dissertation. 
The appendices give further information on the following topics:- 
Appendix I: An overview of the Japanese industrial and corporate system. 
Appendix II: Details of the case study data acquisition process. 
Appendix III: Background details on the case study firms. 
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Exhibit 1.6  Detailed thesis structure 
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Chapter 2 Convergence towards the ‘digital industry’
Chapter overview 
In this chapter, the aim is to describe the competitive environment that faced firms operating in 
the IT industry at the time of acquisition, as well as describing the changes that have taken place 
in the years following up to the time of writing. This chapter provides us with a view of the 
competitive environment within the IT industry at the time of the acquisitions as well as 
describing the factors that were contributing to the increasing uncertainty and dynamism of this 
environment. 
This chapter is divided as follows:- Firstly, a short profile is given of the changes that have 
occurred within the computer industry over the last 20 years and which led to the emergence of 
open systems based computing. Next, the various factors which have combined with changes in 
the computer industry to act as catalysts for the formation of a new industry, the ‘digital 
industry’, are highlighted. These factors include changes in the telecommunications, consumer 
electronics and various ‘content’ providers. The widespread use of alliances within this industry 
are then discussed, with particular reference to their use by Japanese firms. The final section of 
the chapter focuses on the generic strengths and weaknesses of Japanese firms attempting to 
operate within this new competitive environment. 
Changes in the computer industry 
Until the 1980s, the computer industry was dominated by the producers of large 
computers. The majority of these machines fitted into one of two broad categories - 
minicomputers and mainframes. The leading applications for these machines were to 
assist in the administration of large organisations, and the performing of time consuming 
calculations. They were usually kept in centralised locations, operated by specialists, and 
almost invariably ran proprietary operating and application software. Large suppliers 
dominated the market, and these firms tended to be highly vertically integrated, providing 
customers with a complete ‘package’, comprising hardware, software, maintenance and 
other services (Mills, 1996). As the hardware element of these packages was so 
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expensive, complicated and proprietary in nature, customers tended to stick with one 
supplier. Computer firms were content to maintain ‘closed’ standards for their hardware 
and software as a method of ensuring customer loyalty (See Exhibit 2.1). 
 
Property Closed systems Open systems 
Scalability Upward and downward scalability 
limited to models within the 
vendors own product line. 
Scaleable within and across vendor 
lines supporting similar standards. 
Customers free to choose among 
vendors. 
Portability Portability generally limited to 
moving applications upwards and 
downwards within a vendor’s own 
product family. 
Ability to run software on multiple 
platforms and easily move applications 
from one platform to another. 
Interoperability Interoperability between products 
from differing vendors non-
existent. 
Systems from different vendors can 
work together. 
Compatibility Compatibility generally 
maintained within a product line 
until architecture of that product 
is replaced. 
Compatibility generally maintained 
through standards and architectures 
until replaced. 
Exhibit 2.1  Closed versus open systems 
Source: Sun Microsystems (1996) 
Various factors conspired to form high barriers to entry for firms seeking to enter this 
market (van der Meer & Gudim, 1992)4. These include:- 
• Considerable economies of scale: The big firms dominated the market, and as their 
output rose, the average costs of R&D, production, marketing maintenance and other 
services fell. New firms would not be in such a favourable position. 
• A high degree of product differentiation: The computer industry was characterised by 
a degree of enforced system loyalty. This was the result mainly of the software 
                                                 
4 However, it was possible for firms to gain entry into the market. The emergence of the minicomputer market gave 
companies such as DEC the opportunity to gain market share in this newly created market segment of the industry. 
Also, the development of the integrated circuit (IC) saw the start-up of a number of specialist chip developers. As the 
costs involved in designing and manufacturing ICs was high, firms began providing the computer hardware producers 
with an external source of processor chips. It was in this way that Intel and Motorola grew within the computer 
industry. 
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required to make the hardware run not being portable among systems produced by 
different manufacturers and in some cases, even among the systems produced by the 
same manufacturer. The result was known as ‘software lock-in’, i.e., once a user was 
committed to a particular manufacturer’s computer system, there were high costs 
involved in switching to a different system. 
• High absolute cost barriers: These included the cost of capital needed to gain and 
then maintain market share. Capital requirements were also raised by the large 
computer firms’ policies of ‘bundling’, i.e., only providing complete systems 
including hardware, software, maintenance and other services.5 
A schematic view of the major players within this ‘old’ computer industry is given in 
Exhibit 2.2. 
 
 
Exhibit 2.2  The key players of the ‘old’ computer industry 
Source: Adapted from Intel (1993) 
IBM dominated the ‘old’ computer industry and by 1980, the US firm had gained 80% of 
the market for large computers (Gates, 1995). As a large, well-established firm offering a 
complete range of scaleable computer systems, IBM was the ‘safe’ solution for providing 
the computer requirements for most firms. Buyers often lacked the necessary technical 
                                                 
5 In the case of IBM, these costs were reinforced by the practice of leasing rather than selling computers, thereby 
increasing the amount of capital required by a new entrant to the market. 
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expertise to make informed decisions regarding the purchase of computer systems and 
therefore relied on IBM to make that decision for them (Mills, 1996). Consequently, the 
buyer’s price sensitivity was quite low. In order to obtain a computer system that was 
perceived as satisfying their business needs, customers were quite willing to pay a 
premium to a supplier with a reputation for quality (van der Meer & Gudim, 1992). In 
addition, IBM’s practice of leasing computers led to IBM being regarded by many firms 
as their “partner in data processing and office work” (Mills, 1996). 
The development of the PC6 
The personal computer7 (PC) emerged from being a hobbyists toy in the 1970s to a high 
volume commercial product in the 1980s. As these small machines were assembled from 
‘off-the-shelf’ components, there was less requirement for firms producing PCs to be 
vertically integrated.  
The early PCs were relatively simple in structure (though using complex components) 
and could perform tasks such as word-processing, accounting, organising mailing lists, 
and playing games. As such, they were ideally suited for small businesses and hobbyist 
users. Most large computer firms were keen to gain a share of this emerging market8. In 
order to “make its presence known in every area of the computer industry”, IBM 
launched its own PC in 1981 (Chposky & Leonis, 1988). IBM’s machine was built 
around a microprocessor unit from Intel (‘8088’), and an operating system from 
Microsoft (‘PC-DOS’). This Intel-Microsoft pattern grew to become the de facto standard 
for the majority of PCs world-wide, although throughout the 1980s, various other 
                                                 
6 Chposky & Leonis (1988), Cringely (1992) and Gates (1995) provide three rather different perspectives on the 
development of the PC industry. This section draws on the work of each of these authors in order to provide a balanced 
view. 
7 Categorised at this time as a ‘microcomputer’, to fit in with the existing classifications of computers. IBM 
popularised the term ‘personal computer’ through its marketing activities for its original microcomputer. 
8 Most but not all; notable exceptions were DEC, whose founder repeatedly and publicly dismissed PCs as a “passing 
fad”, and Wang, whose founder saw the potential of these small computers, but failed to understand the importance of 
their ‘openness’. Wang continued to attempt to tie hardware and software together in a proprietary format, and 
consequently failed in the face of competition from open system providers (Gates, 1995). 
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computer firms did attempt to push their own competing standards9. 
IBM’s success in the PC market, which it regarded as a useful supplement to its large 
computer businesses drove the company’s profits to record levels - $6.6 billion in 198410. 
More software began to be written for the PCs and this, along with the development of 
many third-party hardware accessories, acted as a positive feedback force to increase 
demand for the core hardware. The large computer firms viewed the market for PCs not 
as a separate market, but as an entry point for small firms who could not yet afford 
‘mainstream’ (i.e., mainframe, or minicomputer) systems, but who one day might. 
The majority of mainframe and minicomputer firms did not see the PC as a threat to their 
core business. However, the design for the de facto standard IBM-PC was effectively 
open11 - it used standardised interfaces, and any firm could purchase the microprocessor 
chips from Intel, and license DOS from Microsoft. This allowed other firms, even 
relatively small ones, to begin producing ‘clones’ of the IBM-PC. IBM aimed to stay one 
step ahead of the clone manufacturers by maintaining the technological lead. In 1983, it 
produced its second generation machine - the PC-XT, and in 1984, the PC-AT. This latter 
machine, built around Intel’s 80286 chip, gave vastly improved performance compared 
with previous models, and within one year had gained 70% of the PC market (Gates, 
1995). The clone producers responded quickly, and price competition became fierce. PCs 
began to be linked together to form networks, and this, coupled with the improving 
price:performance ratio of newer PCs and the emergence of key commercial applications 
(such as the Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet and WordStar word-processing programme) 
                                                 
9 By the early 1980s, there were some 200 mutually incompatible types of PC on the market (Chposky & Leonis 
(1988). Among the more successful of these were those produced by Acorn, Atari, Apple, Commodore, DEC, Eagle, 
Hewlett Packard, NEC, Northstar and Xerox. Of these, only Apple's Macintosh platform has survived as a competitor 
for the PC standard on an international level, and until recently, NEC's 9800 platform as a competitor in the Japanese 
market. 
10 This was due in part to IBM’s shift in strategy from generating revenue from renting computer systems to selling 
them (Mills, 1996). 
11 Within IBM, the responsibility for the design, manufacture and marketing of the PC lay with a ‘special operating 
unit’ within IBM called 'Entry Systems'. Rather than relying upon system components designed and manufactured by 
IBM itself and carefully protecting the design of the overall PC system design, the PC utilised standardised, bought-in 
components from outside (such as the central processor unit from Intel) which gave the PC an 'open architecture' 
design. The operating system (DOS) software was licensed from the (then) small software firm of Microsoft, who were 
free to license DOS to any other firms. 
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transformed these small computers into powerful business tools.  
As the performance of the new PCs improved, the application areas of these small 
machines began to encroach into business areas previously dominated by the large 
computer systems (Chposky & Leonis, 1988). IBM’s response to this unexpected 
technological challenge was to develop a new architecture for its next generation of 
machines, the PS/2, which would be technologically advanced, protected, and 
incompatible with many PC-AT accessories and software12. This, it was hoped, would 
allow IBM to control the hardware standard, and avoid the PC stealing sales from the 
business areas of its other divisions. However, this move came too late, as customers had 
begun to see the potential benefits of having open systems and a wide range of vendors to 
choose between. Customers did not switch to IBM’s new PS/2 system, and the market for 
the PC-AT compatible machines continued to grow. The rapid growth of the PC, well 
beyond the expectations of the majority of the established computer firms, caused the 
structure of the computer industry to change dramatically. Exhibit 2.3 gives a schematic 
view of this “hot ‘new’ industry” (Chposky & Leonis, 1988), as centred on the PC.  
Within this ‘new’ industry, the role of standards became critical. The systemic nature of 
the products required the integrating of components from a wide range of companies, 
each of which had to conform to standards in order for the products to function. The 
networks of computers that were being formed relied upon there being standardised 
formats for the interchange of data and the connecting of components. The acceptance of 
standards became critical:- 
A small handful of the companies supplying components to the network will define and control the 
systems critical architectures, for each specific layer of the system. [..] Companies that control 
proprietary architectural standards have an advantage over other vendors. Since they are usually better 
positioned to develop products that maximise its capabilities; by modifying the architecture, they can 
discipline competing product vendors. In an open system, era, the most consistently successful 
information technology companies will be the ones who manage to establish a proprietary 
architectural standard over a substantial competitive space and defend it against the assaults of both 
                                                 
12 The development of the PS/2 was carried out in conjunction with the development of a new operating system to 
replace MS-DOS - OS/2. 
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clones and rival architectural sponsors (Morris & Ferguson, 1993:88-89. Emphasis added). 
 
 
Exhibit 2.3  The ‘new’ computer industry (based around the PC market) 
Source: Adapted from Intel (1993) 
The emergence of the more user-friendly ‘graphical-user interface’13 coupled with 
increased processing power and emerging ‘multimedia’14 applications pushed up the 
demand for PCs for home use. This has fuelled demand for PCs which is predicted to 
continue well into the next millennium (See Exhibit 2.4).  
This growth is affecting the producers of all components within the PC ‘foodchain’, from 
disk drives to monitors, and memory chips to microprocessors15. The market has become 
extremely dynamic, as customers become more familiar with computers and more 
exacting in their demands for high performance machines at low cost. 
 
                                                 
13 Instead of relying on typed commands, graphical user interfaces (GUI) allow the user to control the functions of the 
computer by positioning a cursor on the screen guided by the movements of a input device - a ‘mouse’. This system 
was pioneered by Xerox, and made a commercial success by Apple with the Macintosh operating system, and 
Microsoft with the Windows operating system. 
14Broadly defined by JETRO (1994) as being "the integration of different information such as graphics, text, sound and 
computer data, and the ability to show, or play it simultaneously". 
15 Tapscott and Caston (1993) describe in more detail the core technologies that make up this PC foodchain. 
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Exhibit 2.4  The predicted growth of the PC industry 
Source: DataQuest, 29/4/96 
The growth of the market for PCs resulted in widespread changes in the computer 
industry. At the same time, there were changes taking place in the consumer electronics 
and telecommunications industries. Driven by transforming technologies, these industries 
were converging to form a ‘new’ industry. Certain aspects of this convergence were 
evident at the time of the acquisitions, but for many firms these changes simply 
represented an increased level of uncertainty within their competitive environment. In the 
1990s, particular driving forces relating to this convergence have become more evident. 
The following section outlines the key factors that have influenced the formation of this 
new and complex competitive environment. 
Convergence towards the ‘digital industry’ 
Firms in industry sectors ranging from computers to consumer electronics, electronic 
devices to telecommunications, and entertainment media to software publishing, 
increasingly find themselves operating within a common competitive environment. This 
shared environment has been labelled the ‘digital industry’ (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). 
The hardware sector of this industry alone has been predicted to be worth over $1 trillion 
by the year 2000 (DataQuest, 9/5/95). It has boundaries which are ill-defined and fluid in 
their behaviour (See Exhibit 2.5).  
Japanese innovation strategy and the acquisition of UK IT firms                                                                                             Chapter 2 
 23 
 
Exhibit 2.5  The merging fields of the digital industry 
Source: Adapted from Apple Computer (1993) 
The industry is usually viewed in terms of the converging sectors of computing, 
telecommunications and consumer electronics. However, it is more helpful for our 
purposes to view it in terms of the devices, content and distribution (See Exhibit 2.6). 
Devices describes the hardware needed to input, process, store and output various forms 
of data. Devices encompass not only the various products which display, record and 
transmit data, but also the components that are joined together to form these devices, such 
as the integrated circuits, display screens and storage systems. 
Content encompasses all the forms of data that are input, processed, stored and output by 
the devices. Content therefore includes application software, video games, TV 
programmes, news services, electronic commerce services and films. 
Distribution includes all means by which the content is passed from one location to 
another. This includes conventional and cellular telephone networks, terrestrial, cable and 
satellite television broadcasting, the Internet and dedicated ‘area networks’. 
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Content Music, films, application software, video games, TV shows, news, electronic commerce. 
Distribution TV (terrestrial, cable, satellite), telecommunications (copper, fibre-optic, cellular), Internet. 
Devices Consumer electronics, computers, electronic components, communication devices. 
Digital integration The switch from analogue to digital core electronic technology. 
Exhibit 2.6  The focus areas of the digital industry 
As the barriers which previously separated the industries of telecommunications, IT and 
consumer electronics begin to dissolve, new opportunities to develop distinct products 
and services are emerging. Which of these product and service areas are likely to take-
off, and which technologies will drive the development of new products and services is 
unclear. The speed and uncertainty of the direction of change within the digital industry 
requires firms to maintain a high level of responsiveness. Firms must develop and 
maintain an organisational structure that allows the firm to respond quickly and 
effectively to changes in technology and competitive conditions. 
Among the forces which are influencing the formation of this industry are: a widespread 
move from analogue to digital core electronic technologies in a variety of product areas; 
changes in the telecommunication industry; the saturation of certain consumer electronic 
product areas; the widespread penetration of the personal computer; the growth of the 
video games industry; and the rapid uptake of the use of the Internet. Each of these areas 
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in described briefly in the following sections. 
Analogue to digital technologies 
It is possible to encode text, graphics, voice, music and video in a binary format - a series 
of 1s and 0s. Once this data has been ‘digitised’, it then becomes possible to store, 
manipulate, transmit and merge this data in many different ways (Cawson, 1994). The 
development of standard formats for the compression of digitised data16 allows the 
movement of this data between media and locations using minimal capacity. Data can be 
stored and transported in a magnetically and optically readable format17. The data can be 
transmitted using conventional (copper wire or fibre-optic) and cellular telephone 
networks, as well as via dedicated data transfer networks (Local Area Networks (LAN), 
Wide Area Networks (WAN)). 
The ability to treat diverse forms of data with a degree of commonality has proved to be 
one of the most powerful forces driving the convergence of diverse sectors to form the 
digital industry. Once data is codified in this way, it becomes possible to move across 
previously impenetrable boundaries between product areas. The possible application 
areas enabled by this switch from analogue to digital technologies are manifold. Firms in 
the digital industry seek to explore ways of making what is already technically possible, 
commercially feasible. 
The key issues relating the move from analogue to digital core electronic technologies to 
the formation of the digital industry can be summarised as:- 
• Digitisation has given text, sound, picture and video data a common format for 
storage, manipulation and transmission. 
• Boundaries between product areas and industry sectors are becoming gradually 
transparent. 
                                                 
16 Standard formats include JPEG for picture data, and MPEG for video data. 
17 These include magnetically coated disk (FD), magnetically coated tape (DAT), optically-readable, surface-coated 
disk (CD, CD-ROM, DVD), magneto-optical disk (MO), phase-change dual technology disk (PD) and various forms of 
integrated circuit memory (Flash, EPROM). 
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• Firms from previously discrete sectors now find it possible to compete and co-operate 
within a common competitive environment. 
Changes in telecommunications 
The deregulation of telecommunication services world-wide has increased the level of 
competition among service providers, who now include cellular and cable telephone 
companies. The value of the core business of carrying voice calls is reducing as 
competition drives both prices and margins down (The Economist, 11/9/93). Telephone 
networks must also be able to provide reliable, fast and capacious links for the transfer of 
computer data around the globe. While it is possible to use existing copper wires to do 
this18, fibre optic networks and satellite links provide a more satisfactory solution for the 
increasing demand for high capacity data transfer over long distances. The cost of 
upgrading all telephone networks to high-bandwidth fibre-optic is very high, and demand 
for it comes at a time when price competition among telecommunications service 
providers is particularly fierce. Telecommunication firms need to find new ways to derive 
profit from the telephone networks through the provision of increasingly wide ranging 
services for the consumer. The fierce competition has led to telecommunications firms 
merging their operations with of those cable TV firms to provide a range of services 
encompassing telephony, television and Internet access19.  
The key issues relating the telecommunications sector to the formation of the digital 
industry can be summarised as:- 
• Deregulation of telephone services world-wide has led to increased competition for 
telecommunication service providers. 
• The spreading of fibre-optic communication technology has enhanced the ability of  
telephone networks to be used for the carrying of high volumes of data. 
                                                 
18 Asymmetrical digital loop subscriber (ADSL) technology allows conventional copper telephone lines to transmit 
reasonably high volumes of data - 6 million bits per second. 
19 An example of this can be seen in the emergent strategy of Cable & Wireless. 
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• Telecommunications firms are being forced to investigate new product and service 
areas to improve their profitability. 
Diffusion of the PC 
The widespread and rapid penetration of the PC (as described earlier) has been a strong 
force in the formation of the digital industry. The market has grown rapidly, and is 
predicted to continue growing into the next century. The emergence of the home-user 
market is pushing the PC into areas previously dominated by the consumer electronics 
firms and video game producers (See Exhibit 2.7). In response to the increasing demand 
for machines whose main purpose is entertainment rather than commercial applications, 
some consumer electronic firms are attempting to produce their own PCs20.  
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Exhibit 2.7  The predicted growth of the US home versus professional PC market  
Source: DataQuest, 19/7/94 
At the same time, PC producers are attempting to make the new generations of PCs more 
of a domestic appliance than a business tool in order to increase the level of market 
penetration. This strategy is illustrated by the emergence of the PC-TV - a PC which is 
capable of receiving and displaying TV broadcasts. In addition, new forms of data 
                                                 
20 E.g., Japan’s Sony announced in 1995 that it would produce a range of PCs aimed firmly at the home user 
(Computer Weekly, 16/11/95). 
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storage, such as the digital video disk (DVD) will also allow the distribution of films on 
disk which can then not only be replayed for display on TVs, but can also be used with 
PCs. As the bandwidth of telecommunication networks increase, it will become possible 
for users to download content in various forms directly to their PCs. 
The key issues relating the PC sector to the formation of the digital industry can be 
summarised as:- 
• High level of penetration of PCs into home and business markets have made the PC 
‘familiar’ to a large and growing population of consumers. 
• Increasing power and versatility of PCs now means that these machines can combine 
the previously separate functions of the devices such as the computer, TV, fax 
machine and video games console. 
• Competition among producers of the hardware devices has become increasingly 
fierce as the devices themselves become increasingly generic. 
Video games 
The video games industry, for long ignored by the mainstream consumer electronics 
sector has grown fast. World-wide sales of games software amount to around £14 billion 
(Durlacher, 1994). The market is split between two categories of hardware platforms: 
dedicated games consoles21 and PCs. Until 1995, the dominant platform was the console, 
but the increased performance of the newer PCs coupled with their widespread diffusion 
has allowed this sector to account for 66% of the games software sold (Durlacher, 1995). 
The overall market for games software has shown rapid growth through the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, but began showing signs of slowing down in the mid-1990s22. This 
slowdown has been due to consumers waiting for the emergence of new console 
                                                 
21 Such as those made by the Japanese firms Sega and Nintendo. 
22 The market for console-based games has been dominated by two Japanese firms - Sega and Nintendo - who between 
them managed to capture 95% of all video games sold between 1990 and 1994 (Bowerdean, 1995). However, problems 
encountered by Nintendo in developing a new generation of machines, coupled with a strong market entry from Sony 
and the growth of the PC-based games market has caused Nintendo to lose its shared dominant position. The three key 
standards for games software are now Sega's Saturn, Sony's Playstation and the PC. 
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machines based on high performance technologies23. 
Emergent areas of business in this sector include the direct provision of software to users 
via cable networks (such as Sega with its Sega Channel) and via the Internet. The latter 
option is increasingly being used by software developers and has the advantage of 
rendering the process of producing copies of ‘hard’ software (i.e., cartridges and CDs) 
redundant. The distribution of software via the Internet and the consequent reduction in 
the need for removable data storage is discussed further on. 
The key issues relating the video and computer games sector to the formation of the 
digital industry are:- 
• Though initially regarded as a niche market, video games have diffused into 
mainstream consumer electronics and PC market sectors. (This may be regarded as an 
indicator of the future potential of other entertainment markets for products of the 
digital industry). 
• Having largely missed the initial games boom, the large consumer electronics firms 
are keen to gain a share of this growing market.  
• The selection of hardware platforms has become less important as the performance of 
PCs and consoles increases, and as cable and Internet distribution takes the place of 
cartridge and CD-ROM software publishing. 
The Internet 
The Internet has emerged from being a relatively obscure network of computers set up by 
the US Department of Defense in the 1960s and used for much of its early years to link 
computers at academic institutions, to one of the fastest growing sectors driving the 
formation of the digital industry. For the first 30 years of its existence the Internet was 
                                                 
23 The market for machines based on 8-, and 16-bit technologies is saturated. Demand is expected to recover with the 
emergence of 32-, and 64-bit machines. The console market is also split between the 'cartridge' market and the CD-
ROM based market. While cartridge offers very high performance, they are more expensive and time-consuming to 
develop and produce when compared with CD-ROM. Cartridges typically cost the software developers $33 and take 8 
weeks to produce. CDs cost under $10 and take only one week to produce (Investor’s Business Daily, 18/9/96). 
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used primarily for electronic mail - the transfer of text data from one computer to another. 
The development of graphics, video and audio transfer capability in the 1990s24, coupled 
with the widespread diffusion of PC, has led to a sharp increase in the use of the Internet 
(See Exhibit 2.8).  
The emergence of the use of Internet technology for communication within 
geographically dispersed organisations - ‘intranets’ - is one particular area that has shown 
unanticipated levels of growth (Nikkei Business, 18/3/96). 
Software publishers are becoming increasingly keen to use the Internet for the direct 
distribution of software25. Direct distribution provides a means for publishing software 
without the need to produce large quantities of floppy, or compact disks. Upgrades can be 
directly sent to users’ computers, and the on-line link provides software developers with a 
potentially more reliable form of market research than that provided by software 
registration cards26.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 The World Wide Web ('WWW', or 'Web'), developed by CERN in Switzerland in 1991, provides a system of 
protocols to allow the transfer of linked 'pages' of data between computers. These pages may contain text, graphics, 
audio and video data. 
25 Interview with Godfrey, 25/4/96. 
26 Certain firms, including Oracle Systems and Sun Microsystems, believe that the Internet will be able to provide 
users with all the software they need - the PC will be replaced by a ‘network computer’ (NC) which will download all 
the elements of the software it requires, as and when they are needed. This will avoid the need for complex and largely 
unused software to reside within individual PC hard disk storage space. It will also remove the requirement for PCs to 
be complex devices, or ‘thick clients’ - comprising hard drives, large memories, and complex operating systems. The 
NC will be a ‘thin client’, consisting of only a processor, limited memory requirement and some form of 
communication circuitry in the form of a modem or Ethernet card (Financial Times, 2/10/96). 
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Exhibit 2.8  Growth of the Internet (as measured by number of computer hosts) 
Source: Network Wizards, 1996. 
The use of the Internet for software distribution illustrates a wider trend in computing. It 
can be thought of as representing the latest upheaval in a series of changes that have 
punctuated the development of the computer industry (as described earlier). The 
emergence of the mainframe, then the minicomputer and open systems based computing, 
marked the key technologies that have defined the evolution of the IT industry. The 
growth in use of the Internet has provided the latest contribution to an emerging paradigm 
shift27 and this transformation has been largely software driven. The linking of computers 
which form the framework of the Internet has been in place for many years, but it was the 
development of the ‘browser’ software which provided the impetus for the widespread 
penetration of the Internet28. In addition, the Internet is changing the way software itself 
is written and distributed. By providing software applications via the Internet in small self 
contained units (‘applets’) when called for by the user, the nature of software itself is 
changing. Most importantly, these applets are hardware and operating system 
independent. Software applications become effectively tailor-made for individual users, 
                                                 
27 This emergent paradigm shift can be regarded as a development within the fourth Kondratieff wave (Hall & Preston, 
1988). 
28 Though the 'web' was developed in 1989, and its first implementation appeared publicly in 1990, it did not receive 
widespread popular use until the software browser NCSA Mosaic became available in 1993 (Gray, 1996). 
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regardless of which system they may be using. 
The key issues relating the Internet to the formation of the digital industry are:- 
• The Internet arguably represents a key contribution to the emerging paradigm shift in 
the computer industry. 
• Access to the Internet will continue to widen with the diffusion of PCs with modems, 
NCs and WebTVs29. 
• The identification of those Internet services which will succeed and become 
commercially viable remains unclear. 
Saturation of markets for consumer electronics 
For consumer electronics (CE) firms, digitisation has provided a whole range of potential 
new product areas at a time when the demand for existing products based on analogue 
technologies, such as conventional TV and video cassette recorders (VCRs), is becoming 
saturated (Financial Times, 26/10/93). If we consider the four types of CE products 
identified by Cawson (1994), it is clear that the development of all types of product is 
being influenced by the spread of digitisation (See Exhibit 2.9).  
 
Type Stand-alone Software-dependent Broadcast-dependent Network-dependent 
 
• Camcorder 
• Digital 
camcorder  
• Electronic 
calculator. 
• PC 
• CD player,  
• DVD player,  
• Tape recorder,  
• VCR. 
• TV  
• Radio  
• VCR. 
• Fax  
• Cellular phone 
• NC. 
Exhibit 2.9  A typology of consumer electronic products 
Source: Adapted from Cawson (1994) 
The quest for new growth areas has pushed the CE firms outside the boundaries of their 
‘traditional’ areas of expertise30. The video games market was, to a large extent, 
                                                 
29 A hybrid device which consist of a TV with the additional hardware and embedded software required to allow the 
device to capture and display data from the Internet. 
30 In their search for potential growth areas based on digital technology, there have been successes and failures. The 
development of the audio CD market, which was built-up upon the early agreement on standards between the two 
major protagonists (Sony and Phillips), and which had the backing of the music industry, provides a highly successful 
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overlooked by the large CE firms. These CE firms did not identify the growth potential of 
this market, and lacked the expertise to develop the high quality software (Nikkei Weekly, 
17/4/95). However, as the video games industry grew a number of CE firms attempted to 
enter the market. The dominance in the market of the effective duopoly formed by Sega 
and Nintendo provided stiff competition for new entrants to the market in the mid-1990s. 
Japanese firms including Matsushita, NEC, Victor and Sony attempted to enter the 
market, but only Sony has been able to achieve any large scale success in recent years 
(Nikkei Weekly, 7/11/94). 
Small, hand-held computers, or Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), represent one 
product area for CE firms which is believed to hold great potential. These devices 
combine the function of a personal organiser with word-processing and communication 
capabilities. A problem to be overcome to allow the widespread diffusion of these 
devices is the present lack of agreement for standard operating systems (Nikkei Weekly, 
3/10/96).  
As stated earlier, the Internet has acted in many ways as a catalyst for the formation of 
the diverse sectors that make up the digital industry. One way in which its effects are 
being felt in the CE sector is through the widespread development of ‘Web TVs’. These 
devices combine the function of a TV with the hardware and software required to access 
the Internet. CE firms including Phillips, Samsung, Sony and Mitsubishi Electric are all 
developing machines that will function in this way (Multimedia Week, 2/9/96)31.  
The key issues relating the consumer electronics sector to the formation of the digital 
industry are:- 
                                                 
example. The CD largely wiped out the vinyl LP record as the dominant form of music storage. However, the CD 
market itself is now reaching saturation point, and of the much heralded prospective replacement products, none have 
really caught on. Digital Audio Tape (DAT), Mini-Disk (MD) and Digital Compact Cassette (DCC) have all been 
pushed by various CE firms, but none have achieved market penetration to any great extent. The latest hope for a 
storage device which will provide the impetus for the development of a new range of consumer electronics products is 
the Digital Video Disk (DVD). Products based on this new storage media are now reaching consumers in selected 
markets (Nikkei Weekly, 4/9/96). 
31 CE firms are thus leveraging their skills to derive benefit from the Internet in two ways. One option is to develop 
PCs with enhanced multimedia capabilities (fast processors, large memory and storage capacity, dedicated audio and 
video cards). The other option is to enhance the functionality of TVs to include the ability to access the Internet. 
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• Saturation of certain product areas of the analogue electronics sectors has provided 
the impetus for CE firms to aggressively seek out new product areas based on digital 
electronic technologies. 
• Digitisation has broken down the barriers between sectors, and allowed CE firms to 
leverage their skills into sectors previously dominated by computer firms. 
• The Internet provides a whole new media for CE products to be built around. 
Electronic devices 
The continued growth within industry sectors that are combining to form the digital 
industry has fuelled demand for the various core components that form the core of the 
hardware devices. Of these, the semiconductors and display devices form two of the 
largest markets.  
The dominant technology at present for display devices remains the cathode ray tube 
(CRT). Despite the fact that this technology dates back over 50 years, the CRT is still the 
main form of display device for the majority of TVs and computer monitors. Emerging as 
a replacement for CRT is the flat panel display. Flat displays come in two main forms: 
liquid crystal displays (LCDs) and plasma panel displays (PDPs). It is predicted that these 
flat panels will, at some point in the near future, replace the CRT for use as TV and 
computer display devices (See Exhibit 2.10). 
Major uses for semiconductors in CE products, PCs and various telecommunication-
related devices include memory chips, microprocessors, application specific integrated 
circuits (ASICs), and audio and video chips. The market for semiconductors derived from 
the anticipated emergence of the DVD related devices alone is forecast to be $3.6 billion 
by the year 2000 (DataQuest, 22/7/96). The maturing market for PCs and the advancing 
technologies of video games are still providing a large market for semiconductor 
manufacturers (DataQuest, 14/8/95). 
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Exhibit 2.10  World-wide shipments of computer monitors 
Source: The Economist (24/8/96) (Approximate data only) 
Although demand for DRAM chips is cyclical (leading to dramatic peaks and troughs in 
demand32), the market for high capacity memory chips is predicted to continue to grow as 
increasingly ‘memory-hungry’ software for PCs continues to be developed. There has 
been a split between the producers of the memory chips (DRAM, EPROM, SRAM, 
Flash), and those who produce the processor chips (microprocessors and 
microcontrollers). Higher added value chips such as microprocessors and 
microcontrollers provide the producers with a product which is less likely to suffer from 
the dramatic price swings of the basic memory chips. 
The key issues relating the electronic devices sector to the formation of the digital 
industry are:- 
• Firms producing bulk, commodity, memory chips, such as DRAM, are highly 
susceptible to the market’s dramatic demand swings. 
• Semiconductor firms are seeking out new technologies and attempting to identify 
                                                 
32 4M DRAM chip prices in June 1996 were down 60% on the previous year due to excess capacity (Investor’s 
Business Daily 12/6/96). Problems stem from a shift in demand towards the higher capacity chips. Demand for 4M 
chips is falling, as the demand for 16M and 64M chips increases (Nikkei Weekly, 8/10/96). Such shifts in demand from 
consumers (i.e., the product assemblers) can cause delayed knock-on effects for the chip manufacturers. Coupled with 
this is the leap-frogging of generations of chips. Samsung recently announced a functional 1 gigabit DRAM, which is 
effectively three generations ahead of 16 megabit chips (Nikkei Weekly, 5/11/96). 
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which products, or product areas these can be built into. 
• The increasing demand for flat panel displays provides an opportunity for those firms, 
predominately Japanese, who have invested heavily in this area.  
Storage media 
In the past, the separate industry sectors of consumer electronics and computing had their 
own standards for the storage of data, e.g., video data was stored in analogue form on 
magnetic tape, and computer data was stored in digital format on magnetically coated 
disks or tape. With the diffusion of digitisation throughout industry sectors, it has become 
possible for storage standards to cross platform boundaries. One of the first and most 
successful examples of this has been the CD, which has moved from being a device used 
for the storage of digitised music, to a high capacity storage device for PCs. The DVD is 
predicted to be another device conforming to a standard which encompasses both the 
needs of the consumer electronics sector as well as the computer sector. 
A wider trend observed as convergence continues is for the data to be stored away from 
the user. For example, the Internet potentially provides a vast ‘virtual’ storage space for 
data, remote from the individual user, and advances in distribution technology mean that 
it is possible to have ‘video-on-demand’ at locations remote from the source. Firms who 
have focused exclusively in the past on the provision of data storage media for the 
individual users are now having to find alternative ways of deriving value from their 
skills. In addition, the use of storage media for the distribution of software is declining as 
the Internet becomes a viable means of direct distribution33. 
The key issues relating the data storage media sector to the formation of the digital 
industry are:- 
• There has been an emergence of cross-platform standards for removable data storage. 
                                                 
33 In November 1996, ‘Egghead Inc.’ became the first major software retailer to deliver its programmes directly to the 
customer via the Internet. Analysts predict that within twelve months, the Internet will account for 20% of software 
sales (Wall Street Journal, 8/11/96). 
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• There is a wide array of choices for the computer users, as the fight for the definition 
of new standards intensifies. 
• The wider trend of shifting the data storage requirements away from the individual 
users. 
From hardware to software 
Hardware and software, or devices and content have been mutually reinforcing elements 
within the demand system for computers and certain types of CE products. Demand for 
new devices is dependent upon there being content available to use with them. Yet 
content will not be developed unless there is widespread diffusion of the required 
devices. For example, PCs only began to achieve respectable levels of diffusion once 
various key software applications became available. Once this had occurred, then demand 
for the software fuelled demand for the hardware and visa versa (Cringely, 1992). The 
computing, consumer electronics and telecommunications industries are predicting a 
general shift of the profitable areas of their businesses from being located within the 
devices side, to the content and distribution side34:- 
It is the owners of the networks who will be the main beneficiaries of the multimedia age, followed by 
those who provide the services (Nobuyuki Idei, Managing Director of Sony, as quoted in Financial 
Times, 2/11/94). 
The key issues relating the changing relationship between the hardware and software 
industries to the formation of the digital industry are:- 
• There is a general trend towards the hardware products becoming more generic in 
nature. 
• There is a high degree of uncertainty as to which of the ‘service sectors’ within the 
digital industry will actually take-off and provide the most lucrative areas for firms to 
operate within. 
• Hardware firms may face problems when attempting to acquire the relevant skills in 
                                                 
34 Interview with Shimpo, 1993; Goto, 1996; Davison, 1996; Godfrey, 1996. See Appendix II for details of interviews. 
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the provision and distribution of content. 
Alliances within the digital industry 
Four interrelated features of the digital industry can be identified from the information 
given in the previous sections - uncertain, dynamic, open and international.  
1. Firms operating within this industry are faced with a competitive environment which 
is highly uncertain. It is extremely difficult in a competitive environment such as this 
to predict future trends accurately, and develop a strategy which allows firms to 
maintain competitive advantage in the medium- to long-term. One of the clearest 
illustrations of this unpredictability is the unexpectedly fast growth of the Internet and 
‘spin-off’ developments such as ‘intranets’, and the resultant new patterns of software 
development and distribution. Products developed within the digital industry will tend 
to be systemic in nature, i.e., their diffusion is dependent upon various 
complementary innovations (Chesbrough & Teece, 1996). An example of this was 
discussed earlier in relation to PCs, which only began achieving market penetration 
once ‘killer applications’ had been developed. Not only is the success of a given 
product dependent upon complementary innovations, but there is also the need to 
consider standards. As was stated earlier:- 
[..] competitive success flows to the company that manages to establish proprietary 
architectural control over a broad, fast-moving competitive space (Morris & Ferguson, 
1993:87). 
Proprietary architectural control is not the same as maintaining a closed system, rather it 
refers to the need to provide a dominant design, to which others will conform in order 
to present the consumer with a connectable product range. Attempting to identify 
which technologies will emerge to become the de facto standards is a challenge 
facing all firms in this competitive environment. 
2. A second characteristic of the digital industry is the speed at which these changes in 
direction are occurring. The time between new technologies (or new combinations of 
existing technologies) being developed, these technologies reaching the market in the 
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form of new products or services, and these products or services becoming first 
technologically and then commercially obsolete is shortening (von Braun, 1990). This 
trend is noticeable in many industry sectors but is particularly prevalent in the 
competitive environment created by convergence towards the digital industry. 
3. Linked with this fast pace of change is the third feature of the digital industry; the 
need for firms to have an organisational structure which is open, flexible and able to 
respond to changes by rapidly developing new products or services. In high 
technology industries, there is often a time-lag before products based upon new 
technologies reach the consumer. It may take time for agreements on standards for 
products and services based upon the new technologies to be defined. However, once 
these standards have been agreed, there is a need to introduce the new product or 
service to the market as quickly as possible. To do this effectively may well require 
close collaboration with other firms (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). 
4. The ‘new industrial competition’ described by Clark & Fujimoto (1991) stressed the 
way in which firms increasingly have little choice in deciding whether to compete 
internationally. In the digital industry this is predicted to be particularly true. As the 
technologies of the devices become more generic in nature they require a global 
presence to derive sufficient volume for economies of scale. Software and other 
forms of content require customisation to local needs. 
These four features conspire to create a competitive environment within which it is 
particularly difficult for firms to formulate effective strategies. This environment presents 
a paradox for firms: in some ways it favours the small, nimble firm which is able to 
respond rapidly to signals from the market, or to apply emerging technologies into niche 
opportunity areas (Mills, 1996). In other ways, it would seem to favour the large firm, 
which is able to maintain a wide portfolio of skills which it can lever into opportunity 
areas as and when they emerge. However, the diversity of skills and assets required to 
compete effectively in this convergent environment are so wide that no one firm can hold 
all these skills and assets internally while maintaining a structure that provides the 
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required level of responsiveness to changing conditions. 
This paradox facing a firm attempting to compete in this complex competitive 
environment (which requires firms to maintain the responsiveness of a small firm with 
the wide-reaching skills and assets of a large firm) is one that can be addressed though 
the use of alliances:- 
Today, few companies can afford to develop internally all the technologies that might provide an 
advantage in the future. In every company we studied, we found a mix of approaches: Some 
technologies were “purchased” from other companies; others were acquired through licences, 
partnerships and alliances; and still other critical technologies were developed internally (Chesbrough 
& Teece, 1996:70-71). 
Alliances35 provide a means for firms operating within conditions of uncertainty and 
change to tackle complex business opportunities that would otherwise be impossible, or 
at least impractical for them to manage alone36. In some cases, the development of a 
complete product segment has been dependent from very early in the development 
process upon having a number firms knitted into alliances, e.g., the development of High 
Definition Television (HDTV) (Cawson, 1994). The high level of use of alliances as the 
process of convergence accelerates can be regarded as a feature of the digital industry 
(Hamel & Prahalad, 1994).  
Within each of the areas of devices, networks and content, links are being made. For 
example, alliances are being formed between firms whose core businesses can be 
regarded as devices, such as microprocessor chip manufacturers forming links with PC 
manufacturers. Links have also be formed between firms within differing focus areas, 
such as the links between Sony (devices) and CBS Records (content), as well as the BBC 
(content and distribution networks) and ICL (devices and distribution services). 
Alliances within this industry allow firms to derive benefit in a number of ways, as are 
                                                 
35 Here used to encompass a range of strategic tie-ups including loose 'agreements', through formalised joint ventures 
through to outright acquisition of ownership of an external firm. 
36 The extent to which firms operating within this industry believe that alliances in the form of M&A are important was 
revealed in a recent survey by one M&A advisory service. This revealed that an astonishing 72% of companies 
operating in the IT industry were planning to use M&A within the following 12 months (Investor’s Business Daily, 
19/12/96, as reported in Educom newsgroup). 
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illustrated in the following sections. 
Spreading of risk and cost.  
The uncertainty of the competitive climate in which firms are operating and the cost of 
investing in emerging technologies has acted as an impetus for the forming of alliances 
among firms who were competing in the same markets. For example, the cost of 
developing the new generation of DRAM chips, as well as the high costs of producing 
existing chips in a market susceptible to dramatic swings in demand has led to the 
formation of a swathe of alliances between chip producers. These include a tie-up 
between IBM (US), Siemens (Germany) and Toshiba (Japan) to develop the ‘next 
generation’ 256M DRAM chips (Financial Times, 20/6/95), and the tie-ups between 
NEC (Japan) and Samsung (South Korea) to share facilities in the production of 4M and 
16M DRAM chips as well as the development the 256M DRAM chips (Financial Times, 
14/2/95). 
Hedging bets.  
Such is the level of uncertainty within the competitive environment leading to the 
formation of the digital industry that firms may be forced to gain, or have access to skills 
in a wide range of emerging technologies. The identification of which of these emerging 
technologies will be important is highly problematic. Firms therefore may choose to 
invest in, or form links with, a wide range of firms specialising in emerging technologies 
to avoid missing an opportunity area. An example of this form of motive for forming 
alliances can be seen in the case of General Magic. General Magic was founded in 1990 
as a spin-off from Apple Computer in the US to develop a software platform for PDAs as 
well as an ‘agent-based’ programming language for use over telecommunication 
networks. As both these areas have yet to achieve widespread penetration37, many firms 
                                                 
37 General Magic's 'agent-based' programming language, Telescript, was originally designed for use over 
telecommunication networks, and consequently received widespread interest from telecommunication firms (as is 
shown in Exhibit 2.11). However, the rapid growth of the Internet has shifted the focus of attention for these firms. Sun 
Microsystems have developed a programming language, called Java, which provides a similar functionality for Internet 
users and which is, unlike Telescript, achieving high levels of penetration (The Economist, 3/2/96). 
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have been keen to make certain that they have access to these technologies for when (and 
if) the market takes-off (See Exhibit 2.11). 
 
 
Exhibit 2.11  General Magic alliance partners 
Source: General Magic (1996). 
Achievement of ‘critical mass’ 
In certain areas of this competitive environment it is necessary for firms to achieve a 
given size if they are to be able to compete effectively. Using the example of PC 
manufacturing, it has been recognised that as the products themselves become ever-more 
generic, with prices and margins being driven downwards, it is necessary for firms 
operating in this sector to achieve a size which allows them to benefit from certain 
economies of scale, such as cost benefits in component procurement. Also, the 
requirement for a global presence and the need to provide a full product range may drive 
firms together. An example of this can be seen in the alliance (and subsequent merger) 
between NEC in Japan and Packard Bell in the US to form a global PC manufacturing 
operation (DataQuest, 13/6/96). 
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Internalising new skills 
Aside from having access to emerging technologies through alliance partners, a firm may 
also use alliances as a way of internalising some particular skill. By working with a 
partner who has skills and knowledge in a particular area, a firm may be able to 
internalise those skills and knowledge. As the speed of change grows ever faster, it 
becomes increasingly necessary for firms to be able to internalise skills rapidly from 
external sources:- 
Product development cycles now commonly exceed product life cycles, making it necessary to 
acquire new technologies to avoid missing a window of opportunity (Representative of Broadview 
Associates, M&A analysts, as quoted in Financial Times, 1/2/96). 
An example of this can be seen in Apple Computer’s development of a notebook sized 
computer. Apple realised the potential market that a product built around the ‘Macintosh’ 
design might have, but was unable to develop such a product itself. A link was made with 
Sony, a firm renowned for its skills in miniaturisation, who developed Apple’s first 
generation of notebook-sized computer. Subsequent generations of Apple’s notebook 
computer were able to draw upon skills and knowledge internalised through working with 
Sony. 
Positive reinforcement, or ‘synergistic benefits’ 
There have been a number of alliances formed between those firms which have 
concentrated on the production of devices, and those firms whose core business lies in the 
provision of content in some form or another (Nikkei Weekly, 31/10/94, Financial Times, 
26/10/93). In the early 1990s, a number of such alliances were formed between Japanese 
consumer electronics producers and various Hollywood film studios. These were 
motivated by a desire to either achieve some form of synergistic benefit from having 
content providers and device producers in close contact, or by the desire to have a 
positive feedback cycle in operation. Such a feedback cycle was believed to provide those 
firms involved in the forming of the alliance with benefits in pushing a given new 
standard of devices, For example, the level of demand for new consumer electronics 
devices is often low until consumers can be convinced that there will be sufficient content 
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available for them to warrant purchasing such a device. By having content providers and 
device producers in close connection, it was believed that technology trajectories could 
be more easily predicted and strategy more easily formulated. One example of this can be 
seen in Sony’s acquisition of CBS Records, and the subsequent development of the 
MiniDisk, a candidate for the replacement of the CD. 
Thus, it can be seen that the features of the competitive environment leading to the 
formation of the digital industry indicate clearly the requirement for successful firms to 
be competent at, among other business skills, the managing of alliances. 
Japanese firms within the digital industry 
In this section, a brief overview is given of the strengths and weaknesses of Japanese high 
technology firms with respect to their ability to compete in the digital industry. The use 
of alliance within each of these sections is highlighted where appropriate. The aim here is 
not to detail exhaustively the strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese firms attempting 
to operate in this sector. Rather, it is to point towards certain weaknesses that are being 
rectified through the use of alliances. 
Devices 
One of Japan’s most successful post-war achievements has been the growth of its 
consumer electronics (CE) firms. CE firms have achieved high levels of penetration in 
the markets for a wide range of audio and video (AV) products (Ohsono, 1995)38. CE 
firms have been able to develop or internalise a range of skills and technologies in the 
production of a wide variety of CE goods. The strength of the Japanese CE firms has 
been their ability to produce well designed, quality products at a reasonable price for the 
demanding Japanese consumers.  
Japan’s CE firms are leading in the development of DVD products for home use (Nikkei 
Weekly, 4/9/96). CE firms hope that the DVD sector, in the form of video and audio 
                                                 
38 AV covers a spectrum of products which includes TVs, VCRs, video cameras, radios, and record, tape and CD 
players. 
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players for home use, as well as DVD-ROMs for computers will revitalise the CE market.  
While many CE sectors have been dominated by the large firms such as Matsushita, 
Sanyo, Sharp and Sony, international success has also been captured by relatively small 
firms such as Sega and Nintendo in the market for video games (as discussed earlier, and 
in Durlacher, 1994;1995). 
The Japanese IT industry has, with government assistance, been highly successful in 
domestic and, to a certain extent, international markets39. Fujitsu - “Japan’s IBM” is 
ranked as the world’s second largest computer manufacturer (Nikkei Weekly, 13/9/93). 
Combining the strengths of the CE firms with those of the IT industry is resulting in a 
situation where Japanese firms should be able to produce the appropriate products for the 
digital industry. Japanese firms are seeking alliances not only domestically, but also 
internationally to harness the combined strengths of CE and IT firms. Two illustrations of 
this can be seen in the alliances between Fujitsu (IT) and Sharp (CE), and Toshiba (CE & 
IT) and Apple (IT) (Nikkei Weekly 31/1/94 & 21/11/94). Some commentators are 
observing that it may be the CE sector which advances the speed of convergence towards 
the digital industry:- 
Traditional PC makers have probably pushed the consumer market as far as they can. It will take 
outsiders with consumer electronics experience like Toshiba and Sony to break into the larger 
consumer market (Andy Grove, CEO of US chip-maker Intel, as quoted in Fortune, 28/10/96). 
In the field of office automation, Japanese firms have achieved remarkable successes. 
Aside from word processors and office desktop PCs for the domestic market, firms in this 
sector have achieved international success in laptop computers, laser printers, bubble-jet 
printers, photocopiers and calculators (Ohsono, 1995). Exhibit 2.12 gives a schematic 
view of the strengths held by Japanese firms, and how they may to be combined with the 
skills held by non-Japanese firms to form the typical integrated products of the digital 
industry. 
                                                 
39 See Anchordoguy, 1989; Fransman 1990; 1995 for details of the development of the Japanese IT industry. 
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Exhibit 2.12  Competences required in the development of ‘multimedia’ hardware 
Source:  Japan Development Bank (1995) 
One of the Japanese firms’ core strengths has been in the manufacture of the components 
that combine to form the devices of the digital industry. Details of two of these are 
highlighted in the following sections. 
The first of these is the strengths held by Japanese firms in semiconductor technology. 
Japanese firms have gained a large share of the market for semiconductors. 
Semiconductors can be viewed as an essential ‘raw material’ for the devices that make up 
the hardware side of the digital industry. As can be seen from Exhibit 2.13, five out of the 
top ten producers of semiconductor devices are Japanese.  
 
 
Firm Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Intel US 5 4 1 1 1 1 
NEC Japan 1 1 2 2 2 2 
Toshiba Japan 2 2 3 4 3 3 
Hitachi Japan 3 3 5 5 5 4 
Motorola US 4 5 4 3 4 5 
Samsung South Korea - - - 7 7 6 
TI US 7 7 6 6 6 7 
Fujitsu Japan 6 6 7 8 8 8 
Mitsubishi Japan 8 8 8 9 9 9 
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Electric 
Philips Netherlands 9 10 - - - 10 
                                                               Numbers refer to ranking within top ten by sales 
Exhibit 2.13  World semiconductor rankings 
Source:  Asahi (1994-5) 
If the figures for semiconductor devices as used in consumer electronics are separated 
from those used in industrial electronics, the dominance of the Japanese firms can be seen 
to be even greater (See Exhibit 2.14). 
 
Company Country 1995 Revenue 1995 Market Share (%) 
Toshiba Japan 3,286 13.4 
NEC Japan 2,710 11.0 
Matsushita Japan 1,905 7.7 
Phillips Netherlands 1,724 7.0 
Sanyo Japan 1,613 6.6 
Others     - 13,375 54.3 
Total  24,613 100.0 
Exhibit 2.14  Semiconductor vendors for consumer electronics 
Source: DataQuest, 20/8/96. 
The Japanese semiconductor firms have tended to focus efforts on the production of 
DRAM chips, and to seek out ways of increasing the capacity of these chips (See Exhibit 
2.15). There has been a negative and positive side to Japan’s dominance of the market for 
memory chips. On the positive side, having skills and large capacity in the manufacture 
of the ‘raw material’ required for almost all products in the digital industry has put the 
Japanese in a very strong position. On the negative side, excessive reliance on a product 
for which demand is highly volatile has led to restructuring by the major chip 
manufacturers (Nikkei Weekly, 18/9/96). 
 
Country Processor semiconductors 
(% share of world-wide production) 
Memory semiconductors 
(% share of world-wide production) 
US  67 15 
Japan 28 62 
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Exhibit 2.15  US-Japan division of semiconductor memory and devices 
Source: Japan Development Bank (1995) 
The second component group in which Japanese firms have developed competence and 
market share is that of display devices. Emerging as a replacement for CRT, based on 
technology some 50 years old but which still provides the display devices for the majority 
of TVs and computer monitors, is the flat panel display. Japanese firms dominate both 
LCD and PDP markets (Nikkei Weekly, 31/10/96), and it is predicted that these panels 
will, as described earlier, replace the CRT for use as a TV and computer display devices. 
Content 
Japanese firms have strengths in niche areas of content for the products of the digital 
industry, such as video games software. In other areas of content, such as application 
software40 and film production, the Japanese have been less successful. One of the key 
forces driving convergence, the growth of the Internet, illustrates the problems facing 
Japanese firms.  
Japan, compared to many Western countries, has been slow to adopt the Internet owing to 
a number of factors. These include the fact that the Internet is largely based on the 
English language, fewer than 10% of Japanese computers are linked to a network of any 
kind, and fewer than 10% of Japanese offices are computerised (Financial Times, 
22/1/96, with reference to 1995 data)41. Japan’s slowness to embrace the Internet points 
to a wider problem for Japanese firms. As the growth has been so rapid, and driven by 
small, nimble firms able to spot opportunities and derive profit from them, there has been 
little time for long-, or even medium-term planning. The Japanese government has set up 
study groups to analyse the potential impact of the Internet on Japanese business 
                                                 
40 Lack of strengths in certain type of software causes problems when it comes to developing products based upon 
open standards. This can be seen in the struggle for the development of an operating system for small, handheld 
computers, or personal digital assistants (PDAs). Japanese firms, in order to ensure that their contribution to this sector 
of the digital industry is internationally compatible have sought to join US based consortia for the development of the 
basic operating system for these machines. This can be seen in the alliances that surround ‘Windows CE’ and ‘Magic 
Cap’ (Nikkei Weekly, 3/10/96). 
41 However, others argue that Japan is adapting fast to changing conditions:- “Japan is second only to the United States 
in the number of companies investing in developing highway building blocks and the highway’s content” (Gates, 
1995:237).  
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(Financial Times, 22/1/96). However, the dynamic nature of the Internet related business 
opportunities are such that by the time these groups report back, the situation will have 
advanced to a new level. Such a fast moving environment is ill-suited to slow, meticulous 
planning. 
Aware of the increasing importance of the provision of content, some Japanese firms 
have sought to gain access to the ‘soft’ resources of film and music through the use of 
acquisitions (Ohsono, 1995). The foray by Japanese firms including Sony, Matsushita 
and Pioneer into the US film-making industry has highlighted the problems faced by 
Japanese firms seeking to gain access to the content sector of the digital industry. All 
three of these firms invested heavily in US film studios, but have faced mounting 
financial losses resulting from inexperience in dealing with an “alien business culture” 
(Nikkei Weekly, 31/10/94). However, it has not been completely unsuccessful; Sony’s 
purchase of CBS records allowed the Japanese firm to ensure that there would be a 
reasonable amount of content available for its Mini Disk (MD). 
Networks 
The deregulation of the Japanese telephone industries in 1986 has resulted in a similar 
situation facing Japanese telephone companies as is facing their global competitors. As 
was discussed earlier, telecommunication firms are facing intense and increasing 
competition. There is a need to find ways of deriving profit from the telephone networks 
other than from the carrying of voice data. Also, the up-grading of existing copper lines 
to fibre-optic to give high bandwidth links to Japanese homes and offices has faced 
problems in funding (The Engineer, 23/9/93)42.  
Japan’s giant telephone company, NTT, has been seeking ways to smooth its passage into 
the digital industry by seeking out alliance partners overseas, in order to broaden its range 
of competences and potential product and service areas. Examples of such alliances 
                                                 
42 The problems rest in deciding the spilt between public and private sector funding. Gates (1995) contends that:- “Any 
Government getting involved will need to track new developments and be prepared to shift directions. Such flexibility 
required technological expertise that, with the attendant risks, is better covered by industry” (Gates, 1995:239). 
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include NTT’s links with General Magic (See earlier Exhibit 2.11) and other US firms 
who have “superior software skills” to NTT (Nikkei Weekly, 31/1/94). Such skills are 
hoped to provide the Japanese firms with a positive feedback loop to increase demand for 
their products and services. An example of this is Sony’s publicised wish to see NTT 
begin a communications service based on General Magic’s software, thus driving demand 
for more products to use with this communication network (Nikkei Weekly, 31/1/94). 
General comments 
Certain points relating to the strategies of Japanese companies attempting to compete in 
the fast moving and uncertain environment leading to the formation of the digital industry 
can be drawn from the points raised in the previous sections. It has been argued that 
certain features of Japanese firms that have given them competitive advantage in the past 
may result in these same firms being ill-suited to operating in a dynamic and uncertain 
environment. Using the case of the PC industry, Cringely (1992) illustrates this point:- 
The Japanese have grown rich in other industries by moving into established markets with products 
that are a little better and a little cheaper, but in the PC business the continual question that needs 
asking is, “Better than what?” Last years model? This years? Next years? By the time [they] think 
they have a sense of what to aim for, the state of the art has usually changed (Cringely, 1992:16). 
This view of what is required to be successful in the digital industry is supported by the 
CEO of the US firm Silicon Graphics:- 
Long term product planning in our business is dangerous [..] because it forces companies to make 
wild guesses about what customers might want. [..] Long term planning weds companies to 
approaches and technologies too early, which is deadly in our marketplace and others. No one can 
plan in the future. Three years is long term. Even two years may be. Five years is laughable (Ed 
McCracken, as quoted in Prokesch, 1993:137). 
This contrasts starkly with the methodical planning and slow consensus building that has 
been identified as a core strength of Japanese manufacturing firms. It becomes clear that 
Japanese firms, basing their strategies on “adaptive persistence” (Pascale, 1984) may find 
the increasingly fast moving and uncertain environment of the digital industry hard to 
compete in using skills developed for  more clearly segmented and maturing industries:-  
[..] in the fast moving world, by the time you’ve [reached consensus] its too late, because the world 
has changed. [..] If you’re building a mainframe computer with a 5 or 7 year cycle, then that isn’t a 
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problem. If you’re dealing with a world of [the digital industry] where things change very quickly 
then this isn’t a clever characteristic to have (Interview with Davison, 28/2/96). 
It begins to become clearer that following analysis of the nature of the digital industry 
that certain Japanese firms may find themselves ill-suited to competing within this fast 
moving environment. The use of alliances by Japanese firms is one way in which they are 
seeking to learn new skills to allow them to compete in this new industry. 
Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter has been to provide a brief description of the change in the 
competitive environment of the IT industry at the time of the acquisitions and in the years 
following. A fair description of this complex environment warrants much greater analysis 
than it is possible to provide within the constraints of space of this dissertation. This 
chapter has thus only aimed to provide a view of certain key factors pertinent to 
addressing the research questions. 
  52 
Chapter 3 Literature review 
Chapter overview 
The focus of this Chapter is an exploration of the literature which examines the strategic options 
open to firms attempting to maintain growth in the face of a fast changing environment.  
Following the examination of the various generic strategic options open to a firm, attention is 
brought to rest on two specific areas of strategic management. Firstly, as the changes in the 
environment were driven by emerging technologies, this review examines the role of innovation 
management. Secondly, as the core of this research is a consideration of the strategic use of 
corporate acquisitions, the review also highlights the complex management issues presented by 
the strategic use of acquisitions. 
In summary, the literature reveals that corporate acquisitions represent what would seem to be 
an effective way to enhance the ability of a firm to innovate by providing a means to access new 
technologies and knowledge. Acquisitions also represent an effective way for a firm to reposition 
itself with respect to its environment in conditions of rapid change through diversification and 
internationalisation. However, the extreme difficulty faced in integrating the acquisitions may 
negate this effectiveness. For Japanese firms in particular, cultural factors result in the strategic 
use of international corporate acquisitions being fraught with difficulty. The literature provides 
us with insights into strategic management in a changing environment driven by fast emerging 
technologies. However, it also points to a certain incongruity. Acquisitions present such a series 
of complex managerial challenge for Japanese firms that it is hard to see why they would be 
viewed as a viable strategic response to environmental change. This review points to the need for 
some form of alternative perspective for viewing the behaviour of the Japanese firms which will 
assist in highlighting understanding of the benefits that have accrued through the acquisition of 
ownership of the UK firms. 
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Part I: Strategic Management 
In this first part of the review, following a brief introduction to the main contexts of 
strategic management literature, we examine the link between the industrial and 
competitive environment, and the firm’s behaviour. We examine the literature which 
focuses on consideration of the how a firm can maintain growth in the face of major 
environmental change. These issues are then tied-in with examination of the specific 
factors that characterise Japanese approaches to strategic management, which are 
themselves embedded in an understanding of the Japanese industrial and corporate 
system. 
The nature of strategy 
Strategy is defined by Chandler (1962) as being:- 
the determination of the basic, long-term goals and objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption of 
courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for those goals43 (Ibid., 13). 
The body of literature which explores the manifold dimensions of strategy and strategic 
decision making is vast. Even at the most basic level, definitions of what is encompassed 
by strategy and strategic decision making abound 44. Such is the profusion of approaches 
to the topic that a number of authors have sought to provide frameworks for positioning 
the diverse approaches to strategy in relation to one another. For the purposes of this 
research, the definition of strategy and the issues encompassed by strategic decision 
making is taken from Johnson & Scholes (1993). These authors define the nature of 
strategy resting within issues connected with decisions made in certain contexts (See 
Exhibit 3.1). These contexts include relationship between the scope of the activities of the 
firm and matching of these activities to its environment. 
 
                                                 
43 He continues in the militaristic vein to differentiate tactics from strategy by defining the former as “ensuring the 
efficient and steady use of current resources whose allocation has already been decided” (Ibid., 383). 
44 For example, for Mintzberg, strategy is simply about “[..] the positioning of an organisation in market niches” (1989: 
25), whereas Pascale (1984) attributes a deeper significance to strategy by describing it as “.. much more than a 
conventional noun. It embodies an implicit model of how organisations should be guided and consequently pre-
configures our way of thinking”. For Itami & Numagami (1992) this strategy links in with the active nature of the 
organisation and its interaction with the environment as being “the dynamic design of the activities for the entire firm”. 
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Exhibit 3.1  Strategic contexts 
Source: Johnson & Scholes (1993) 
Once the context in which strategic issues are dealt with has been identified, it is then 
useful for this research to identify the major groupings of strategic management theories. 
Whittington (1993) identified four broad categories of the theories of strategy- the 
Classical, Evolutionary, Processual and Systemic. (See Exhibit 3.2)45. 
Classical 
In the Classical approach to strategy, rational planning provides the means to achieve 
what is perceived to be the main goal of all business - profit maximisation. The main 
writings in this field46 draw certain key elements from academic economics, through the 
works of Porter (1980) and Williamson (1985), and military practice stemming back to 
Ancient Greece47. The Classical view of strategy can thus be summed up as being 
focused on the role of managers who will adopt profit-maximising strategies based on 
rational long term planning. 
                                                 
45 These differing perspectives have evolved over time as dissatisfaction has emerged with the ability of contemporary 
strategy to provide reliable competitive advantage (Rothwell, 1992). Various alternative categorisations can be 
observed in the literature, such as is presented by Teece et al. (1992). 
46 Authors include Chandler (1962), Ansoff (1965), Sloan (1963) and Porter (1980; 1985). 
47 The determination of these goals and objectives rests with the top management who are required to act as generals 
commanding an army into battle. 
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Exhibit 3.2  Four perspectives in strategy 
Source: Whittington, 1993. 
Evolutionary 
In the Evolutionary perspective, the markets and competitive processes are the guiding 
force to profit maximisation. The influence that is imposed on the Classical theories by 
militaristic and heroic leader factors are replaced here by the biological principle of 
natural selection. Writers in this field48 stress the role of the environment over that of the 
mangers to select winners. Markets are regarded as being too efficient to permit the 
creation of a sustainable competitive advantage based upon complex strategies which can 
only ever deliver a temporary advantage. 
Processualist 
For the third of the categories identified by Whittington, there is an acceptance that there 
are limits to the role of rational decision making. However, the Processualist do not share 
the confidence of the Evolutionary theorists that the market is capable of, or efficient at, 
selecting profit maximising outcomes. Key authors writing in this field expound49 the 
view that as people are all ‘boundedly rational’ (i.e., they do not have the capacity to 
consider more than a few factors at a time and do not have perfect access to information), 
                                                 
48 Authors include Henderson (1989) and  Alchian (1950). 
49 Authors include Cybert & March (1963) and Mintzberg (1987). 
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the idea of ‘adaptive rationality’ - the adjusting of routines in response to signals from the 
external environment - becomes the basis of strategic thinking. Thus the role of emergent 
strategy becomes a critical consideration (See Exhibit 3.3). 
 
 
Exhibit 3.3  Development of strategy 
Source: Mintzberg, 1994 
Systemic 
Here, a number of the basic tenets of the Classical view are shared. For example, there is 
an acceptance that the managers of organisations can plan forward and pro-actively 
influence their environments. However, under the Systemic view, there is an awareness 
of the fact that the role and actions of the managers are deeply integrated into social 
systems. Decisions are never made in a purely economic way; there will always be the 
influence of the social context to be considered. Key authors in this field50 all cite 
examples of how the concepts of strategy, and what it actually involves, are very much 
culturally based. The influence of the sociological system in which the strategy is being 
developed and implemented is the key issue for those subscribing to the Systemic view of 
strategy. 
The strategic contexts provided by Johnson & Scholes (1993), and the four perspectives 
identified by Whittington (1993) furnish us with a solid foundation upon which to build 
an understanding of the differing ways in which a firm is able to interact with its 
environment. The next stage in this review is to focus on linking consideration of the 
firm’s growth with changes in the environment.  
                                                 
50 Authors include Hu (1992), Smothers (1990), and Pascale & Athos (1986). 
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Strategy, growth and change 
The enterprising firm, if it is a large one, will permanently commit part of its resources to the task of 
investigating the possible avenues of profitable expansion, acting on the assumption, supported 
perhaps by past experience, that there are always likely to be opportunities for profitable growth, or 
that expansion is necessary in a competitive world (Penrose, 1959:30) (Emphasis added). 
If growth becomes the basic aim (or one of the basic aims) of the firm, then it is 
necessary for the purposes of this research to examine the differing approaches to 
formulating a strategy for expansion. Before doing so, it is important to link 
consideration of expansion with environmental conditions. 
All firms are “complex organisations operating in situations of uncertainty (or limited 
information)” (Clarke & McGuinness, 1987:1) which function in an environment which 
is constantly in a state of flux51. The environment within which the firms at the centre of 
this research were operating was one characterised by rapid and dramatic technological 
change, as described in Chapter 2. Such an environment presents a number of problems 
for effective strategic management.  
With no pre-existing ‘value chain’, how can one anticipate where and how money can be made in the 
industry, decide which activities to ‘control’, and know how vertically or horizontally integrated to 
be? (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994:44). 
The shift to a new technology presents a complex problem for firms (Soukup & Cooper, 
1983). In such conditions of flux, firms will seek either to cause changes in the 
environment, or be forced to adapt themselves in response to changes in the environment 
after they have occurred. These two approaches to strategy in the face of change can be 
labelled “pre-emptive” and “pro-active” (van der Meer & Gudim, 1992, after Gilbert & 
Strebel, 1988). For high technology firms operating in highly complex and rapidly 
changing environments typified by a fast pace of technological change, a pre-emptive 
                                                 
51 A number of perspectives have emerged which attempt to deal with issues relating to such change generally, rather 
than the issues of strategy and success for a single organisation at a particular time in a particular industry. Strategy 
process research seeks to address some of these issues. Stacey (1995) provides a view of the strategic process as a 
response to change based on the idea that, far from striving to obtain a state of equilibrium, a system must be driven 
away from equilibrium where it can make use of disorder and irregularity. This view is echoed in the writings of 
Nonaka (1991), and Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) on the issue of Japanese innovation strategy, when they talk of the 
‘use’ of chaos to internally give birth to new problems. 
Japanese innovation strategy and the acquisition of UK IT firms                                                                                             Chapter 3 
 58 
strategy can be risky. If successful, it may result in the setting of a new product or 
technology standard (Morris & Ferguson, 1993)52. However, if unsuccessful, the result 
may be resources embedded in proprietary technology that finds itself chasing a 
diminishing market. A firm that opts for a pro-active strategy in an environment driven 
by fast changing technologies must rely on a high degree of organisational flexibility. 
Such organisational flexibility should allow the firm to react to the changes in the 
environment and apply or reconfigure its resources in such a way so as to derive some 
competitive advantage from the situation (Chesborough & Teece, 1996). 
Growth and environmental change 
The following section focuses on the examination of three generic growth strategies 
which may be employed by firms faced with a situation of wide-reaching environmental 
change, each of which incorporate the use of corporate acquisitions. The three strategies 
are; diversification, internationalisation and innovation. 
Diversification and integration 
The diversification options open to a firm can be encompassed by two broad 
classifications. The first of these is the related diversification. This refers to expansion 
beyond the present product or market, but still within the industry in which the company 
operates. Such related diversification can include forward and backward integration 
(vertical integration), and horizontal integration (See Exhibit 3.4).  
For unrelated diversification, the firm expands beyond the boundaries of its present 
industry53. Corporate acquisitions represent a means by which a firm can shift its 
boundaries to allow the desired diversification to be achieved.  
The writings of Williamson (1985) on transaction costs attempt to explain the extent to 
which firms will integrate. If the transaction costs can be minimised by internalising, then 
there will be a strong incentive to integrate. If the costs can be minimised by managing 
                                                 
52 “Simply stated, competitive success flows to the company that manages to establish proprietary architectural control 
over a broad, fast-moving, competitive space” (Morris & Ferguson, 1993:87). 
53 In this way, the conglomerate enterprise - a relatively recent phenomenon in the economic world - is formed 
(Whittington, 1993). 
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activities through the free market, then there will be less incentive to integrate. Thus it is 
the environment that dictates the level of integration required. In addition, the potential 
‘synergy’ effects that may emerge from both related and unrelated diversification 
strategies are often cited as motives for such activities. As will be shown in the later 
sections of this literature review, such synergy effects are an often cited motive for 
diversifying acquisitions, yet the high rate of failure of such ventures points to the 
complex managerial issues raised. 
 
 
Exhibit 3.4  Organisational integration 
Source: Johnson & Scholes (1993) 
Internationalisation 
The second growth strategy relates to the expansion of a firm’s activities beyond 
domestic markets. A firm may wish, or be pushed by environmental conditions, to 
compete in international markets by exporting its goods overseas (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 
1989). Beyond that, the firm may choose to move beyond merely exporting goods and 
internationalise some of its production (Steele, et al., 1996). Such a strategy might be 
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formulated and implemented for a number of reasons, varying from avoidance of tariffs 
through to low input factor costs (Ferdows, 1993). 
The transaction costs approach (Williamson, 1985) adds to the explanation of why a firm 
would wish to internationalise. While there are alternatives to, for example, setting up 
and managing an overseas manufacturing plant which would be less expensive and risk-
laden (such as licensing or selling technology and brands to an overseas firm 
(Whittington, 1993)), there are benefits of internationalising from the standpoint of 
transaction costs. The need to internationalise can be viewed as a result of the ‘failure’ of 
international markets. As legal controls over international trade may not be perfect, and 
distortions may be introduced via customs and tariffs, firms may wish to co-ordinate their 
international transactions by hierarchy rather than the market (Rugman in Whittington, 
1993). 
The means by which a firm is able to ‘internationalise’ varies from the setting up of a 
greenfield site, through forming joint venture partnerships to the acquisition of a firm 
with operations in the desired location. Cross border acquisitions represent what is 
arguably an effective means for a firm to internationalise that avoids the problems 
associated with greenfield sites (length of time to become operational, supplier problems, 
etc.), and joint ventures (issues of control, protection, differing partner objectives, etc.). 
Yet, as will be discussed further in the final section of this review, there are many 
complex managerial problems involved when attempting cross-border acquisitions which 
may result in the failure to achieve strategic goals. 
Innovation54 
A firm can grow by finding new technologies to develop into new products, or by finding 
new ways to apply existing technologies in new products. As is discussed by von Braun 
                                                 
54 Innovation - = invention + exploitation. “The invention process covers all efforts aimed at creating new ideas and 
getting them to work. The exploitation process includes all stages of commercial development, application, and 
transfer, including the focusing of ideas or inventions towards specific objectives, evaluating those objectives, 
downstream transfer of research and /or development results, and the eventual broad-based utilisation, dissemination, 
and diffusion of the technology-based outcomes” (Roberts, 1987:3). Technology - “[..] is simply the body of 
knowledge about techniques. But it is frequently used to encompass both the knowledge itself and the tangible 
embodiment of the knowledge in the operating system using physical production equipment” (Freeman, 1982:4n). 
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(1990), the pace of this product development process and the speed at which new 
technologies are being diffused is accelerating. This stems from two main factors. Firstly, 
the technologies themselves are changing55, and secondly, the commercialisation of these 
technologies - the industrial innovation process - is also changing (Rothwell, 1992). 
There are two bodies of literature of relevance to this particular growth strategy. The first 
relates to the interaction between strategy and technology and this has been contributed to 
by writers such as Itami and Numagami (1992), Granstrand et al. (1992), McGee and 
Thomas (1989), Porter (1985), and Wilkinson (1985;1987). These writers focus on the 
ways in which firms cultivate the development of new technologies within the firm, as 
well as the acquiring of new technologies from outside. This latter option includes a 
range of options from technology licensing through to the acquisition of a firm 
possessing the required technology. 
The second body of literature focuses on issues emerging from the interaction between 
innovation and strategy and includes writers such as Rothwell (1992), Prahalad and 
Hamel (1990), Cooper (1984), Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) and Florida & Kenney (1990). 
Firms will seek not only to focus on the development or acquisition of new technologies, 
but will seek to find ways of applying those technologies in new and imaginative ways. 
Firms will seek to develop an organisational culture and structure which will facilitate 
innovation. Such a structure may incorporate the active use of alliances and, if required, 
the moving of the boundaries of the firm through acquisition to encompass the 
knowledge and skills of an external firm. 
These three growth strategies of diversification, internationalisation and innovation link 
consideration of the influence of the environment upon strategic options open to the firm. 
It can be seen how corporate acquisitions can be an integral element of each of these 
strategies.  
                                                 
55 As Porter (1985) describes it; “Technological change is one of the principle drivers of competition. It plays a major 
role in industry structural change, as well as in creating new industries. It is also a great equaliser, eroding the 
competitive advantage of well-entrenched firms and propelling others to the forefront” (Ibid., 164). 
Japanese innovation strategy and the acquisition of UK IT firms                                                                                             Chapter 3 
 62 
As the impetus driving changes in the competitive environment of the IT industry was a 
technological discontinuity of sufficient impact as to result in a change of industry 
paradigm, the role of technology and innovation can be seen to be of central importance 
to this research. Before focusing attention on the literature relating to innovation 
management, the nature of the research topic dictates that it is important for us to 
consider certain culture-specific issues of business strategies of Japanese firms. 
Notes on Japanese business strategy 
The consideration of strategic management in the face of environmental change so far has 
been implicitly embedded in a ‘Western’ business context. Earlier discussion of the 
systemic approaches to strategy revealed that many of the concepts of strategic 
management may be embedded in the social system where the strategy is being 
developed and implemented. As this research aims to understand issues relating to the 
strategies of Japanese firms, it is necessary to be aware of certain distinctive aspects of 
Japanese approaches to strategic management. However, consideration of Japanese 
strategy is embedded in an understanding of the Japanese corporate and industrial system. 
This system is described in more detail in Appendix I, but in summary, firms operating 
within this environment can be described as follows:- 
The Japanese enterprise system is an interorganizational system of business management and co-
ordination. It is based on the strategic interaction and alignment of three basic forms of industrial 
organization - factory, firm and interfirm network (Fruin, 1992:3). 
Many authors have attempted to ‘explain’ Japanese business strategy and to distil the 
essence of its success for use in other countries (Ohmae, 1982; Pascale & Athos, 1986). 
However, there are fundamental problems in reaching a level of distillation where any 
attempt at extraction is possible. As Pascale (1984) points out:- 
The Japanese don’t use the term ‘strategy’ to describe a crisp business definition or competitive 
master plan. They think more in terms of ‘strategic accommodation’ or ‘adaptive persistence’ 
underscoring their belief that corporate direction evolves from an incremental adjustment to unfolding 
events. Rarely, in their view, does one leader (or strategic planning group) produce a bold strategy 
that guides the firm unerringly (Ibid., 64). 
This can be seen to draw from one theme embedded in the processualist approach to 
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strategy. Miyazaki (1995) brings this to the foreground of the discussion by highlighting 
the core role in Japanese strategy of the emergent strategy (as also discussed by 
Mintzberg, 1994):- 
Japanese corporate strategies have been coherent, with organisational changes and other activities 
taking place over a long period, and gradually transforming the organisation to one better suited for 
building technological capabilities. In addition, top management in Japanese companies have been 
quick to sense the changing environment, and have long been able to devise appropriate long term 
strategies accordingly (Miyazaki, 1995:87) (Emphasis added). 
Ohmae (1982) attributes much of the Japanese success down to the strategy of seeking 
out markets, functions and products which would initially avoid head-to-head 
competition with non-Japanese companies, and by “the tendency to look for a different 
battleground on which to compete” (Ohmae, 1982:240) Smothers (1990) carries these 
themes forward and identifies three ‘motifs’ of successful Japanese strategies which have 
aided the Japan’s post-war successes (See Exhibit 3.5). 
As described in Chapter 2, these strategies that have previously led the Japanese to 
success in global markets may be less suited to competition in a dynamic and uncertain 
environment. Some authors are uncertain of the suitability of Japanese strategies for 
competition in the new competitive environment. Porter (1996) talks of the way in which 
Japanese firms may have to learn a more ‘Western’ approach to strategy:- 
Most Japanese companies imitate and emulate one another. All rivals offer most if not all product 
varieties, features and services; they employ all channels and match one anothers plant configurations. 
[..] To [learn strategy] they may have to overcome strong cultural barriers. Japan is notoriously 
consensus oriented, and companies have a strong tendency to mediate differences among individuals 
rather than accentuate them. Strategy [..] requires hard choices (Porter, 1996:63). 
This theme of ‘learning new ways’ is one that will be shown in later chapters to be a key 
factor in the analysis of the acquisitions. 
 
Knowledge-based strategy 
Striving for ever-higher ratios of value-added in products (i.e., goods services and processes) due to the 
multiplier of knowledge-intensive inputs (such as information, design, care or expertise) in proportion to 
other inputs such as mundane materials, energy or physical labour 
Alliance-based strategy 
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With workers and stakeholders, but not with competitors, this means seeking: (a) mutually trusting, self-
maintaining relationships, resulting in minimal internal and external investments in coercive control systems 
(including minimisation of national military expenditures): and (b) co-operative, legitimate relationships which 
result in ‘win-win’ arrangements or mutual gains 
Productivity-based strategy 
This means continuously moving both capital and human resources to ever-higher valued use in production 
processes (or service delivery systems) in conjunction with minimising non-productive investments. 
Exhibit 3.5  Three motifs underlying successful Japanese corporate strategies 
Source: Smothers (1990) 
Having highlighted briefly the importance of consideration of certain features of Japanese 
business strategies, attention can now be brought back to a more in-depth consideration 
of one of the growth strategies described earlier - innovation. 
Part II: Management of Innovation 
In this section, we examine in more detail the issues surrounding the ability of a firm to 
innovate in response to change in a dynamic and uncertain environment driven by fast 
emerging technologies. The aim here is to examine the innovation process at the level of 
the firm56, and to see how corporate acquisitions can be included in this process. This 
section is divided into four areas as follows: (1) models of the innovation process, (2) 
knowledge and technology, (3) organisational structure, and (4) Japanese approaches to 
innovation management. 
Models of innovation 
Models that depict innovation as a smooth, well behaved linear process badly mis-specify the nature 
and direction of the causal factors at work. Innovation is complex, uncertain, somewhat disorderly, 
and subject to changes of many sorts (Kline & Rosenberg, 1986:275). 
An awareness of the complexities of the issues relating to the process of innovation at the 
level of the firm can be seen in the emergence in the literature of ever-more intricate 
models which attempt to provide a view of the innovation process57. A number of 
                                                 
56 This is distinct from analysis of innovation at a macroeconomic level. 
57 Rothwell (1992) has identified 5 generations of images of innovation which mark the stages of changes in perception 
of the innovation process since the 1950s. Horwitch & Prahalad (1976) challenge the assumption that there exists one 
universally applicable model of innovation. Instead, they present a generalised framework built around three ‘modes’. 
These modes describe the manner in which innovation takes place, encompassing both processes and settings. Mode I 
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typologies of innovation process models can be identified from the literature and these 
have been summarised by Forrest (1991). The simplest of these are the stage, pipeline or 
linear models. In such models, the innovation process is viewed as a sequential linear 
activity taking place in a series of stages. Examples of models of this type include 
Utterback’s (1972) 3 stage model and Pannenborg’s (1986) 7-stage model (See Exhibit 
3.6). 
 
 
Exhibit 3.6  7-stage model of the innovation process 
Source: Pannenborg (1986) 
In the second typology of the conversion model, innovation is described as a conversion 
process with inputs being transformed through a number of steps into products. Twiss 
(1992) provides a simple example of such a model. A more representative model (an 
‘interactive’ model) is given in Rothwell (1992) (See Exhibit 3.7). 
 
                                                 
is the technological innovation process found in small, high-technology firms. Mode II is technological innovation in 
large multi-market, multi-product corporation. Mode III the technological innovation in the multi-organisation and 
multi-sector enterprise. 
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Exhibit 3.7  Interactive model of the innovation process 
Source: Rothwell (1992) 
The remaining typologies encompass the integrative model (models which attempt to 
integrate all the facets of the innovation process including the changing characteristics of 
the innovation process as the firm grows and develops over time (Utterback & Abernathy 
(1978) and Schmidt-Tiedemann (1982)); the decision models (which view the innovation 
process in terms of key ‘decision points’ (Cooper & More, 1979); and the biological 
analogy (where the organisation is viewed as an adaptive open system readily monitoring 
its environment58 (Martin, 1984)). 
The complex nature of innovation, and the wide variety of contexts in which it occurs 
makes the task of modelling the process with any degree of realism almost impossible. 
However, models do provide a framework for visualising the interaction between the key 
inputs, outputs and variables within the innovation process, and places them in their 
appropriate contexts. Certain additional factors, such as the role of corporate acquisitions, 
while not explicitly a part of the models, can be included by viewing them as a method to 
enhance the firm’s store of knowledge and technology. 
                                                 
58 The innovation process here is regarded as a ‘technological mutation’, with products and processes evolving as new 
knowledge is obtained from the market and technological environments, thus enabling a technology-market synergy to 
occur. As the environment provides new knowledge for the organisation, technological mutations will occur. 
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Knowledge, technology and innovation 
The innovative capacity of the firm can be regarded as being dependent on the richness of 
the firm’s knowledge base. This knowledge base encompasses both tacit and explicit (or 
articulated ) knowledge (See Exhibit 3.8). The knowledge base, coupled with the ‘hard’ 
resource base of the firm, will dictate to a large extent how effectively the firm is able to 
achieve some competitive advantage over its competitors (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Kline 
& Rosenberg, 1986; Nonaka, 1990; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Senker, 1995). A firm 
will seek to augment its knowledge base by refining what it has already internalised, and 
by reaching into the environment - into its industry or the wider external environment of 
society generally59. 
 
Tacit knowledge (Subjective) Explicit knowledge (Objective) 
• Knowledge of experience (body) 
• Simultaneous knowledge (here and now) 
• Analogue knowledge (practice) 
• Knowledge of rationality (mind) 
• Sequential knowledge (there and then) 
• Digital knowledge (theory) 
Exhibit 3.8  Two types of knowledge 
Source: Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995 
The strong link between tacit knowledge and innovation is summed up by Senker (1995) 
as follows:- 
[..] continuing dependence on tacit knowledge for innovation arises from the tendency for advances in 
knowledge and techniques to be associated with new tacit knowledge; from adherence to previous 
successful practice; from the lack of scientific or technological expertise within specific firms or 
sectors; and, possibly most commonly, from the complexity of systems. Vincenti’s (1990) observation 
that uncertainty diminishes as a technology becomes older suggests a fourth category where tacit 
knowledge is of importance: in the emergence of new technologies (Ibid., 431). 
A specific form of knowledge a firm possesses is embodied in its technology60. For 
                                                 
59 “Information about the activities and methods of other firms can be obtained by a variety of means - by buying and 
studying their products; by hiring away their technically expert employees; by reading accounts of their activities in 
trade journals, reports of securities analysts, and their mandatory filings with government agencies; by hiring 
consultants who work with the other firms of the industry as well; by reading copies of their patents or the publications 
of their research scientists; by overt purchase or exchange; or by covert schemes of industrial espionage.” (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982:64). 
60 As defined earlier, technology is: “[..] technology is simply the body of knowledge about techniques. But it is 
frequently used to encompass both the knowledge itself and the tangible embodiment of the knowledge in the operating 
system using physical production equipment.” (Freeman, 1982:4n). 
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Clarke et al. (1989), the three key factors relating technology to the innovative ability of 
the firm are the acquisition of technology, the management of technology and the 
exploitation of technology. These points are then amplified by Granstrand et al. (1992) 
who provide a typology of generic ‘technology strategies’, based on the coupling of 
technology acquisition with technology exploitation (See Exhibit 3.9).  
 
 
Exhibit 3.9  Technology strategies 
Source: Granstrand et al. (1992) 
By viewing innovation in terms of its relationship with organisational knowledge and 
technology, the role of corporate acquisition can be identified within the innovation 
process. This points to wider consideration of the ways in which a firm’s structure, and in 
particular how external and internal technology and skills are combined, is linked to the 
ability to manage innovation. 
Organisational structure and the use of alliances 
The structure of a firm has been identified as having a strong influence on its ability to 
innovate (Morgan, 1986; Twiss & Goodridge, 1989; Schoonhoven & Jelinek, 1990; 
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Pavitt, 1991;1992; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). While no ‘ideal’ structure which 
optimises innovative ability can be identified, there are certain features of an 
organisation’s structure which will affect its innovative ability. 
The innovative organisation needs to behave in many ways like the small entrepreneurial venture 
company, yet take full advantages of the benefits of size and large resources (Twiss & Goodridge, 
1989:27). 
For firms operating in high technology industries, particular features of the successfully 
innovating organisation have been identified:- 
These firms show a consistent pattern of structure - formal, quasi-formal and informal - that actively 
facilitates both innovative ideas and task-relevant co-operation. While they have thousands of 
employees, these companies clearly organise for innovation, they re-organise for innovation and they 
retain the small company flavour by carefully fostering patterns of interaction usually associated with 
small companies. [..] The dynamic tension between all these elements is an important component of 
the management of innovation (Schoonhoven & Jelinek, 1990:117). 
Faced with a dynamic and uncertain environment driven by fast emerging technologies, 
firms may be forced to find ways to access external sources of technology and 
knowledge. As Teece (1992) discusses, analysis of the innovative abilities of the firm as a 
discrete entity has become increasingly difficult:- 
Discussions of the link between firm size and innovation are outmoded because the boundaries of the 
firm have become fuzzy in recent decades. Strategic alliances61 - constellations of bilateral 
agreements among firms - are increasingly necessary to support innovative activities (Teece, 1992:1). 
This use of external organisations to enhance the innovative capacity of a firm is also 
discussed by Forrest (1991), and Bidault & Cummings (1994). The latter authors present 
the view that there is a tension between the dynamics of innovation and the logic of 
partnering that may cause sufficient managerial obstacles so as to offset the planned 
benefits of co-operation. The main justifications for entering alliances as a means to 
foster innovation can be summarised as follows:- 
1. Alliances may appear as a faster and cheaper way to develop new products and processes. 
2. Co-operative R&D allows partners to reach a critical mass of human and financial resources 
                                                 
61 Alliances encompass here a range of strategic options of loose co-operative marketing and distribution agreements, 
through joint venture agreements, to complete internalisation of the resources of an external organisation, i.e., a 100% 
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needed to undertake large projects. 
3. Merging technological knowledge and skills from different companies improves the innovation 
process (Bidault & Cummings, 1994:33). 
However, these benefits may not be realised owing to the fundamental tension that exists 
between the dynamics of innovation and the logic required for partnering to be a success. 
Innovation stems from creativity, uncertainty and risk-taking. Partnering, on the contrary, 
emphasises clarity and explicitness:- 
The inherent nature of the two processes definitely seem incompatible: on the one hand, a co-
operative agreement should be as specific as possible, while on the other, we can characterise 
innovation management, to a large extent, as an ambiguous and non-linear process (Bidault & 
Cummings, 1994:41). 
It can be viewed that the use of ‘loose’ strategic partnering to enhance a firm’s ability to 
innovate may not be an ideal solution in all cases. It may be that tighter linkage between 
internal and external skills and technologies may be more appropriate. The acquisition of 
ownership of an innovative firm can be regarded as a strategic option which extends the 
boundaries of the firm (and consequently its knowledge base) without certain 
complexities of looser partnerships (Granstrand et al., 1992; Chakrabati et al., 1994). 
However, the specific managerial difficulties that acquisitions pose have meant that firms 
may in preference seek out joint venture partners rather than acquisition targets when 
seeking to internalise certain intangible resources:- 
Internalisation via collaboration may be more attractive than acquiring a firm in total. In buying a 
company the acquirer must pay for non-distinctive assets, and is confronted with a substantially larger 
organisational integration problem (Hamel, 1991:99). 
Exhibit 3.10 provides some examples of issues that firms must address in selecting 
between alliance partner or acquisition target. 
 
 Strategic/JV alliance partner Acquisition target 
Commitment “Easy to make, easy to divorce” Once investment made, cost 
incentive to integrate successfully. 
Value Can result in win-win situation. Act of acquiring can destroy the 
                                                 
take-over of ownership. 
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value. 
Control If 50:50 split, can cause problems for 
decision making. 
Control lies firmly with the acquirer. 
Exhibit 3.10  Typical considerations of alliance partner versus acquisition target  
It becomes clear that faced with an uncertain and dynamic environment driven by fast 
emerging technologies, firms must develop strategies and organisational structures that 
allow them to adapt and react to changes rapidly. In a complex environment, innovation 
requires the flexibility of a small firm linked to the capital and capacity of a large firm. 
‘Looser’ alliances form one solution to this paradox, but alliances in themselves present a 
series of problems, and may be inappropriate for the effective management of innovation. 
Tighter control over external technologies may be more appropriate. Acquisition of 
ownership of an external firm possessing the technology or skills required provides one 
means to achieve this tighter control. Before turning the focus of attention to 
consideration of the managerial issues that the use of acquisitions raises, it is important 
here to consider the specific issues relating to Japanese approaches to the management of 
innovation. 
Japanese approaches to innovation management 
Much of the writing on the subject of Japan and innovation at the level of the firm 
unavoidably polarises the discussion into generalised comparisons of the ‘Japanese’ and 
‘Western’ models of the innovation process. What becomes clear after examination of the 
main body of literature written on the subject is that there are a number of features of the 
Japanese industrial and corporate system that have lead to new product development and 
innovation at the level of the firm differing from the perceived generic ‘Western’ way. 
Bowonder & Miyake (1992) present a summary of a number of views of Japanese 
innovation which have contributed to the formulation of various ‘Japanese’ models. 
These views seek to highlight features of the Japanese industrial system, organisational 
structure and corporate strategy which are perceived to have contributed to the continued 
success of Japanese high technology firms at producing streams of innovations. See 
Exhibit 3.11.  
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Exhibit 3.11  The Japanese innovation process 
Source: Bowonder & Miyake, (1993) 
Bowonder & Miyake (1993) continue this analysis of the innovation process within 
Japanese firms by characterising seven key features:- 
• Emphasis on commercial utilisation. Japanese firms stress the commercial end of the 
innovation spectrum. Quick commercialisation of innovative ideas developed 
elsewhere needs strong interaction between functions such as design, engineering, 
testing, manufacturing and marketing (Gomory, 1989; Florida & Kenney, 
1990;199362). 
• Intensive diffusion of technologies. Japanese firms place considerable emphasis on 
                                                 
62 For Florida & Kenney (1990, 1993) one of the key factors in Japan’s success is the focus on ‘follow-through’ 
innovations, i.e., maintaining a steady stream of innovative products, as opposed to focusing efforts on achieving 
technological ‘breakthroughs’. For Gomory (1989) the focus of Japanese innovation can be placed on the ability of 
firms to view innovation in terms of a ‘product cycle’, i.e., emphasis placed on incremental improvements and the 
continuous turning out of new products, as opposed to the ‘ladder’ view of innovation, which describes the step-by-step 
reduction to practice of new scientific knowledge that then generates a radically new product.  
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rapid technology diffusion. This requires a high level of functional co-ordination and 
continuous technological improvements or product modifications. Large trading 
houses play a key role in facilitating diffusion and utilisation of market information. 
• Emphasis on incremental innovation. Regular product and process improvement is 
only possible through intensive co-ordination and interaction of functional managers 
dealing with R&D, design, engineering, manufacturing and marketing. Kaizen (the 
gradual, unending cycle of improvements) facilitates functional interaction and rapid 
exchange of information across functions. 
• Multiple competence technologies. Many of the recent Japanese innovations have been 
in areas requiring multiple skills to integrate advanced technologies (Prahalad & 
Hamel, 1990). This can also be seen in the work of Kodama (1990;1992) on 
technology fusion within Japanese firms. 
• Morphogenetic logic. Maruyama (1985) and Tatsuno (1990) discuss the way that 
Japanese thinking follows morphogenetic logic, whereas Western thinking is based on 
Aristotelian logic. This has been much discussed in relation to the transferability of 
Japanese innovation management methods (Pascale & Athos, 1986). 
• Integration of marketing and innovation. The use of multiple marketing channels 
(such as trading houses, marketing subsidiaries and direct selling) helps to 
differentiate users while also achieving a high degree of co-ordination in terms of 
market planning. This integrated marketing function provides market intelligence as 
well as feedback information from users (Kotler et al., 1985). 
• Organisational learning. A major characteristic of the Japanese innovation process is 
the rapid assimilation of technology (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). The linking of skills 
through rapid organisational learning is the result of functional integration. Corporate 
networking facilitates functional integration, while also helping in the creation of new 
skill groups through creative organisational learning processes.  
The view of the innovation process within Japanese firms (given in Exhibit 3.11) can also 
be seen to highlight the role of technology and knowledge acquisition. The ways in which 
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this technology is acquired range from technology licensing through joint venture 
partnering, to the acquisition of innovative firms (Granstrand & Sjölander, 1990; 
Granstrand et al., 1992). But, as Bidault & Cummings (1994) discuss, the use of the 
‘looser’ partnerships with external firms can be incompatible with the dynamics of 
innovation. Tighter control, or internalisation of the source of the technology or skill 
through acquisition may provide a more effective means to augment the ability of the 
firm to innovate. However, it is necessary to consider the complex managerial issues 
raised by the use of acquisitions. 
Part III: Management of Acquisitions 
It has been well documented that a high percentage (50-80%) of acquisitions ‘fail’63 
(Kitching, 1967; Meeks, 1977; Napier, 1989; Mujtaba, 1990; Cartwright & Cooper, 1990; 
Schweiger et al., 1993; Elsass & Veiga, 1994). Yet acquisitions, owing to a number of 
factors, remain a strategic tool widely used by firms to grow64.  
Recent literature has focused on the problems of integrating the two organisations 
following an acquisition as being a major cause of acquisition failure (Jemison & Sitkin, 
1986a;1986b; Buono & Bowditch, 1989; Cartwright & Cooper, 1990; Haspeslagh & 
Jemison, 1991). Such literature seeks to redress the bias of research attention towards the 
pre-acquisition strategic and financial considerations, and the negotiation process65. 
However, to gain a richer picture of the complex activity of acquisition suitable for the 
purposes of this research66, it is necessary to take an approach to viewing acquisitions 
that includes consideration not only of strategic fit, organisational fit, integration 
management and human resource issues, but also an understanding of the management of 
the complete process of acquisition. In this section, the aim is to provide an overview to 
                                                 
63 The ‘failure’ of an acquisition is taken from Kitching (1967) to be (a) the actual financial results following the 
acquisition to not reach the expectations of the projected figures from before the acquisition or (b) a qualitative 
assessment of acquisition as compared with the original strategy which shows a mis-match. 
64 Such factors include: (1) market conditions, (2) increasing availability of capital, (3) more companies for sale, (4) 
the easing of regulations, (5) the need to share risk, (6) the existence of ‘complex indivisible problems’, and (7) the 
unrecognised psychological motives for acquisitions (Cartwright & Cooper, 1990). 
65 See Auerbach (1988), Weston et al. (1990). 
66 The financial considerations in relation to acquisitions are not within the scope of this research. 
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the literature relating to these areas and to summarise the particular problems faced by 
Japanese corporations when using acquisitions. 
Acquisition types 
As discussed earlier, corporate acquisitions represent one of a number of ways in which a 
firm may grow, and they can be classified by a number of criteria67. For the purposes of 
this research, the integrated typology of acquisition type provided by Buono & Bowditch 
(1989) will be used for classification purposes (See Exhibit 3.12). 
 
Exhibit 3.12  An integrated typology of acquisitions 
Source: Buono & Bowditch (1989) 
The acquisition process 
Acquisitions tend to follow a fairly predictable sequence of steps and various labels can 
be applied to these stages (See Exhibit 3.13). The image of likening the process of 
                                                 
67 Kitching (1967) provides four main types based on the way in which the activities of the acquiring firm relate to 
those of the acquired firm: Vertical (the combination of two organizations from successive processes within the same 
industry); Horizontal (the combination of two similar organizations in the same industry); Conglomerate (where the 
acquired organization is in a completely unrelated field of business activity); and Concentric (where the organization 
acquired is in an unfamiliar but related field, into which the acquiring company wishes to expand). 
Various other forms of classification include Napier’s (1989) grouping on the basis of degree of integration required for 
the desired acquisition outcomes to be achieved: Extension mergers (where the acquiring organization does not intend 
to change, other than perhaps minimally, the way in which the acquired business transacts its business); Collaborative 
mergers (where success is dependent upon the integration of operations (‘synergy’ mergers) or exchange of technology 
or other expertise (‘exchange’ mergers)); and Redesign mergers (where the acquiring organization intends to introduce 
wide-scale changes whereby the acquired totally adopts the practices and procedures of the acquirer). 
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acquisition to a marriage was developed by Levinson (1970) and has been popularised by 
various authors seeking to highlight the ‘softer’ issues involved in acquisitions. An 
awareness of the importance of integration planning within the complete process, rather 
than biasing attention on the pre-acquisition stages is now realised by both practitioner 
(McDermott-Brown & Hargreaves 1991) and academics alike to be crucial to a 
successful acquisition outcome:- 
The lack of careful research attention to the problems of post-acquisition integration appears to reflect 
the difficulty in recognising the process itself as part of the problem. [..] An emphasis on process does 
not imply a rejection of the [strategic] choice perspective as an important determinant of acquisition 
outcomes. To the contrary, strategic analysis may be a necessary condition for success in all 
acquisitions, and organisational fit may also be a necessary condition in related diversification 
acquisitions. [..] (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986:148). 
 
 
Exhibit 3.13  Acquisition stages 
Source: Adapted from Cartwright & Cooper, (1990) 
Strategic fit 
A number of authors stress the importance of a good ‘strategic fit’ between the target and 
acquiring firm for a successful acquisition outcome. This strategic fit is described by 
Jemison & Sitkin (1986) as follows:- 
[..] the degree to which the target firm augments or complements the parent’s strategy and thus makes 
identifiable contributions to the financial and non-financial goals of the parent (Ibid., 146). 
Firms who successfully acquire are viewed as being skilful at identifying ways in which 
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the resource of an external firm will be combined with those of the acquiring organization 
to create additional value. One means by which additional value may be created is 
through the achievement of ‘synergistic benefits’, or the ‘2+2=5 effect’ (Kitching, 1967; 
O’Rourke, 1989), that are anticipated following the integration of the acquisition68. Such 
anticipated benefits form one of a list of possible strategic motives for acquisitions, which 
can themselves be grouped in two broad categories (Napier, 1989); (1) financial or value 
maximising motives, and (2) managerial or non-value maximising motives. Value 
maximising motives encompass all those that are aimed at creating added value for 
shareholders, such as increasing synergy through economies of scale, transferring and 
distributing knowledge from one organisation to another, and the transfer of new 
management to the acquired unit to release unrealised potential. Non-value maximising 
motives describe those which are aimed at increasing market share or asset growth, 
increasing management’s power and reducing uncertainty in a firm’s external 
environment. 
While consideration of strategic fit are essential in the acquisition process, it provides 
only one part of the complete activity. Consideration of how the two organisations will fit 
together is also a major consideration in ensuring a successful acquisition outcome 
(Cartwright & Cooper, 1990). 
Organisational fit 
Consideration of the compatibility of the two organisational structures and systems when 
integration is attempted stems from an awareness and understanding of the role of 
culture:- 
While it is clear that successful mergers and acquisitions must be based primarily on strategic, 
financial, and other objective criteria, ignoring a potential clash of cultures can lead to financial 
failure or at least a substantial diminution of expected results. Far too often, personnel and 
organisational issues are assigned a low priority during the pre-acquisition evaluation process. Other 
times, they are an afterthought. Increasing evidence suggests that cultural incompatibility is the single 
                                                 
68 The issue of synergy is one which raises much discussion in the literature (Kitching, 1967; Nahavandi & 
Malekzadeh, 1988; Senn, 1989). Kitching (1967) was one of the first to highlight the fact that the existence of potential 
synergy is no guarantee that this extra benefit will actually be released by the joining of the two firms. 
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largest cause of failure to achieve projected performance, [..] (Senn, 1989:229) (Emphasis added). 
The issues relating to culture can be broken down into three areas: (1) national, (2) 
organisational, and (3) technological (Garnsey et al., 1992). 
National Culture  
Although modern cultures are growing to share much in common, it is not possible to 
dismiss cross-national differences as insignificant (Morgan, 1986). Whenever two 
national cultures come into contact, there will almost inevitably be “culturally frustrating 
incidents” (Osigweh et al., 1993). Underlying values, such as those of equal opportunity, 
reward based on performance and selection on merit, are biased by national culture 
(Laurent, 1986). Dealing with the “confusion and distrust in day-to-day interaction” 
(Garnsey et al., 1992) can be a major problem in integrating cross-border acquisitions. 
Organisational Culture  
Schein (1985) defined organisational culture as:- 
[..] a pattern of basic assumptions - invented, discovered or developed by a given group as it learns to 
cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration - that has worked well enough to 
be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think 
and feel in relation to those problems (Ibid., 9). 
A company’s culture might be likened to a person’s personality (Senn, 1989). Just as with 
individual personalities, a company’s culture can be thought of as being made up of 
collective values, customs and unwritten rules that govern behaviour within the 
organization. Once this image of an organisational culture being likened to an 
individual’s personality is used, the complexity of the situation that arises when two 
cultures attempt to combine in the same way that two personalities come together through 
the process of marriage becomes obvious:-  
Two companies merging based only on financial data is like two people marrying based only on 
height, weight, and vital statistics; both lead to a high divorce rate (Senn, 1989:229). 
Despite an increased awareness of the importance of corporate culture in organisational 
management, the issue of how to merge two differing cultures still represents a complex 
managerial challenge (Senn, 1989; Cartwright & Cooper, 1990; 1992). This can be 
illustrated clearly by comparing examples of the systems and structures of starkly 
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differing organisational cultures (See Exhibit 3.14). 
Technological Culture 
High-technology companies, especially small ones, often have their own idiosyncratic 
cultural environment in which new ideas are generated and transformed into products 
(Garnsey et al., 1992). When a small firm with its informal procedures is then taken over 
by a larger firm with more clearly defined routines, procedures and organisational 
culture, the creativity of the smaller unit may be swamped and lost. This can be one of 
the hardest integration problems to deal with following an acquisition (O'Rourke, 1989).  
 
 
 
Style A Style B 
• Seniority-based compensation and promotion. 
• Conservative, risk-averse. 
• Cost- and control-driven. 
• Long-range planning & deliberate decision-
making. 
• Analytical, cautious. 
• Autocratic. 
• Performance-based compensation and 
promotion. 
• Innovative, risk-taking. 
• Service- and quality-driven. 
• Opportunistic, rapid decision making. 
• Intuitive, daring. 
• Participative. 
Exhibit 3.14  Potentially conflicting organisational cultures 
Source: Senn (1989) 
Post acquisition integration 
Integration forms one of the most problematic areas of acquisition management (Johnson 
& Scholes, 1993) and is defined by Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991) as follows:- 
Integration is the interactive and gradual process in which individuals from two organizations learn to 
work together and co-operate in the transfer of strategic capabilities (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 
1991:105).  
Schweiger et al. (1993) describe the problems that can emerge from ineffective 
integration (implementation):- 
[Acquisitions] if not properly managed can create overly dysfunctional and organizational outcomes 
such as lower productivity, loyalty to the company, job satisfaction and higher stress, turnover and 
absenteeism. Moreover, [..] the integration of two companies can lead to destructive interpersonal and 
inter-group conflict. The combined net effect of these factors is an ineffective, if not aborted 
implementation (Schweiger et al., 1993). 
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The awareness of the importance of organisational and cultural issues when integrating 
two organisations and in reaching a successful acquisition outcome is discussed in detail 
by authors such as Nahavandi & Malekzadeh (1988), Buono & Bowditch (1989), Napier, 
(1989), Cartwright & Cooper (1990; 1992), Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991), Schweiger et 
al. (1993), and Elsass & Veiga (1994). Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991) provide a model to 
help understand the dynamics of the integration process (See Exhibit 3.15). This model 
presents the process in terms of creating an appropriate atmosphere for capability transfer 
which will lead to improved competitive advantage.  
 
 
Exhibit 3.15  The acquisition integration process 
Source: Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991) 
The creation of an appropriate atmosphere for integration requires consideration of a 
number of factors69. If this atmosphere can be created, then the transfer and application of 
strategic capabilities should be facilitated. Three groups of recurring integration process-
based problems have been identified by Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991). These are as 
                                                 
69 Such factors may include:  
• A reciprocal understanding of each firm’s organisational culture. 
• The willingness of people in both firms to work together after the acquisition. 
• The capacity to transfer and receive capability. 
• Discretionary resources to help foster the atmosphere needed to support the transfer. 
• A cause-effect understanding of the benefits expected from the acquisition (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). 
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follows:- 
1. Determinism - the tendency to cling to the original justification in the face of a 
different or changing reality confronting the acquisition. 
2. Value destruction - the impact of acquisition in individual managers and employees 
themselves. 
3. Leadership vacuum - the lack of appropriate leadership to articulate a new purpose 
for the combined firms. 
In response to such problems as these, Schweiger et al. (1993) propose three means by 
which firms may integrate.  
• Assimilation refers to the situation when one organisation adopts some or all of the 
identity of the other. This process can either be forced or voluntary. Forced 
assimilation is often driven by the buying firm’s ‘superiority syndrome’, but such an 
integration strategy may be required when the acquired firm has performed poorly in 
the past or is resisting change. 
• Novation occurs when two organisations are combined and a new identity is created. 
This form of integration may be highly desirable, but can prove costly in both time 
and money as both organisations are required to change. 
• Structural integration allows the combining organisations keep their own ‘identity’. 
Firms taking this approach to integration face the problems that may stem from a 
requirement for heightened tolerance on the part of members of both organisations to 
accept the validity of each others working practices.  
Consideration of the post-acquisition integration issues provides us with an indicator of 
the complex managerial issues that must be considered when one organisation merges 
with another. Practitioners point to the need for consideration of integration issues to be 
included in all stages of the process70. 
                                                 
70 Pre-acquisition phase. Acquiring firm should have clear idea of its own ‘cultural profile’ along with a profile of a 
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Thus the elements of strategic fit, organisational fit, integration management, human 
resource issues and an understanding of the management of the complete process of 
acquisition combine to form a holistic view of the management of acquisitions. Viewing 
acquisitions in this way helps to highlight the complex managerial issues raised if the 
acquisition is to be successfully implemented. For cross-border acquisitions by Japanese 
firms, there are an additional series of factors that must be considered. 
Use of acquisitions by Japanese firms 
It has been well documented that Japanese firms have a different attitude towards M&A 
when compared with their Western counterparts (Schlosstein, 1989; Windmill & 
Mendelssohn, 1990; Kester, 1991):- 
Unlike [Western] firms, which tend to diversify by way of take-overs and mergers, most Japanese 
companies have followed an in-house approach to developing new products and services. [..] internal 
product diversification is more risky and time consuming than restructuring through acquisitions. But 
an external acquisition in Japanese means merging two closed and exclusive corporate families, each 
with its own well-established hierarchy and social system (Yuzawa, 1994:72). 
This reticence to use corporate acquisitions stems from a number of factors which are 
discussed briefly in the following sections. 
Corporate governance 
The Japanese system of corporate governance71 has been a major influence on the way in 
which Japanese firms have regarded M&A:- 
This system, more than anything else, has decisively influenced Japanese merger and acquisition 
activity throughout the country’s modern economic history. It has largely obviated the necessity for 
deep and active market for corporate control at home, limited the activity of Japanese companies in 
the market abroad, and yielded a paucity of attractive targets for foreign bidders. It has also produced 
                                                 
typified organisation with which managers feel they could work. The profile of a potential target could be one that is 
similar to the acquirers, or deliberately different to support new strategic directions. 
Due diligence phase. Acquirer should gain insight into target’s: Management (calibre of key managers, style, 
managerial values, direction and control); Organisation (structures systems and functions); Climate (environment, 
responsiveness to change, extent of employee involvement and union representation). 
Post-acquisition phase. Acquirer should implement a planned process of integration that includes: Communication 
plans and strategies; Organisational structure and reporting relationships; New vision, mission and values development 
plans; Personnel plan, dealing with benefits and compensation (Senn, 1989; McDermott-Brown & Hargreaves, 1991). 
71 Corporate governance is used here to describe the “entire set of incentives, safe-guards and dispute resolution 
processes that orders the activities of various corporate stakeholders, each seeking to improve its welfare through co-
ordinated economic activity with others” (Kester, 1991). Appendix I provides a more detailed examination of the 
Japanese system of corporate governance. 
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a distinctly Japanese standard for those acquisitions that do take place (Kester, 1991:5-6). 
The key features of the Japanese system of corporate governance can be described as (1) 
implicit contracting founded on trust72, (2) extensive reciprocal shareholdings and 
implicit reciprocal trade agreements with a few key stakeholders, (3) managerial 
incentives aligned toward overall corporate growth and away from transfers of value 
among stakeholders, and (4) early intervention by key stakeholders, especially main 
banks (See Appendix I). 
Schlosstein (1989) relates the issue of growth versus profit as a managerial goal within 
Japanese firms to the consequent focus on non-value maximising motives for acquisitions 
that do take place in Japan:-  
The fundamental objective underlying the execution of mergers and acquisitions in the United States 
is financial - maximising shareholder value. In Japan and East Asia, however, the fundamental 
corporate objective is strategic - maximising market share (Ibid., 311). 
Many of the acquisitions that take place in Japan tend to be among firms already related 
by virtue of their existing keiretsu connections (Senn, 1989). Acquisitions by original 
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) of their component suppliers in which they already 
have an equity stake is one example of how Japanese firms may use acquisitions within 
the domestic market. 
Culture 
For Japanese firms, people are arguably viewed as the most important asset, rather than 
its products or its plant and equipment (Schlosstein, 1989). Added to this is the view of 
the ‘company-as-family’ (Kester, 1991). Consequently, any attempt to buy and sell 
companies carries with it unsavoury moral connotations of ‘flesh-peddling’. Even the 
language used to describe M&A activity is laden with negative imagery for the Japanese. 
e.g., nottori - also used to mean hijacking, and baishu - used to imply bribery. The view 
of the company functioning as a microcosm of society as a whole, with unique 
                                                 
72 The concept of implicit contracting is one which has bearing upon the use of acquisitions by Japanese firms. As 
Cartwright & Cooper (1992) discuss, this ties-in with the Japanese decision-makers being heavily influenced by the 
opinions and judgements of operational managers. This contrasts with the UK and US preference for leaning towards 
the views of legal advisors and consultants in the negotiation phase of an acquisition. 
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hierarchies and internal factions is discussed by Schlosstein (1989) in relation to the 
difficulties encountered when Japanese firms combine73.  
Acquisitions, when they do take place in Japan, are often forced by near bankruptcy or 
business failures (Schlosstein, 1991). Consequently, there is often a ‘losers stigma’ 
attached to acquisitions74. Hostile bids are very rare and one of the major reasons given is 
the desire among Japanese firms working together to achieve ‘harmony’. If an acquisition 
were to be hostile, then it would be very hard for firms to work towards common goals 
following the acquisition (Kester, 1991). 
International acquisitions 
A number of motivating and restraining factors are given by Kish & Vasconcellos (1993) 
in relation to Japanese cross-border acquisitions. On the positive side (as discussed in 
Chapter 1) are factors such as exchange rate movements (making the target financially 
attractive), the availability of technology not found domestically, and factors related to 
the domestic economic situation (e.g., domestic market stagnation). On the negative side 
are factors such as lack of information on prospective targets, the cost of replacing 
inefficient management overseas, government restrictions and regulations, as well as a 
“deep-rooted fear that [Japanese managers] might not be able to understand or control 
their foreign managers” (Financial Times, 12/4/88). 
Conclusions 
The literature has revealed that corporate acquisitions represent what would seem to be 
an effective way to enhance the ability of a firm to innovate by providing a means to 
access new technologies and knowledge. Acquisitions also represent an effective way for 
a firm to reposition itself with respect to its environment in conditions of rapid change 
through diversification and internationalisation. However, the extreme difficulty faced in 
                                                 
73 The example of the long term problems encountered following the merger of Dai-Ichi Bank and Nippon-Kangyo 
Bank in 1971 illustrates this point. Over twenty-five years on, the two cultures have still not fully merged: “Even now 
if you have a former Dai-Ichi man in one position, his junior will always be a Kangyo man, and visa-versa. People 
always ask; ‘Is he from ‘D’ or ‘K’, even now!’” (Interview with Kitazato, 1995). 
74 From discussion  with Matsuoka, 1996. See Appendix II for details. 
Japanese innovation strategy and the acquisition of UK IT firms                                                                                             Chapter 3 
 85 
integrating the acquisitions may negate this effectiveness. For Japanese firms in 
particular, cultural factors result in the strategic use of international corporate acquisitions 
being fraught with difficulty. The literature has provided us with insights into strategic 
management in a changing environment driven by fast emerging technologies. However, 
it has also pointed to a certain incongruity. Acquisitions present such a series of complex 
managerial challenge for Japanese firms that it is hard to see why they would be viewed 
as a viable strategic response to environmental change. This review has pointed to the 
need for some form of alternative perspective for viewing the behaviour of the Japanese 
firms which will assist in highlighting understanding of the benefits that have accrued 
through the acquisition of ownership of the UK firms. 
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Chapter 4 Conceptual approach 
Chapter overview 
The previous chapter provided an outline of the various theoretical contexts in which the more 
readily apparent motives and benefits of the acquisitions are embedded. The three bodies of 
literature examined (strategic management, the management of innovation, and the management 
of acquisitions) provided differing standpoints from which elements of the research question 
could be addressed.  
However, fuller analysis of the research question requires a conceptual framework which can 
provide a more integrated view of the issues under examination. What is needed is an approach 
which allows us to view the case studies not only in terms of the acquisition of technology and the 
Japanese firms’ capacity to respond to immediate changes in the computer industry, but also to 
view them in terms of the acquisition of tacit knowledge and organisational skills that would 
allow the firms to respond to predicted wider reaching changes. As such, there is a need to view 
the behaviour of the firm in terms of its required resources, the way these resources are 
configured, and the means available to the firm by which these resources can be acquired, 
adapted and augmented. These resources encompass tangible and intangible strengths ranging 
from manufacturing capacity to command of a particular technology, from the knowledge of how 
to market products and services globally, to the ability of the organisation to adapt itself to fast 
changing conditions, and from the capacity to create knowledge internally to the capacity to 
internalise knowledge rapidly from external sources. The body of literature on competence and 
capability which has emerged from analysis of the firm in terms of its resources would seem to be 
able to provide components for the construction of such a framework.  
This body of literature however lacks clarity and consistency in its use of terminology and unit of 
analysis. However, from this body of literature, a number of useful concepts can be distilled 
which provided us with a language for describing the behaviour of firms faced with a dynamic 
and uncertain environment. Using this language, we can define a number of key constructs. These 
can be combined with the rich contextual evidence of real-world cases to make it possible to 
develop a framework for enhancing our understanding of the role of acquisitions within a strategy 
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to ensure growth in the face of conditions of uncertainty driven by emerging technologies. 
Introduction 
Competence and capability analysis attempts to identify the intangible strengths within a 
firm and explores the ways in which these strengths can be leveraged and enhanced to 
provide maximum competitive advantage (Gregory, 1995). Such intangible strengths 
include the firm’s tacit and explicit knowledge assets. While a lack of clarity is evident in 
the terminology used within the literature, at the simplest level, a competence can be 
viewed as “a bundle of skills and technologies rather than a single discrete skill or 
technology” (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994:223). A firm’s capabilities are simply “the 
capacity of a firm to renew, augment and adapt its [..] competences over time” (Teece et 
al., 1992:18). 
These deceptively simple definitions given above have provided the basis for an 
alternative strategic management paradigm for identifying the sources of competitive 
advantage (Teece et al., 1992). In contrast to structural competitive strategy paradigms 
(as discussed in Chapter 3), which focus on the positioning of products in markets, 
competitive forces, product market imperfections and entry deterrence, the basis of the 
behavioural competitive strategy paradigm presented by Teece et al. (1992) stems from 
the resource-based view of the firm75 (Wernerfelt, 1984). Proponents of the resource-
based view of the firm regard it as a more effective way of identifying sources of 
competitive advantage in conditions of rapid change (Stalk et al., 1992). In relatively 
stable conditions, competition is based on a ‘war of position’, and consequently the 
structural, product positioning approach to strategy may well be adequate. In conditions 
of market fragmentation, rapidly converging technologies and accelerating product life 
cycles, competition is more accurately portrayed as a ‘war of movement’:- 
Successful competitors move quickly in and out of products, markets, and sometimes even entire 
                                                 
75 The resource-based view of the firm as described by Wernerfelt (1984) has its origins in the work of Penrose (1959). 
Examination of a firm in terms of its resources leads to “different immediate insights than the traditional product 
perspective”. Resources are taken to be “anything which could be thought of as a strength or weakness of a given firm. 
More formally, a firm’s resources at a given time could be defined as those (tangible and intangible) assets which are 
tied semi-permanently to the firm. [..] Examples are brand names, in-house knowledge of technology, employment of 
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businesses, [..]. In such an environment, the essence of strategy is not the structure of a company’s 
products and markets, but the dynamics of its behaviour (Stalk et al., 1992:62). 
Building on the foundations provided by the resource-based view of the firm, a number of 
authors have sought to highlight certain features of competitive strategy in a dynamic 
environment. Prahalad & Hamel (1990) brought to the forefront of this strategic 
management debate the concept of a firm’s core competences. These are ‘unique’ 
activities76  that a firm can perform by clustering together certain firm specific assets, or 
resources. Such resources will be the tangible (e.g., specific technologies) as well as 
intangible (e.g., tacit knowledge of how to sell a product in a particular market). Stalk et 
al. (1992) have focused on the role of specific business processes, or capabilities, which 
allow the maximum effect to be leveraged from the firm’s competences and which add to 
the firm’s competitiveness. Teece et al. (1992) have added to this, highlighting the active 
nature of this behavioural approach to strategy with their discussion of dynamic 
capabilities. Building on Wernerfelt’s (1984) resource-based view of the firm these 
authors represent what is arguably the ‘core’ of the new behavioural approach to 
competitive strategy based on competence and capability.  
The competence and capability literature has been supplemented by authors writing from 
a number of differing standpoints. Nonaka (1991), and Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) have 
focused on the process of organisational knowledge creation, and link these concepts 
with the work of Prahalad & Hamel (1990) by attempting to explain explicitly how such a 
knowledge creation process is used in Japanese companies to enhance the competences. 
Meyer & Utterback (1993) have discussed the ways in which product families impact on 
organisational capabilities. A common theme is picked up by Iansiti & Clark (1994) who 
stress the importance of integration of internal and external knowledge on the dynamic 
capabilities of the firm. Rosenbloom & Christensen (1994) add to the discussion the 
effect of technological discontinuities, or dramatic changes in technology, on 
                                                 
skilled personnel, trade contracts, machinery, efficient procedures, capital, etc.” (Wernerfelt, 1984: 172). 
76 ‘Unique’ is not taken to mean that such activities are solely held by a single firm. To be ‘unique’ in this context the 
competences should not be ubiquitous across an industry. 
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organisational capabilities. In particular, they focus on the ways in which it may not be 
the lack of a technology that prevents them from competing in the face of a technological 
discontinuity, but rather the inability of the organisation to react to changes. The negative 
effects upon a firm’s competitiveness of inflexibly focusing on the core capabilities and 
competences, or core rigidities, are explored by Leonard-Barton (1992). This work ties-in 
with consideration of path dependencies (Teece et al., 1992), or the way in which firms 
present behaviour is heavily influenced by previous activities. 
These authors, among others, have contributed significantly to the debate of how 
competences and capabilities may be used to add competitive advantage in a dynamic 
competitive environment, but have also added a certain impediment to the usefulness of 
the approach by providing a profusion not only of terminology, but also differing uses of 
the terminology. Also, as raised by Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995), there is a lack of 
comprehensive, all-encompassing theoretical framework which could facilitate a degree 
of integration of complementary concepts.  
Despite these criticisms, the literature on competence and capability would seem to 
provide the richest source of components for building a working theoretical framework 
for the purposes of this research. In the following sections, the concepts developed by the 
leading authors in writing in the field of competence and capability are discussed, before 
moving on to an examination of the ways in which a firm may build-up competence and 
capability. 
Competences and capabilities 
Competences 
As described earlier, competences are the groups of skills and technologies which are co-
ordinated in a certain way so as to differentiate a firm from its competitors (Prahalad & 
Hamel, 1990). Examples of such are given as Sony’s capacity to miniaturise and Philips’ 
optical-media expertise. These competences represent the integration of learning across a 
broad range of individual skill sets and organisational units. They allow the firm to be 
viewed not as a diversified portfolio of businesses, but as a number of shared 
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competences. While Prahalad & Hamel (1990) stress the role of the co-ordination of skills 
and technologies, others have sought to add to the definition of competence the 
importance of other factors. For example, Teece et al. (1992) describe the competences 
that differentiate a firm from its competitors not only in terms of a set of differentiated 
skills, but also complementary assets and organisational arrangements which in 
combination allow a firm to co-ordinate a set of activities in a way that gives the firm 
competitive advantage in a particular market. 
Core competences 
Those competences that are critical to a firm’s survival can be labelled as core (Teece et 
al., 1992). Attempts to differentiate between ‘core’ and ‘non-core’ competences rest on a 
number of measures. At one level, a core competence should be one that stands at the 
centre of the firm’s long-term competitive success (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). Hamel & 
Prahalad (1994) provide three tests for identifying the competences that can be regarded 
as core:- 
1. Customer value - the competence must make a disproportionate contribution to 
customer-perceived value. Core competences are the skills that enable a firm to 
deliver a customer benefit. In making an important contribution to customer perceived 
value, the core competence is not necessarily visible, or easily understood, by the 
customer.  
2. Competitor differentiation - a core competence must be competitively distinctive. In 
this context, this does not mean that only one firm in an industry may be in possession 
of the competence. Rather, it implies that the holding of this competence is not 
ubiquitous across an entire industry, or that one firm’s level of competence is 
substantially superior to others. 
3. Extendability - a competence may not be considered core if there is no way of 
imagining an array of new products or services issuing from it. In practical terms, this 
means that in defining core competences, managers must work very hard to abstract 
away from the particular product configuration in which the competence is embedded, 
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and imagine how the competence might be applied in new product areas. 
In practical usage, attempts to differentiate between a core and a non-core competence are 
somewhat problematic. 
Capabilities 
Competences and capabilities represent two differing but complementary dimensions of 
the behavioural paradigm for competitive strategy. While the usage of the terminology in 
the literature makes it hard to draw a clear dividing line between a competence and a 
capability, much of the literature points towards analysis in terms of capabilities 
emphasising the business processes along the entire value chain which allow a firm to 
differentiate itself from competitors by reconfiguring resources. Competence analysis 
focuses on the actual configuration of resources which can be applied to achieve some 
competitive advantage. 
Stalk et al. (1992) go on to identify four principles on which capability-based competition 
stands:- 
1. The building blocks of corporate strategy are not the products and markets but the business 
processes. 
2. Competitive success depends on transforming a company’s key process into strategic 
capabilities that consistently provide superior value to the customer. 
3. Companies create these capabilities by making strategic investments in support infrastructure 
that links and transcends the traditional SBUs [strategic business units] and functions. 
4. Because capabilities are necessarily cross-functional, the champion of a capabilities-based 
strategy is the CEO (Stalk et al., 1992:62). 
Comparing this with the points raised by Prahalad & Hamel (1990) it becomes clear that 
elements of the issues described above could be applied to a description of competence-
based strategy. This point will be returned to in the critique given further on in this 
chapter. 
Core capabilities 
As with the earlier description of core competences, a firm’s capabilities can also be 
considered ‘core’ if they differentiate the firm from its competitors strategically 
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(Leonard-Barton, 1992). Whereas the definition of capabilities given by Stalk et al. 
focused on differentiating between competences and capabilities, Leonard-Barton’s 
approach is to provide a model of capabilities in four dimensions which encompass some 
of the key aspects of capabilities (See Exhibit 4.1).  
 
 
Exhibit 4.1  Four dimensions of core capabilities 
Source: Leonard-Barton (1992) 
 
These dimensions are:- 
1. Skills and knowledge - these encompass both firm-specific techniques and scientific 
understanding. 
2. Technical systems - the results of accumulating, codifying and structuring the tacit 
knowledge that rests with employees. This encompasses both information and 
procedures. 
3. Managerial systems - the formal and informal ways of creating and controlling 
knowledge. 
4. Values and norms - the value assigned to knowledge, the means of collecting 
knowledge and the controlling of knowledge. 
However, as with competences, attempts to differentiate between core and non-core 
capabilities are extremely difficult. 
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Core rigidities 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, Leonard-Barton (1992) also discusses 
the downside of a resource-based strategy that focuses on the core capabilities:- 
[..] shortfalls in the process are often traceable to the gap between current environmental requirements 
and a corporation’s core capabilities. Values, skills, managerial systems, and technical systems that 
served the company well in the past and may still be wholly appropriate for some projects or parts of 
projects, are experienced by others as core rigidities - inappropriate sets of knowledge. [..] these 
deeply embedded knowledge sets actively create problems. While core rigidities are more problematic 
for projects that are deliberately designed to create new, non-traditional capabilities, rigidities can 
effect all projects - even those that are reasonably congruent with current core capabilities (Leonard-
Barton, 1992:118). 
This ties-in with considerations of path dependencies (Teece et al., 1992). In brief, this 
describes the situation where a firm’s strategic options will naturally tend to focus in upon 
previously successful activities, even if these are inappropriate for the present conditions. 
Thus, as the environment changes, firms may find that the core competences and 
capabilities which provided their competitive advantage in the past are actually hindering 
their ability to adapt to the changing environment. This leads on to consideration of the 
dynamic nature of capabilities required to respond to changing conditions. 
Dynamic capabilities 
Teece et al. (1992) and Teece & Pisano (1994) contribute to the discussion of the role of 
capabilities in a behavioural competitive strategy by adding an emphasis to the dynamic 
nature of the management of the key business processes. By stressing the importance of 
considering the shifting nature of the competitive environment, they are able to define the 
dynamic capabilities of a firm as follows:- 
[Dynamic capabilities are] the capacity of a firm to renew, augment and adapt its core competences 
over time. Capabilities thus reflect the firm’s latent competences (Teece et al., 1992:18). 
This view highlights the need to change internal and external organisational skills, 
resources and functional competences in response to a dynamic environment. Teece & 
Pisano (1994) advance the argument that the strategic dimensions of the firm can be 
viewed in terms of processes (the patterns of current practice and learning), positions (its 
current store of technology, customer base and network relationships) and paths (the 
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alternatives available to the firm).  
The processes of importance to the discussion here can be identified as integration, 
learning, reconfiguration and transformation; the key positions as dependent upon 
technological assets, complementary assets, financial assets and location assets; and the 
paths as path dependencies and technological opportunities available to the firm. 
Critique 
Two major criticisms can be made of the literature on competence and capability as 
described above. Firstly, there is a need for a clear distinction between what is meant by a 
competence, and what is meant by a capability. The use of these terms varies from one 
author to another, and while some attempt to make clear definitions, others use these two 
terms interchangeably. While some authors talk rather confusingly of “a difficult-to-
imitate competence/capability being a distinctive competence” (Teece et al., 1992) and 
attempt to become ever-more specific by attempting to differentiate between “generic 
core competences” versus “distinctive core competences” (Meyer & Utterback, 1993) one 
factor becomes clear: often the authors are describing essentially identical concepts but 
with differing terminology. As pointed out by Leonard-Barton (1992) with regard to 
defining capabilities:- 
The concept is not new. Various authors have called them distinctive competences, core or 
organisational competencies, firm specific competence, resource deployments and invisible assets 
(Ibid., 111-112)77 
Many authors have sought to clarify issues by introducing new terminology, but this 
seems to have in many cases added to the confusion rather than reduced it. However, by 
focusing on concepts embedded in the key literature, it becomes clear that the basic ideas 
of competences (the configuration of resources, including skills, knowledge and 
technologies) and capability (the way in which resources may be reconfigured to form 
new competences) are ones that as they stand, and without recourse to ever-more exact 
definitions, provide a useful tool for examining the behaviour of firms. 
                                                 
77 Note: citations omitted. 
Japanese innovation strategy and the acquisition of UK IT firms                                                                                             Chapter 4 
 95 
A second criticism can be levelled at this body of literature. The use of a theoretical unit 
of analysis is inconsistent between authors. For example while authors such as Prahalad 
& Hamel (1990) and Leonard-Barton (1992) focus on the processes within the firm as the 
unit of interest, other authors (such as Stalk et al., 1992) analyse competence and 
capability in terms of the changing business environment. Porter (1991) stresses the need 
to integrate consideration of both these internal and external factors:- 
Resources are not valuable in and of themselves, but because they allow firms to perform activities 
that create advantages in particular markets. Resources are only meaningful in the context of 
performing certain activities to achieve certain competitive advantages. The competitive value of 
resources can be enhanced and eliminated by changes in technology, competitor behaviour, or buyer 
needs which an inward focus will overlook (Porter, 1991:108). 
What is required for the purposes of this research is an understanding of the process 
within the firm, which includes consideration of the evolving industrial environment. For 
the Japanese firms at the centre of this research, the immediate and anticipated changes in 
the competitive environment were dictating the internal processes required for firms to 
survive. For example, the highly open, systemic and rapidly changing nature of the ‘new’ 
computer industry was dictating that firms attempting to operate within this industry 
needed themselves to be open (able to work with external organisations), systemic (to 
have an intimate knowledge of how their products and services fitted with and relied upon 
those of other firms), and able to respond rapidly to change in the competitive 
environment. 
Despite the criticisms, the resource-based view of the firm provides us with a language 
for discussing the issues of the how the changing industrial environment was influencing 
the internal management processes required of the firms at the centre of this research in 
order to remain competitive. 
In the following section, the discussion turns to consideration of the ways in which firms 
are able to enhance both their competences and capabilities. 
Building up competences and capabilities 
As discussed earlier, competence and capability analysis stems from an understanding of 
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a firm in terms of its resources78 - competences are the bundles of resources; capabilities 
are the ways in which the firm can reconfigure these resources over time. Consequently, a 
discussion as to how competences and capabilities may be enhanced needs to be rooted in 
an understanding of the ways in which a firm’s resources may be exploited. Hamel & 
Prahalad’s (1993) description of resource stretch and resource leverage provide a useful 
five-point framework on which to base such a discussion. The five points of their 
framework are:  
1. resource concentration,  
2. resource accumulation,  
3. resource complementing,  
4. resource conserving, and  
5. resource recovery.  
Each of these five points represents a process for manipulating resources (a capability), 
and the output from each process represents an augmented, renewed or adapted grouping 
of resources (a competence). 
Concentration 
Hamel & Prahalad (1993) discuss the requirements for effective concentration of 
resources in terms of convergence and focus. The first of these two terms refers to the 
need for the efforts of individuals, functions and businesses to be convergent upon a 
common focal point over time. Such a common focal point requires a high degree of 
commitment to the company’s growth trajectory to avoid the squandering of resources on 
competing projects. Given a dynamic environment, such as that of the IT industry, 
convergence is not always easily achieved. 
                                                 
78 Resources, as defined earlier, encompass more than just tangible assets. An important dimension to a firm’s 
resources is that of knowledge. A firm can be viewed as a “repository of knowledge” (Fransman, 1994:715), and this 
body of knowledge is added to through the experiences of the employees. The relative efficiency of the various 
processes by which knowledge is accumulated, adapted and applied is one way in which a firm may be differentiated 
from its competitors. The term ‘resources’ in the discussion below is taken to include both the tangible and intangible. 
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Focus requires attention to be given to key operating goals at any one time (as distinct 
from convergence, which refers to the allocation of resources over time). The dilution of 
resources across a wide range of goals and projects is unlikely to lead to satisfactory 
performance of the firm in the medium to long term. 
Accumulation 
Resources, and in particular knowledge can be accumulated by a number of means, 
including extraction, borrowing and creation. 
Extraction refers to the drawing-out of knowledge from the cumulative experiences of 
employees. The processes of dealing with customers, analysing competitors and solving 
technical problems provides a valuable source of knowledge which a firm can utilise to 
add to its competitiveness. For extraction to be effective, an appropriate corporate 
environment needs to be cultivated where employees can become skilled at problem 
identification and solving, and where all employees feel a responsibility for the firm’s 
competitiveness. 
The term borrowing encompasses a number of means by which a firm may gain resources 
from outside its boundaries. The options available form a spectrum ranging from the 
reverse engineering of competitor’s products and industrial espionage, though to the 
taking-over of ownership of a firm possessing a resource lacking in the parent 
organisation. Intermediate strategic options along that spectrum include joint venture 
partnerships, licensing agreements, technology purchasing, selective hiring, the use of 
consultants and the scanning of trade and academic journals. Some of these options may 
only be appropriate for the acquisition of more tangible resources and explicit, relatively 
easy to transfer knowledge of a particular technology79. 
The effective acquisition of the more intangible resources such as the tacit knowledge 
held within another firm requires a high degree of interaction between the two 
organisations. It also calls for an understanding of the processes of organisational learning 
                                                 
79 The acquisition of technology was discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, Part II. 
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(Argyris & Schön, 1984) and knowledge conversion (i.e., between tacit and explicit 
knowledge) (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Joint venture partnerships (Hamel et al., 1989) 
and corporate acquisitions (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991) form two major ways in which 
a firm can attempt the transfer of such intangible resources80.  
Consideration of the relative merits of accumulation through joint venture partnerships 
and acquisitions adds to the discussion of the use of these strategic options given in 
Chapter 3. Japanese firms have shown a preference for using joint ventures for acquiring 
distinctive competences (Hamel & Prahalad, 1993). The case of NEC is cited as an 
example of the use of alliances by Japanese firms:- 
NEC relied upon hundreds of alliances, licensing deals and joint ventures to bolster its product 
development efforts and to gain access to foreign markets. Alliances with Intel, General Electric, 
Varian and Honeywell, to name a few, multiplied NEC’s internal resources. Indeed, NEC managers 
have been forthright in admitting that without the capacity to learn from their partners, their progress 
towards the goal of computers and communication81 would have been much slower (Hamel & 
Prahalad, 1993:80). 
However, such strategic alliances require careful management if the desired goals are to 
be achieved. There is the risk, when entering into such partnerships, of the inadvertent 
surrendering of resources to an alliance partner (Reich & Mankin, 1986). In addition, 
reliance upon an alliance partner can cause extreme problems when there is a risk of 
change of ownership of that partner, e.g., a hostile take-over bid. In such a situation, it 
may become necessary for one partner to acquire a large capital stake in the other as a 
defensive move to ensure continuing access and transfer of resources. 
The literature relating to intangible resources has tended to focus on how knowledge is 
acquired and accumulated (Argyris & Schön, 1984; Senge, 199082), but less attention has 
been given to the functioning of the knowledge creation process. This issue has recently 
                                                 
80 At a different level, the head-hunting of staff from competitors can provide one means of transferring tacit 
knowledge between firms. This option is particularly prevalent in the IT industry, and the relative frequency and ease 
with which it occurs (the “hypermobility” of labour) is discussed by Florida & Kenney, (1990). 
81 The strategy of integrating skills in telecommunication, semiconductor, and computer related technologies to exploit 
the convergence of communication and computers - ‘C&C’. 
82 Senge (1990) introduces the concept of ‘learning disabilities’ within organisations which may impede the ability of a 
firm to acquire new knowledge. 
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been addressed in some depth by Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995). 
The organisation which wishes to cope dynamically with the changing environment needs to be one 
that creates information and knowledge, not merely process them efficiently. [..] Understanding how 
organisations create new products, new methods and new organisational forms is important. A more 
fundamental need is to understand how organisations create new knowledge that makes such creations 
possible (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995:50). 
Nonaka & Takeuchi go on to highlight the way in which knowledge is created though the 
interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge, and how these various conversion 
processes lead to ‘new’ knowledge (See Exhibit 4.2). 
 
 
Exhibit 4.2  Four modes of knowledge conversion 
Source: Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) 
Complementing 
The ability to blend resources to create synergistic benefit is an extremely powerful form 
of leverage. Kodama (1991;1992) cites the success of Japanese firms in ‘opto-electronics’ 
(the combining of skills in optics and electronics) and ‘mechatronics’ (the combining of 
skills in mechanics and electronics) as examples of this form of resource leverage, which 
he labels fusion. Kodama (1992) provides three principles for technology fusion. Firstly, 
for fusion to be successful, the market must drive development, not visa versa. Secondly, 
an active and efficient intelligence network is required to maintain links with 
developments both inside and outside the industry. Employees must be “active receivers” 
of information. Thirdly, it is vital for firms to actively engage in external R&D consortia 
in a manner which is both reciprocal and substantial. It can be seen that this form of 
leverage ties-in closely with the need for a firm to be an efficient ‘borrower’ of 
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knowledge from external sources. 
For the blending and fusing of resources to be successful, Hamel & Prahalad (1993) 
identify an alternative three factors of importance. Firstly, there must be the ability to 
integrate new technologies, which itself relies upon the availability of technology 
generalists, ‘systems thinkers’ (Senge, 1990; Senge & Sterman, 1992) and the ability to 
optimise technological trade-offs. Secondly, there is the requirement to integrate the 
diverse functional skills such as R&D, production, marketing and sales. Thirdly, there is a 
requirement for a high degree of ingenuity to think-up potential new product 
opportunities, based on the input from the various functional areas within the firm, and 
from outside. 
A second dimension to the complementing of resources is that of balance. This refers to 
the ability of a firm to maintain a sound footing in the key three areas: strong product 
development skills; the capacity to produce goods; and the ability to distribute, market 
and service its products. An adequate deployment of resources in each of these 
dimensions must be maintained to provide the required balance. 
Conserving 
Conserving encompasses all efforts made by a firm to re-cycle its resources and to 
prevent competitors gaining access to them. Strategies of use here include co-opting, or 
the recruiting of potential competitors as an ally against a third party. The relationship 
between various Japanese, European and US computer firms in the ‘war’ against IBM can 
be seen as a good example of this form of resource leverage.  
An additional factor is the defending of resources. Defence includes the use of acquiring a 
capital stake in a partner to prevent competitors from gaining access to the distinct 
resources and competences that the partner may possess. 
Also included in this category of resource leverage options is the concept of shielding, or 
the avoidance of full frontal attack on a stronger competitor by targeting resources on a 
weak, unanticipated target area. 
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Recovery 
The final dimension of resource leverage is that relating to the speed at which resources 
are recovered from the market. A firm than is able quickly to recover resources through 
revenue from the market will add to its competitiveness. One way of achieving this is 
through a shortening of the product development process. Firms operating in the high 
technology industries already have a strong motivation to reduce product development 
times, as the time between new technologies being developed, these technologies being 
converted into products, and these products becoming technologically and commercially 
obsolete, is reducing rapidly (von Braun, 1990).  
A note on capability enhancement 
While it is relatively easy to see how competences may be enhanced (i.e., through 
borrowing, concentration, recovery, etc.) it is not quite so obvious how a firm may 
enhance its capabilities, i.e., those processes or routines by which the competences are 
renewed, augmented and adapted over time. In the same way that a firm may lack a 
specific resource which is required for it to build a distinctive competence, it may also 
lack capability - the skill of a particular organisational or managerial process which 
would allow the firm to enhance or acquire that specific resource. Such capabilities 
include skill at resource accumulation, concentration, complementing, conserving and 
recovery. 
An example of such an organisational process might be the ability to manage a corporate 
acquisition or a joint venture partnership. Such a capability may not easily be acquired 
(Teece & Pisano, 1994). It may be that such a capability can only be internalised by 
experience. Thus an organisation seeking to become skilful in the use of strategic 
alliances as a means to acquire resources and competences can only do so by actually 
forming such an alliance and effectively ‘learning by doing’. This can be seen to tie-in 
with the concepts of single and double loop learning (Argyris & Schön, 1984) whereby 
organisations seek not only to learn a specific skill but seek ways of enhancing their 
ability to learn new skills, i.e., ‘leaning how to learn’. It can be seen how such concepts 
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can be included in examination of the behaviour of the Japanese firms at the centre of this 
research. These firms may have been seeking not only the acquisition of a particular 
resource, but also by acquiring, they were learning a ‘new’ process for internalising 
resources in the future. 
Components of an analytical framework 
The discussion in this chapter has provided us with a number of concepts for viewing the 
behaviour of firms in terms of the manipulation of resources. Viewing the firm in terms of 
its competences and capabilities provides us with a lens for examining behaviour in the 
face of rapid change and uncertainty driven by emerging technologies.  
For firms in such a position, the acquisition of technologies is not necessarily the most 
appropriate strategy, as firms do not know which technologies to acquire. Until standard 
architecture and applications have emerged, building up competence based around an 
inappropriate technology can be disastrous. What a firm needs is the ability to develop a 
suitable organisational structure and to have the appropriate capabilities to allow the firm 
to respond to changes as and when they occur. Consideration in terms of competence and 
capability provides us with the ability to gain a more integrated view of the behaviour of 
firms in conditions of such uncertainty. 
Following on from the distillation of central concepts of resource, competences, 
capabilities, and the means by which these may be enhanced, it is now possible to 
construct a rudimentary analytical framework.  
A primary component of this framework is a consideration of the way in which a firm 
will respond to changes in the environment (e.g., competitors gaining market share), or 
the emergence of new business opportunities (e.g., evolving from a new technology), or 
simply an ‘unknown quantity’. In such a situation, a firm will seek to develop a strategy 
to allow it to respond to these changes or opportunities. In seeking to develop a strategy, 
the firm will face certain constraining factors which will limit its choice of action. These 
limiting factors may be regarded as dependent upon what the firm has got or can access, 
and what the firm can do. Using the language of the resource-based perspective, 
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simplified for our purposes, these involve consideration of:- 
1. Core resources - The store of tangible and intangible firm specific resources that the 
firm has internalised. Such resources include in-house knowledge of technology, 
skilled personnel, brand names and contracts. 
2. Complementary resources - The additional resources which may be required to be 
combined with certain core resources to form a competence. Such resources may 
include sales, distribution, complementary technologies or competitive manufacturing 
facilities. 
3. Competences - The ways in which resources are bundled together to form specific and 
distinctive skills areas. 
4. Capabilities - The routines or processes which allow the firm to reconfigure its 
resources. These include resource concentration, accumulation, complementing, 
conserving and recovery. 
5. Competitive environment - The influence of competitive pressures in the firm’s 
external environment will influence how rapidly and in what way the firm must 
reconfigure resources. 
6. Path dependencies - A firm’s previous investments and activities will, to a certain 
extent, restrict its behaviour. Attempts to reconfigure and adapt resources will 
naturally tend to close in on previous successful activities. 
It may be that these factors do not constrain the choice of effective response, and that the 
firm’s existing resources, competences and capabilities will be sufficient to allow an 
effective response to be developed. However, it is likely that some form of adaptation will 
be necessary to allow an appropriate strategy to be developed and implemented. Such 
actions can be categorised into the following groupings:- 
1. Stretching and leveraging resources - through the activities of concentrating, 
accumulating, complementing, conserving and recovering. These activities will allow 
the firm to enhance not only the essential ‘core’ resources, but also the additional 
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requirements, e.g., complementary assets. 
2. Reconfiguring these resources - to form new or enhanced competences. These 
competences will then provide the means to develop a response to changes in the 
environment, or to take advantage of new business opportunities. 
3. Acquiring knowledge of new processes or routines - These new processes or routines 
will enable new ways of reconfiguring resources to form new competences. 
The selection of an appropriate strategy and the efficiency of its implementation will have 
a direct influence on the firm’s performance. This strategy must be suitably flexible to 
respond to changes in the environment during its implementation. The success of the firm 
will have an impact on the firm’s external environment, and this will feed-back in the 
form of new opportunities and challenges to which the company must respond. By 
integrating these steps of reasoning, it is possible to construct a simple framework for 
analysis. A visual representation of this framework is presented in Exhibit 4.3. 
The next stage in this research is to assess the evidence required in combination with this 
framework to enhance our understanding to the use of corporate acquisitions by Japanese 
firms, faced with a dynamic and uncertain environment driven by fast emerging 
technologies.  
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Exhibit 4.3  Rudimentary conceptual framework 
Source: Derived from Teece et al. (1992) 
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Chapter 5 Research methodology 
Chapter overview 
This chapter has two aims. The first is to assess the evidence required to investigate the research 
questions of the thesis in the light of the conceptual approach so far developed. The second is to 
consider the methods appropriate to obtaining and interpreting the relevant evidence, which 
includes pragmatic considerations of time and cost.  
The chapter is structured around the following format. Firstly, we explore briefly the various 
sources of data that could potentially be used to assist in the building of a theoretical framework 
to enhance our understanding of the use of acquisitions by Japanese firms. This exploration 
points to the use of case studies for obtaining qualitative data to support the development of the 
theoretical framework. Following a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of such an 
approach, the process of selecting an appropriate case study format is then described. The final 
section of the chapter outlines the data acquisition protocol used for obtaining the relevant 
qualitative data. 
Methodology selection 
The selection of an appropriate methodology in social science is embedded in an 
understanding of the relation between data and theory. The two opposing paradigms 
constructed around this relationship can be summarised as those of positivism and 
phenomenology (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). The nature of the research and the allying 
of the research design with a particular paradigm presents a series of choices for the 
research, as can be seen in Exhibit 5.1. 
Though clearly taking a somewhat positivist approach, Yin (1994) provides a summary of 
conditions for selecting an appropriate research strategy in the social sciences. The three 
conditions are dependent upon; (1) the type of research question posed, (2) the extent of 
control an investigator has over actual behavioural events, and (3) the degree of focus on 
contemporary as opposed to historical events (See Exhibit 5.2). 
 
 Positivist paradigm Phenomenological paradigm 
Basic beliefs • The world is external and objective. • The world is socially constructed and 
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• Observer is independent. 
• Science is value free. 
subjective. 
• Observer is part of what is observed. 
• Science is driven by human interest. 
Researcher should • Focus on facts. 
• Look for causality and fundamental 
laws. 
• Reduce phenomena to simplest 
elements. 
• Formulate hypothesis and then test 
them. 
• Focus on meanings. 
• Try to understand what is happening. 
• Look at the totality of each situation. 
• Develop ideas through induction from 
data. 
Preferred methods 
include 
• Operationalising concepts so that they 
can be measured. 
• Taking large samples. 
• Using multiple methods to establish 
different views of phenomena. 
• Small samples investigated in depth or 
over time. 
Exhibit 5.1  Key features of the positivist and phenomenological paradigms 
Source: Easterby-Smith et al., 1991 
 
Research strategy Form of research questions Requires control over 
behavioural events? 
Focuses on 
contemporary events 
Experiment how, why? Yes Yes 
Survey who, what, where, how many, how 
much? 
No Yes 
Archival analysis who, what, where, how many, how 
much? 
No Yes/no 
History how, why? No No 
Case study how, why? No Yes 
Exhibit 5.2  Relevant strategies for research 
Source: Adapted from Yin (1994) 
From an examination of the main question posed in the opening chapter of this 
dissertation (How have Japanese firms been able to benefit from the acquisition of UK IT 
firms to enhance their ability to compete in the complex and dynamic environment of the 
IT industry?), the conditions provided by Yin pointed to the use of some form of 
historical case study83 as the most appropriate form of data collection. 
                                                 
83 The distinction between a historical analysis and a case study, as described by Yin (1994), is that for a pure historical 
study, the researcher is dealing with the ‘dead’ past, i.e., no relevant persons are alive to report on events, and that the 
main source of information is primary documentation, secondary documentation and other artefacts.  
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However, the use of case studies in organisational research carries a number of 
drawbacks. The issue of generalisation is often perceived as one of the major problems 
emerging from the use of case studies in social science research (Bryman, 1989). This 
stems from the inappropriate application of statistical notions which treat each case as a 
sample of one, and consequently attempts to discount any inferences drawn from such a 
single sample. A number of authors (including Yin, 1994; Bryman, 1989) have argued 
that such reasoning should not be applied to case study research:- 
[..] case studies should be evaluated in terms of the adequacy of the theoretical inferences that can be 
generated. The aim is not to infer the findings from a sample to a population, but to engender patterns 
and linkages of theoretical importance (Bryman, 1989:173). 
This view is echoed by Eisenhardt (1989), who describes the role of case studies in 
building theory. Eisenhardt contends that, while there are weaknesses to this approach, 
such as the intensive use of empirical evidence yielding theory which is overly complex 
and the resultant theory being “narrow and idiosyncratic”, there are a number of strengths 
in using case studies for theory building. These include the increased likelihood of 
generating novel theory, the measurability of emergent theories, and the empirical 
validity of resultant theories. These factors, coupled with the nature of this project and the 
conceptual approach so far developed would seem to point to the appropriateness of using 
a case study methodology. This is supported in particular by Eisenhardt’s description of 
the applicability of the use of case studies for theory building:- 
[..] the theory building process relies on past literature and empirical observation or experience as well 
as on the insight of the theorist to build incrementally more powerful theories. However, there are 
times when little is known about a phenomenon, current perspectives seem inadequate because they 
have little empirical substantiation, or they conflict with each other or common sense. Or, sometimes, 
serendipitous findings in a theory testing study suggest the need for a new perspective. In these 
situations, theory building from case study research is particularity appropriate because theory 
building does not rely upon previous literature or prior empirical evidence. Also, the conflict inherent 
in the process is likely to generate the kind of novel theory which is desirable when extant theory 
seems inadequate (Eisenhardt, 1988:548). 
The line of reasoning taken so far in this thesis has pointed to a situation where emerging 
issues “conflict with each other or common sense”, i.e., the use of acquisitions by 
Japanese firms can be viewed as an effective means to internalise technology, but they 
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also present complex managerial challenges for Japanese firms. The perspectives 
provided by the literature have been inadequate, and pointed to the need for an approach 
which provides an alternative means for viewing the use of acquisitions. It would seem 
that a theory built from material drawn from examination of cases and combined with the 
analytical constructs so far developed would be able to provide such a perspective. 
Design of the case study 
The design of a case study can fall into one of four categories (Yin, 1994) (See Exhibit 
5.3). The variables which define the categories are the use of single, or multiple cases, 
and the use of single, or multiple units of analysis.  
 
 Single-case designs Multiple-case designs  
Single unit of analysis Type 1 Type 2  
Multiple units of analysis Type 3 Type 4  
Exhibit 5.3  Types of case studies 
Source: Yin (1994) 
Multiple versus single case studies 
Multiple case studies would seem to have certain advantages over singles case studies. 
For example, multiple cases allow for the comparison, or triangulation of results and 
arguably provide a more ‘robust’ set of results for the research than single case studies 
(Herriott & Firestone, 1983). However, such an argument could be seen as implying the 
inappropriate application of  statistical notions (Bryman, 1989). There are situations 
where single cases will be more suitable84, though adding further cases can have 
                                                 
84 The situations whereby a single case study will be the most appropriate can be grouped into three areas. Firstly, the 
research questions may represents a critical case in testing a well formulated theory. Secondly, when the research 
represents an extreme or unique case. Thirdly, the research may represent a revelatory case - the observation of a 
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advantages:- 
The reasons for including a second case (or more) are usually twofold; the generalizability of the 
research may be enhanced, and comparisons allow the special features of the cases to be identified 
more readily (Bryman, 1989:171). 
The logic underlying the use of multiple case studies is based partly on rationale of 
replication, rather than sampling logic. Thus, it is not a matter of choosing a sample from 
a population which will provide the most representative view of the population as a 
whole, as would be the case when using a survey. Instead, replication provides a rationale 
for selecting more than one case based upon the idea that the theory under examination 
should be tested in more than one comparable context to see whether it ‘fits’ (Bryman, 
1989; Yin 1994). This is discussed further in the section on Validity. 
The choice of an ‘adequate’ number of cases is bounded at the upper level by practical 
considerations relating to the research project resources, as well as issues relating to the 
problems of managing a large quantity of rich and complex data (Miles & Huberman, 
1984). At the lower end of the scale, the restrictions and options have already been 
discussed in relation to the choice of single or multiple cases. 
Single or multiple units of analysis 
In selecting between a single unit, or multiple units of analysis approach within each case, 
there are a number of issues to be considered. A single unit approach is useful for 
providing a global view of the issues at stake within an organisation. By selecting one 
unit of analysis, the research will naturally focus upon the perceived target of the 
research. While this has the advantage of simplicity and clarity, if the nature of the 
research target shifts during the project, the unit of analysis initially selected may be 
inappropriate. It may then becomes necessary to either restructure the research questions, 
or to select a different unit of analysis. A multiple unit of analysis approach has the 
advantage of allowing investigation to take place at a number of different levels, and 
consequently can provide a broader picture of the issues under examination. However, 
                                                 
phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific research. 
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this approach also has its disadvantages. For example, examination of a sub-unit of 
analysis may shift the focus of attention away from the original, broader research issues 
(Yin, 1994). 
Validity, reliability and generalisability in case study research 
Whatever method is used to acquire data for research in social science, there is a need to 
ensure that the method will stand up to external scrutiny. Much of the language used for 
this purpose has been developed from quantitative research, and the usage in qualitative 
research may imply an acceptance of “one absolute positivist reality” (Easterby-Smith et 
al., 1991). However, concepts such as validity, reliability and generalisability, though 
developed from quantitative research practices and often perceived as representing the 
application of the positivist viewpoint, can also be applied for use in interpretativist 
research (See Exhibit 5.4). 
 
 Positivist viewpoint Phenomenological viewpoint 
Validity Does the instrument measure what it is 
supposed to measure? 
Has the researcher gained full access to the 
knowledge and meanings of informants? 
Reliability Will the measure yield the same results on 
different occasions (Assuming no real change 
in what is to be measured)? 
Will similar observations be made by different 
researchers on different occasions? 
Generalisability What is the probability that patterns observed in 
a sample will also be present in the wider 
population from which the sample is drawn? 
How likely is it that ideas and theories 
generated in one setting will also apply in other 
settings? 
Exhibit 5.4  Questions of reliability, validity and generalisability 
Source: Easterby-Smith et al., 1991. 
Though there is a risk of reverting to the inappropriate application of qualitative, 
statistical notions (as discussed earlier, from Bryman (1989)) for interpretativist research, 
these terms do provide us with a “useful discipline” for ensuring the consistency and 
coherence of the material acquired (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). As such, these concepts 
form an essential component of the design case study protocol. 
The generalised format of a multiple case study design is given in Exhibit 5.5. 
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Exhibit 5.5  Multiple case study methodology 
Source: Yin (1994) 
 
Selection of appropriate case study design 
Having considered the various dimensions of the design of generic case studies, the next 
stage is to describe the actual design of the case studies used in this research.  
As described by Bryman (1989), it is often implied that case study research in theory 
building points to the use of a single case. However, considerations of generalisability 
and validity point to the advantages of using more than one case (Easterby-Smith et al., 
1989; Yin, 1994). This is also true of the number of units of analysis used within each 
case. Balancing considerations of practicality with reliability, it was decided for this 
research to select three acquisitions to be used as cases for detailed examination in this 
research. The three acquisitions were selected on the basis of the size of the acquired UK 
firms to allow consideration of a ‘small’, ‘medium’ and ‘large’ acquisition85. Within each 
case, there were two units of analysis, corresponding to the IT division of the Japanese 
firm, and the acquired UK firm as a whole. Providing two units of analysis allowed 
comparisons within each case, as well as comparison between cases. 
                                                 
85 These three labels were applied to the sales of the acquired UK firms prior to acquisition as follows: Small < £10m, 
£10m >medium<£100m, large > £100m. 
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Having selected the number of cases and the units of analysis within each case, the next 
stage was to identify the sources of material required for developing an understanding of 
the case study acquisitions.  
Sources of data 
The potential sources of data which can be used within a case study methodology are 
shown in Exhibit 5.6.  
Exhibit 5.6  Types of data for case studies  
Source: Adapted from Yin (1994) 
The sources of data used for this research project fit into one of four categories (See 
Exhibit 5.7). Primary data relates to data specifically acquired for the present programme 
of research, whereas secondary data refers to data collected for another purpose and kept 
archived in some form (Stewart & Kammins, 1984). Internal refers to data emerging from 
the main unit of analysis - the Japanese parent company. External data describes data 
sources outside the Japanese parent firm - competitors, financiers, government sources, 
etc. Lying between internal and external data is the ‘grey’ area within which data from the 
acquired UK firms rests. As this research attempts to explain events that took place over a 
period of time corresponding to the acquisition process and continuing up until the time 
of writing, the UK firms effectively move from being external sources to internal. For the 
sake of simplicity, these firms will be positioned in the grey area between internal and 
external. In the following sections, the sources for the case study material are described 
briefly. A full listing of all sources of data is given in Appendix II. Details of the actual 
data acquisition protocol used to acquire the data from the case study companies is given 
 
Source of data Examples include: 
Documentation Letters, minutes of meetings, reports, newspaper articles. 
Archival records Service records, survey data, organisational records. 
Interviews Open ended interviews, focused interviews, structured interviews. 
Direct observations Site observations (including meetings, factory work). 
Participant observation Researcher assumes role within case study situation. 
Physical artefacts Physical devices, tools or instruments which are collected or observed. 
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further on.  
 
Exhibit 5.7  Sources of data for the case studies 
 
Primary internal sources 
This data was acquired through the use of semi-structured interviews with senior- and 
middle-management within the Japanese parent company and within the UK subsidiary. 
Details of the format of these interviews is given in Appendix II. 
Primary external sources 
Primary external data relating to the case study companies was acquired though 
interviews with management within competing firms (including personnel from other 
case study companies), within financial organisations having interests connected with 
Japanese firms operating in the UK, and with journalists and researchers whose areas of 
interest overlapped with the focus of this research. 
Secondary internal sources 
These sources of data encompass all information published by the parent companies 
themselves. They include annual reports, publicity material, Web pages and other 
material published by, or in close connection with the parent company. This last category 
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includes books written by company insiders, and previous case studies carried out with a 
high level of co-operation from the firms themselves. 
Secondary external sources 
Data from these sources was acquired in the form of industry reports from Japanese and 
government agencies (e.g., MITI), the results of searches of news archive services (e.g., 
Reuter Business Briefing, FT Profile) and industry case studies (e.g., DataQuest, 
Investor’s Business Daily). 
Selection of case study firms 
Having selected an appropriate methodology, it was then necessary to identify suitable 
firms for use as case studies. Suitable firms were categorised as those which fitted five 
criteria, as summarised below:- 
1. The parent organisation must be based in Japan. 
2. The parent organisation must have taken a majority ownership stake in a UK IT firm. 
3. The acquisition of ownership must have taken place between 1988 and 199286. 
4. The firms must agree to give adequate access to the researcher. 
5. There must be a sufficient quantity of external data available on the companies. 
In order to select suitable firms, a short-list was drawn up from Japanese firms whose 
acquisition of UK firms had been documented in publications stored in the FT Profile 
news archive. From this list, a number of potential firms emerged. After contact with the 
Japanese parent firm and the UK subsidiary, and consideration of the other factors listed 
above, three cases emerged as being most suitable. The outline details of these three 
acquisitions is given below in Exhibit 5.8. 
 
 Case A Case B Case C 
                                                 
86 This time-frame was included to ensure reasonable consistency, and to include consideration of factors relating to the 
integration of the European Union in 1992. 
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Japanese parent firm Fujitsu Mitsubishi Electric Kao Corporation 
Business areas Communication 
systems, computer 
systems, electronic 
devices. 
IT systems, heavy 
electrical machinery, 
consumer electronics. 
Detergents, cosmetics, 
fatty chemicals, edible 
oils, IT products. 
Approximate sales at 
time of acquisition / £m 
12,000 15,000 2,700 
Acquired UK firm ICL Apricot Computers 
Ltd (hardware 
division) 
Protoscan Software 
Services 
Business areas Computer systems, 
computer services. 
Computer systems. Software support 
services. 
Approximate sales at 
time of acquisition / £m 
1,600 81 3.4* 
Exhibit 5.8  Case study firms 
Source: Company reports and *Costello (1992) Note: £1: ¥200 
 
Data collection protocol 
A schematic outline of the data collection protocol is given in Exhibit 5.9. The two stages 
of the process are outlined below. 
 
 
Exhibit 5.9  Data collection protocol 
Stage 1 
In the first stage, contextual evidence relating to the case study acquisitions was acquired 
from examination of secondary data sources. This stage began with a search of news 
items drawn from two commercial archives87 containing reference to both the Japanese 
parent and the target UK company. Content analysis of the returned news stories was then 
undertaken to select those which either; (a) provided useful background information on 
the case study companies and the industry environment, or (b) provided material relating 
                                                 
87 FT Profile and Reuter Business Briefing. Details of publications covered by these archives is given in Appendix II 
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explicitly to the acquisitions. Following this, the case study companies were approached 
directly, and via the Internet to obtain as much secondary material as possible relating to 
company performance, financial figures, organisational structure, product ranges and 
strategies. A bibliographic search was also carried out to determine what had been written 
on the case study firms by academics, in the form of working papers, journal articles, 
dissertations and published books. 
Reports published by commercial industry intelligence firms such as DataQuest were 
accessed to gain industry background information and an understanding of trends. 
Various Japanese government departments and government sponsored agencies, such the 
MITI, JETRO and EIAJ were also approached for additional data on the IT industry in 
general and specific material relating to the case study firms. 
Stage 2 
In Stage 2, the focus moved to the collection of rich contextual evidence from primary 
data sources. Firstly, external sources such as journalists, corporate financiers and 
researchers with interests in the same field as this project were used. Interviews were 
arranged with these sources, and the format of data collection protocol used was one of 
face-to-face, semi-structured/open ended interview88.  
Secondly, certain key personnel within the case study firms were targeted, and interviews 
arranged in the UK and Japan. The picture of events developed in Stage 1 of the data 
acquisition process, and the additions made to this picture by the external interviews 
added to the richness of information obtained during these internal interviews and acted 
as a means of checking the validity of material acquired. 
Validity, reliability and generalisability 
The purpose of using case studies for this research was to provide rich contextual 
evidence which would be combined with theoretical constructs drawn from the literature 
on the resource-based perspective to build a framework for enhancing our understanding 
                                                 
88 Details of the format of these interviews is given in Appendix II. 
Japanese innovation strategy and the acquisition of UK IT firms                                                                                             Chapter 5 
 118 
of the behaviour of firms in conditions of uncertainty driven by fast emerging 
technologies. As such, the validity, reliability and generalisability of the methodology 
needed to be considered at two levels. Firstly, there was a need to ensure that the material 
acquired from the ‘critical cases’ (i.e., those used to build theory) was authentic and 
appropriate, as well as consistent and coherent across cases so as to ensure the validity 
and reliability of the research. Secondly, there was a need to ensure the robustness of the 
framework developed in order to ensure, as far as was possible, the overall 
generalisability of the research (See earlier Exhibit 5.5). 
For addressing the first level issues, the protocol developed ensured that the material 
acquired was authentic by relying on both primary and secondary, as well as internal and 
external sources, and was appropriate by focusing data acquisition efforts on a series of 
key issues during the interviews and content analysis. The use of a semi-structured 
approach to both the interviews and content analysis ensured the consistency and 
coherence of evidence across cases (See Appendix II for details of approach used).  
For the issue of generalisability, i.e., the likelihood that the theories built by this research 
can be applied in other settings, the application of “replication logic” (as described by 
Bryman (1989) and Yin (1994)) through the use of multiple cases for the provision of 
evidence provides a means for ensuring this. However, it is worth reiterating that this 
research focuses on the building of theory from the combining of a conceptual approach 
drawn from literature with the evidence from case studies, not the testing of extant theory. 
As such, the application of ‘tests’ to ensure the generalisability of the framework as it is 
being developed would seem again to represent the inappropriate application of statistical 
notions, as discussed at the start of this chapter89.  
Compilation of data 
Having described the selection of an appropriate methodology for acquiring the rich 
qualitative material to support the building of a theory to investigate the research 
                                                 
89 Eisenhardt (1989) argues that the building of theory that can be extended beyond specific phenomena requires a 
combination of both theory building and theory testing empirical studies.  
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questions, the next stage was to present the material in some structured format prior to 
analysis. Each of the case studies is presented as a report built around the following 
structure:- 
• Background to bidder and target 
• Environmental conditions that led to the firms coming together. 
• The process of acquisition 
• Integration issues 
• Longer term developments 
In the following chapters, the three case studies are presented prior to combining with the 
constructs of the analytical approach so far developed to build a framework for viewing 
the behaviour of firms faced with a dynamic and uncertain environment. 
  120 
Chapter 6 Case Study A: Fujitsu-ICL 
Chapter overview 
In 1990, Fujitsu, a Japanese producer of communication systems, computers and information 
processing systems and electronics devices, acquired ownership of ICL, the UK’s largest 
computer systems company. 
Fujitsu had been working on various collaborative projects with ICL since 1981, when the British 
government had encouraged the near-bankrupt ICL to seek out a partner who would be able to 
provide the leading-edge mainframe computer processor technology that ICL lacked. Fujitsu had 
been able to provide such technology for the UK firm.  
ICL had itself previously been acquired in 1984 by STC (Standard Telephone and Cables), who 
had aimed to use the acquisition to form the foundations of what was hoped to become one of 
Europe’s leading communication and information systems groups. However, STC lacked the 
resources to follow through this strategy, and in the late 1980s, decided to divest itself of the 
majority of ICL shares. Interest in acquiring was shown from many parties, including Nixdorf, 
Philips and Olivetti, but it was Fujitsu who eventually acquired 80% of ICL shares from STC. 
Since acquisition ICL has gradually been transforming itself into an IT systems integrator and 
services company, operating to a large extent autonomously within the Fujitsu group of 
companies.  
 
 
 
Note: To aid the readability of the case study material, all citations are given as footnotes. 
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Fujitsu 
The major businesses of Fujitsu can be grouped as the manufacture and sales of 
communication systems, information processing systems, electronic devices and related 
services (See Exhibit 6.1)90. The company has net sales of over US$36 billion derived 
from operations world-wide which in total employ over 160,000 people. More than half 
of Fujitsu’s manufacturing sites are located outside Japan, although around 70% of sales 
are still derived from the Japanese market (See Exhibit 6.2). 
 
 1988 1990 1992 1994 
Computers and information processing 
systems 
67 66 73 68 
Communications systems 16 15 13 16 
Electronic devices 13 14 10 13 
Other operations 5 4 4 4 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Exhibit 6.1  Fujitsu’s main product areas by percentage sales 
Source: Fujitsu Company Reports91 
 
 1988 1990 1992 1994 
Japan 78 76 70 71 
Asia & Oceania 3 4 4 6 
The Americas 13 13 10 8 
Europe 6 6 16 15 
Africa & Middle East 0.35 0.30 0.58 0.65 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Exhibit 6.2 Fujitsu’s percentage sales by region 
Source: Fujitsu Company Reports 
                                                 
90 Further details of the product range are given in Appendix III. 
91 Note: rounding errors may mean that figures do not add up to 100 in Exhibits 6.1 and 6.2. 
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Company background92 
Fujitsu was formed in 1935 as a spin-off from the communications division of Fuji 
Electric93, a leading electric machinery and vending machine manufacturer, and member 
of the Furukawa zaibatsu94. Fujitsu was formed during the development of Japan’s pre-
World War II telecommunications infrastructure to produce telecommunications 
equipment under license from Siemens AG of Germany. 
In the 1940s and 1950s, Fujitsu’s main operations centred on the manufacture of 
telephones, telephone switching systems and telephone carrier systems. The slow post-
war rebuilding of Japan’s communications was given a huge boost by the outbreak of the 
Korean war. Fujitsu succeeded in producing the first all-Japanese telephone (in 
collaboration with NEC, Oki Electric and Hitachi). With switching systems, Fujitsu 
maintained its links with Siemens, despite opposition from Japan’s Nippon Telegraph and 
Telephone Public Corporation95 which favoured rival US technology. Fujitsu was 
eventually forced to comply with the NTT standards. Competition among the other 
Japanese telecommunications suppliers was strong, and the management of Fujitsu 
realised that they needed to develop new skills to compete in new market areas. 
One opportunity that showed potential stemmed from the increasing trading volumes of 
the securities market in Tokyo. This had led to the demand for a more streamlined trading 
system to replace the existing one which relied on all transactions being dealt with by 
hand. Fujitsu developed a “stock trading volume computation-use calculator”, based on 
punch-card technology to respond to this need. For various reasons, this product was not a 
success, but spurred-on Fujitsu's development teams to producing a fully fledged 
“computer”. 
                                                 
92 The material presented here relating to the history of Fujitsu draws heavily on the memoirs of the present chairman 
of Fujitsu, Takuma Yamamoto (Yamamoto, 1992). 
93 This spin-off was originally named the Fuji Communication Apparatus Manufacturing Company Ltd., or Fuji 
Tsushinki. Fuji Electric remains Fujitsu’s principle external shareholder. 
94 The zaibatsu were the pre-World War II industrial and financial conglomerates that dominated Japan’s industry 
(Ohsono, 1995). 
95 Now the NTT Corporation 
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Fujitsu’s entry into the computer industry96 
Fujitsu’s first computer, the relay-based FACOM 100, was completed in 1954 with the 
aid of Government funding. This machine, as with all early Fujitsu models, was non-
compatible with those developed by the world market leader IBM. Following the failure 
to secure a major contract to supply computers to the University of Tokyo in the 1960s 
(an IBM compatible system from Hitachi was chosen), the decision was made by Fujitsu 
to shift the direction of the firm’s computing strategy towards the IBM-compatible route. 
This was eventually to lead to the development of a very successful series of "plug-
compatible" (PCM)97 computers, which pushed Fujitsu on to dominate the Japanese 
computer industry. 
In 1969 the decision was taken by the then President of Fujitsu, Kanjiro Okada to “stake 
the future of the company on computers”98 and to spin-off resources to allow responses to 
changing technology. It was also at around this time that Japan’s Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI) decided to set in motion plans to strengthen the domestic 
computer industry. This led to the formation of tie-ups between Fujitsu and Hitachi, as 
well as NEC and Toshiba, and Oki Electric and Mitsubishi Electric. 
Once the decision had been made to go down the IBM-compatible route, Fujitsu needed 
to acquire skills in the relevant technologies. Unlike its domestic competitors in the 
computer industry, Fujitsu was the only Japanese computer firm who had not formed a 
technical agreement with a non-Japanese partner in order to gain manufacturing 
competences and software. Following unsuccessful approaches aimed at obtaining direct 
co-operation from IBM (the US company would only consider 100% capital participation 
in technology transfer projects and Fujitsu had no intention of allowing itself to become a 
subsidiary of IBM) Fujitsu at first attempted the development of an IBM-compatible 
                                                 
96 The entry of Fujitsu into the computer industry is covered in detail by, amongst others, Anchordoguy (1988), 
Fransman (1990), and Yamamoto (1992). 
97 Computers from third-party manufacturers which were able to work with (or ‘plug-in’ to) IBM proprietary hardware. 
98 Yamamoto (1992:120). 
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computer without a non-Japanese partner99. However, a partner was finally found in the 
form of the Amdahl Corporation. This US firm had been formed in the early 1970s by 
Gene Amdahl, an ex-IBM engineer who had been responsible for the development of 
some of IBM’s most innovative and successful products. Amdahl had run into financial 
troubles in 1972, and Fujitsu was able to provide the US firm with funds in return for 
access to Amdahl’s technology100. The technology for Fujitsu’s PCM computers was thus 
developed in co-operation with both the Amdahl Corporation in the US and Hitachi in 
Japan. 
Now that Fujitsu had a mainframe computer that was fully compatible and competitive 
with those produced by IBM, the global market leader, Fujitsu was able to build a strong 
position in the domestic market and to attempt to push into international markets. Fujitsu's 
sales and profits continued to grow through the 1970s and 1980s, though with the 
majority of sales still being drawn from the Japanese domestic market. The company 
grew to become the second largest producer of computer systems world-wide, and gained 
the often-used label of ‘Japan’s IBM’. Fujitsu moved into the production of smaller 
computers for the Japanese market, and was able to leverage its wide business mainframe 
customer base to ensure that the small machines achieved top-three ranking by sales in 
the domestic market (See Exhibit 6.3). 
 
1990 domestic sales ranking Mainframe computers Office computers Personal computers 
1 Fujitsu101 Fujitsu NEC 
2 IBM NEC Fujitsu 
3 Hitachi IBM Toshiba 
Exhibit 6.3  Fujitsu sales in personal, office and mainframe computers for 1990 
Source: Nikkei Japan Economic Almanac, 1992 
                                                 
99 “By the time IBM rejected Fujitsu’s overtures, the most appropriate foreign partners had already been taken, so 
Fujitsu decided to go it alone as Japan’s only pure-blooded (junketsu) national computer firm. Fujitsu made the earliest 
and most substantial commitment to computers, and was the only Japanese company that would stake its survival on its 
ability to make computers; [..]” (Anchordoguy, 1989: 24). 
100 Between 1972 and 1976, Amdahl received $54 million in capital and loans from Fujitsu (Anchordoguy, 1989). 
101 Fujitsu, at this time, had 12% of the global market, compared with IBM’s 44% (The Independent, 6/8/90). 
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Impact of changes in the computer industry 
The changes in the computer industry detailed earlier in Chapter 2 impacted hard upon 
the strategies of all firms operating in the mainframe sector of the industry, and Fujitsu 
was no exception. The shift to open systems based computing in business markets and the 
growth of the PC generally forced Fujitsu to re-think its strategy. The Japanese firm saw 
itself in a stronger position than many of both its Japanese and non-Japanese competitors 
for reasons which can be summarised as follows:- 
• Fujitsu had strengths in telecommunications and semiconductors which it was hoped 
would allow the company to ‘buy time’ to redefine itself as a force in open systems 
based computing102. Though suffering from a slump towards the end of the 1980s, the 
demand for memory semiconductors was predicted to pick up as the demand for PCs 
and network servers grew. Fujitsu’s strengths in fast telecommunication switches (such 
as those based on ATM technology) was predicted to provide the company with a 
strong competitive advantage as the demand for computer networks able to cope with 
high bandwidth data transfer increased. 
• The uptake of open systems based computing had been slower in Japan than 
elsewhere103. This was a positive factor for Fujitsu, as it was continuing to derive over 
half of the company’s revenue from mainframes104, and around 70% of all sales from 
the domestic market105. Fujitsu’s strong and loyal domestic mainframe customer base 
was hoped to be able to provide a buffer as the firm developed the required 
competences and moved into open systems based systems. 
• Fujitsu had developed its own range of PCs using proprietary operating systems for 
business and home uses, which had achieved high levels of penetration in the domestic 
                                                 
102 Nikkei Weekly, 13/9/93. 
103 Computer Weekly, 1/4/93. 
104 Nikkei Weekly, 13/9/93. 
105 Fujitsu company reports. 
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market106. 
However, even given the time buffer provided by these factors, Fujitsu still needed to 
develop the ability to compete in the market for open systems computing to allow the 
firm to compete effectively in what was widely realised to be a fast changing international 
IT environment.  
For a firm such as Fujitsu whose IT skills rested predominantly with provision of high 
cost, low volume, large computer systems, the shift in the nature of the IT industry 
towards high volume, low margin machines posed a challenge. For firms aiming to 
compete in the market for the provision of small, open architecture computers, high 
volume was essential. In order for Fujitsu to achieve high volumes on a global scale, the 
Japanese firm needed to be able to have an international network of manufacturing 
capacity. 
A wider trend was also becoming clear towards the end of the 1980s. As the margins on 
the smaller computers became ever narrower, and the nature of the products themselves 
more generic in nature, it became clear that it was in the provision of software and 
services where the high potential for growth lay:- 
Taking a 20 year view, it was becoming pretty clear to everyone that the IT industry is becoming a 
service-based industry sitting on technology which was important, but which is gradually becoming 
more of a ‘commodity’ in nature107. 
While the uptake of open systems based computing and demand for open-architecture 
PCs may have been slow in Japan, the situation was very different in Europe and North 
America. Fujitsu wanted to tap into the skills of alliance partners who were already 
operating in the fast growing client-server, PC, and related service markets. Fujitsu’s 
network of alliances around the world were a rich source of potential capacity and 
resources. Links with non-Japanese firms including Amdahl, Sun Microsystems, ICL, 
                                                 
106 The home-use PC, ‘FM-Towns’, incorporating a CD-ROM drive was technologically very advanced when 
introduced. However, it proved to be an example of Fujitsu pushing technology towards the consumer, regardless of 
whether there was demand. “The consumers couldn’t catch up with that level of technology. It was trying to pre-empt 
the market, but it was just too early” (Interview with Aida, 14/3/96). 
107 Interview with Davison, 28/2/96. 
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Acer and AT&T were all regarded as potentially useful sources of client-server, open 
system and open architecture PC related competences. Such competences included UNIX 
operating system development skills, high performance network server processors and 
open-architecture PC manufacturing capacity. 
This was the situation facing Fujitsu in the late 1980s. At the same time, the majority 
shareholder of ICL (one of Fujitsu’s main alliance partners), was expressing a desire to 
divest itself of ownership of the UK firm. This posed a problem for Fujitsu; while ICL’s 
majority shareholder, STC, had been willing to allow the close relationships to exist 
between Fujitsu and ICL, a new owner for ICL might not be so willing to allow the 
collaboration to continue. If the relationships were to be ended, Fujitsu would lose access 
to a rich source of open systems competence it badly needed. 
ICL 
Company background108 
ICL was formed in 1968 as the result of a merger between International Computers and 
Tabulators (ICT) and English Electric, with equity stakes being held by Plessey and the 
Ministry of Technology (See Exhibit 6.4). This was a government inspired merger to 
strengthen the UK computer industry in its competitive battle against the dominant US 
computer industry headed by IBM. 
In the early 1970s, IBM made the decision to perpetuate its System/360 mainframe 
architecture indefinitely. Those firms attempting to compete in the mainframe market 
were faced with a simple choice; either conform to the market leader’s standard, or opt 
for a differentiated product. ICL took the latter option, and stuck with its 2900 series of 
mainframes109. The UK firm struggled through the early 1970s with the assistance of 
government financial support for R&D expenses. ICL was faced with attempting to 
recoup massive R&D costs from a tiny market share. However, supported by public 
                                                 
108 This background to ICL draws heavily on the ‘official’ history of the company provided by Campbell-Kelly (1989). 
109 The development of this ‘new range’ of computers while maintaining the product lines of the previously separate 
ICT and English Electric Computers had seriously weakened the company financially (Emery, 1995). 
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sector funds, by 1978, ICL displayed revenue growth of 22% and profit growth of 23% - 
the highest of any company in the industry except for DEC and Fujitsu110. ICL’s share 
value almost doubled between the beginning and end of 1978. Based on such encouraging 
financial figures, it was decided to begin implementation of a five year high-growth 
strategy. 
 
Shareholder % of ordinary shares 
English Electric 18.0 
Plessey 18.0 
Vickers 12.6 
Ministry of Technology 10.5 
Ferranti 5.7 
Other ex-ICT shareholders 35.2 
Total 100 
Exhibit 6.4  Initial Ownership of ICL 
Source: ICL Press Office 
In 1979 IBM responded to the emerging competition from producers of mainframes 
compatible with System/360 (‘plug-compatible machines’, or PCMs) by introducing a 
new, technologically advanced range of computers. This 4300 Series of mainframes had 
dramatic improvements in price:performance compared with Systems/360 models and 
related products from PCM producers. The effect of this was to drive a number of PCM 
manufactures into loss, and made the environment for non-PCM producers such as ICL 
extremely difficult. ICL was forced to cut costs as it sought ways to compete with this 
new competition from IBM. IBM’s strategy forced ICL to assign even greater proportions 
of its budget to R&D in order to keep in competition with IBM and achieve the planned 
levels of growth.  
With a change of government from Labour to Conservative in 1979, direct financial 
support for R&D from the public sector became harder to come by. Mrs Thatcher’s 
Conservative government had pledged to distance itself from direct involvement in the 
                                                 
110 Campbell-Kelly, 1989. 
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computer industry. Coupled with this, the UK recession of 1980-81 made the competitive 
situation for ICL extremely harsh. By 1981, ICL was facing a major crisis. Talks were 
held with various firms, many of which were based in the US but including Fujitsu, with 
respect to merging. It became clear that most of these firms were only interested in 
acquiring ICL’s European customer base to extend their own operations. 
ICL was given a reprieve by the UK government, who stepped in at the last moment in 
1981 to prevent the UK’s largest remaining indigenous computer firm from failing. The 
government provided financial support by agreeing to act as a guarantor for a £200m 
loan. This loan came with the condition that there be a major change in the management 
structure. New people were bought in from outside to form a new management team, two 
of the most influential coming from Texas Instruments in the US; Robb Wilmot, who was 
brought in to be managing director, and Peter Bonfield as his second-in-command. 
The new management instigated a major cost-cutting programme and re-orientated the 
company dramatically. The new management realised that ICL could no longer develop 
all its own technology, and had to become much more in tune with the end users of the 
products and services they were aiming to provide:- 
We had to re-think the company from being a vertically integrated product company, to a company 
that bought-in a lot of its technology on a best-of-breed basis, we became much more customer-, and 
market-focused111. 
ICL’s new strategy encompassed the marketing of complete systems and the promotion of 
a ‘new ICL’. The image that ICL had up until that point presented to the customers was 
not one that the new management were keen to perpetuate:- 
The chief [ICL] salesman for a region, it was said, would put up in the best hotel and announce he 
would be available that evening in the parlour to take customer's orders for computers112. 
The resulting new strategy had four key components113:- 
1. Focus - with sales only one fiftieth of those of IBM, ICL was unable to derive 
                                                 
111 Interview with Davison, 28/2/96. 
112 Financial Times, 16/3/94. 
113 As summarised in The Economist, 9/8/86.  
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sufficient revenue to allow it to compete effectively across a wide range of computer 
products. Instead, resources were to be focused on a small number of markets which 
included local government, retail stores, defence and office automation. Small groups 
of around 100 people were to focus on specific markets. 
2. Collaboration - in order to get the most from limited resources, ICL was to make 
strenuous efforts to find partners who would be able to assist the UK firm in the 
achieving of its goals114. 
3. ‘Europeanisation’ - ICL was to attempt to tap into the European markets for industrial 
automation and retail IT products. 
4. Standards - by backing the emerging standards of Open Systems Interconnection 
(OSI) and AT&T’s UNIX operating system, ICL hoped to be able to minimise barriers 
which might isolate its products from potential customers. 
Mainframe sales at that time were virtually static producing only 1/3 of turnover, yet 
consuming 2/3 of R&D expenditure115. The cost of developing VLSI116 semiconductor 
technology for a new range of mainframes would have been prohibitive, and so the new 
management team set up negotiations with Fujitsu to access the Japanese firm’s 
mainframe semiconductor technology, which was widely regarded to be the best of its 
kind at that time. 
The resulting collaborative agreement allowed ICL access to Fujitsu’s core mainframe 
technology and in return, ICL agreed to market Fujitsu mainframe computers in Europe. 
This provided an almost ideal solution to both companies’ problems; ICL's lack of R&D 
resources to develop a new range of semiconductor technologies required for a new range 
of competitive mainframes (the Series 39), and Fujitsu’s problem of gaining a foothold in 
the European market. There was surprise and admiration for ICL at having pulled-off 
                                                 
114 Peter Bonfield stated in 1986 that ICL would actively seek out partnerships wherever possible as an alternative to 
merging with another large firm. He gave three courses of action which were preferential alternatives to mergers and 
acquisitions for ICL: (1) joint ventures, (2) start-ups and (3) spin-offs (Financial Times, 5/11/86). 
115 ICL company reports. 
116 Very Large Scale Integration. A high number and dense packing of transistors on each silicon wafer. 
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such a coup:- 
The ICL-Fujitsu agreement was perceived as an exceptionally innovative solution to ICL’s mainframe 
challenge, and has since come to be regarded as a classic example of technology transfer in the 
1980s117. 
In addition to the acquisition of mainframe semiconductor technology from Fujitsu, ICL 
was shifting resources into areas connected with the development of open systems based 
computing, and most importantly, PCs. ICL’s ‘Networked Product Line’ began to be 
filled with a range of products obtained from acquired companies, or licensed from 
outside companies ranging from Psion to Sinclair, and Singer to Rair. ICL's new 
management had identified the shift in the IT industry away from mainframes to smaller 
networked machines, and was keen to encourage ‘open network standards’ which would 
allow hardware and software from different companies to work together on the same 
network. By focusing efforts in this way, ICL became one of the dominant forces in 
promoting open systems standards in the European market. 
One emerging product area that was allocated resources by the new management team 
was that of the use of IT in the retail sector, and in particular, the use of point-of-sale 
(PoS) laser bar-code scanning technology. ICL lacked much of the basic technology 
required, but Fujitsu proved to be a useful partner and was able to provide what ICL 
lacked118. 
We [ICL] didn’t have the capital available to us to do the basic engineering required for the scanning 
technology and PoS hardware technology which were needed to build the business. Fujitsu [..] 
widened the [mainframe technology] agreement, whereby they built to our design the PoS scanning 
technology119. 
This collaboration resulted in Fujitsu and ICL sharing the development of PoS systems 
which were then marketed by both companies around the world. This sector proved to be 
very successful for ICL, building on early successes of a £20 million business in 1983 to 
                                                 
117 Campbell-Kelly, 1989:342. 
118 Fujitsu were not the only firm able to supply the required scanning technology, but owing to the mainframe 
technology agreement, Fujitsu was “on ICL’s radar screen” (Interview with Davison, 28/2/96). 
119Interview with Davison, 28/2/96. 
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a £500 million business a decade later. Under the new management, ICL moved from a 
£50m loss in 1981 to a profit of £24m in 1982, and thereafter continued to achieve year-
on-year increase in profits (See Exhibit 6.5). 
 
Exhibit 6.5  ICL’s turnover and profits 1984-1988 
Source: Company reports 
In 1984, Standard Telephone and Cables (STC), a telecommunications, electronic 
components and defence systems producer, realising the potential of the increasing 
convergence of computing and telecommunications, made a bid to acquire ownership of 
ICL. This posed potential problems for the collaborative agreement between ICL and 
Fujitsu. A clause had been written into the original partnership agreement that gave 
Fujitsu the right to terminate the partnership if the ownership of ICL changed. As STC 
was a competitor of Fujitsu in the telecommunications business, this could have presented 
a major problem for the Fujitsu-ICL collaboration. Vitally for the UK firm, following 
intense negotiations, Fujitsu agreed to allow the collaboration to continue with ICL under 
the new ownership of STC. 
STC flourished in the late 1980s as the UK’s post-deregulation telecommunications boom 
continued and demand for STC’s cable and telecommunication equipment grew. 
However, into the 1990s, STC’s profits were beginning to fall as demand decreased and 
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key orders fell through120. STC had been unable to find ways of deriving synergistic 
benefit from having interests in both sides of the converging fields of telecommunications 
and computing. Press reports talked of rumours that STC was looking for a buyer for 
ICL121. Both STC and ICL realised that for ICL to grow, it needed “an owner with deeper 
pockets and greater commitment to the information technology business than STC”122. 
The reasons for STC wishing to divest itself so eagerly of ownership of ICL remain 
somewhat of a mystery, according to press reports around the time of acquisition123. With 
the computer industry dominated by IBM, and telecommunications by AT&T, STC may 
have realised that it did not have the resources to compete successfully in both areas124. 
Acquisition 
Once the news had emerged that STC was looking to divest itself of its majority interest 
in ICL, negotiations began in earnest with a number of likely partners (See Exhibit 6.6). 
One key factor overrode all negotiations; as mainframes were still an important 
component of ICL’s return to profitability, continued access to Fujitsu’s mainframe 
technology was essential for ensuring the UK company's continued success. The technical 
collaboration agreement between Fujitsu and ICL which assured this access, contained a 
crucial clause: Fujitsu retained the right to veto any company’s attempt to acquire more 
than 20% of shares in ICL125. 
 
1989 
February STC starts negotiations with Olivetti about pooling their computer interests in a joint venture. 
March Exploratory discussions with Nixdorf and Philips 
September STC approaches Fujitsu about taking a minority stake in ICL. 
October Olivetti talks break down after disagreement over which group should be in control. 
                                                 
120 Financial Times, 31/7/90a. 
121 Newsweek International, 30/7/90. 
122 Financial Times, 16/3/94. 
123 Financial Weekly, 3/8/90. 
124 Financial Times, 31/7/90b. 
125 Financial Times, 1/8/90. 
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November Discussions resume with Nixdorf, but the German company is facing financial problems and 
is taken over by Siemens. 
December Fujitsu talks intensify. 
1990 
January Olivetti talks resume, but peter out over concern whether Fujitsu technology would be 
available to the merged group. 
February-
July 
Negotiations continue with Fujitsu, interspersed with flirtations with Bull, NCR, Siemens and 
Digital Equipment. 
August Fujitsu acquire 80% of ICL. 
Exhibit 6.6  Chronology of the negotiations 
Source: Financial Times, 1/8/90 
Discussions spread to include companies such as Bull, NCR, Siemens (who had acquired 
the now-ailing Nixdorf) and Digital. The growing intensity of negotiations with Fujitsu 
prompted fears to be expressed in the media as to the dangers of letting control of 
Britain’s largest indigenous computer manufacturer slip to Japan. 
Fujitsu seemed well aware of the power of public opinion and the sensitive nature of 
international corporate acquisitions as Fujitsu had faced problems in the US when 
attempting to acquire Fairchild Semiconductor126. The chairman of Fujitsu, Takuma 
Yamamoto, instigated investigations of public and private sentiment in the UK towards 
the idea of what he called one of the UK's “historical and cultural jewels” falling into 
Japanese hands. The results of these investigations were sufficiently positive from 
Fujitsu’s standpoint for such issues not to be considered as a major stumbling block. 
Japan’s MITI was also consulted for advice as to potentially “troublesome” areas. Mrs 
Thatcher's visit to Japan in 1989 which was planned so as to include a tour of Fujitsu's 
Numazu plant may have had some influence on shaping perceptions. In the words of one 
Fujitsu director:- 
The fact that the very busy Prime Minster Thatcher visited us in fact symbolises the status of the 
Fujitsu-ICL relations. [It was] a very precious visit127. 
                                                 
126 Anchordoguy (1989); Yamamoto (1992). 
127 Toshio Hiraguri, quoted in Computer Weekly, 2/8/90. 
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The option for Fujitsu to acquire around 50% of ICL shares was rebuffed by the Japanese 
firm, as it was only interested in being a clear majority owner. One Fujitsu director talked 
of the lessons learned from previous joint venture partnerships where ownership had been 
split 50:50. Such a split of decision making is “always very difficult, especially at critical 
moments”128. Furthermore, STC were not interested in selling less than a significant stake 
in ICL129. 
After a negotiation period lasting over a year, the deal was struck between STC and 
Fujitsu, whereby Fujitsu would acquire an 80% stake in ICL for a cost of £743 million. 
STC would hold on to the remaining 20%, with a provision to prevent that 20% falling 
into ‘hostile’ hands in the event of STC being itself acquired130. The intention was stated 
that ICL would be floated on the stock exchange at some appropriate time in the near 
future. 
Motives for the acquisition 
Fujitsu’s motives in the late 1980s for wishing to strengthen its ties with ICL, though not 
necessarily acquire a majority shareholding, can be summarised as follows:- 
• Globalisation - Fujitsu, in common with other Japanese IT companies realised that in 
order to compete successfully on an international level, they would have to strengthen 
their position in non-Japanese markets. To do this, they needed to gain competences in 
hardware and software that conformed to international open standards131. Forming 
links with non-Japanese firms was an effective way of doing this132. Fujitsu had little 
choice but to become more deeply involved with ICL if it wanted to become a true 
                                                 
128 “Fujitsu has had some bad experiences. We made an alliance with a US company and split ownership fifty-fifty. So 
there was no majority and unclear responsibilities. Both companies blamed each other for the problems that occurred, 
responsibilities were ambiguous, so it ended up failing. So after that, we made a decision that in the case of alliances we 
would always make it clear who takes the leadership” (Interview with Kitazato, 11/1/94). 
129 Financial Times, 1/8/90. 
130 Financial Times, 1/8/90. 
131 Interview with Yurino, 14/3/96. 
132 Japanese firms involved in tie-ups in 1990 included NEC with Bull and Honeywell in the US, and Hitachi with its 
tie-ups with EDS in the US and Comparex and Olivetti in Europe (Computer Weekly, 26/7/90). 
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competitor to IBM133. 
Fujitsu’s approach to globalising its computer business is both novel and bold. It is attempting to take 
strategic stakes in different companies to acquire different skills. In the past nine years, it has set about 
learning ICL’s skills very well134. 
• Avoidance of trade barriers - If Fujitsu wanted to become truly global in operation, it 
needed to have a strong foothold in key markets. Having a subsidiary operating within 
a key market was one way to avoid potential or actual trade barriers. This was a key 
motive for Japanese firms attempting to compete within the markets of the European 
Union. Japanese companies were eager to merge with European operations to gain a 
firmer presence in the run-up to 1992 and the formation of the single European 
market135. ICL, with strong operations in Europe, could be used as a base for Fujitsu to 
attack US and European markets136. 
• Widened customer base and increased  production capacity- ICL had a wide customer 
base in Europe, something that Fujitsu lacked. The UK firm also had highly regarded 
competences in computer manufacturing. This was especially important for Fujitsu, 
who needed to have manufacturing operations close to all major markets to counteract 
the affect of the appreciating Yen137. 
• Skills in software and systems networking - Fujitsu badly needed expertise in software 
and systems networking to allow it to compete in the growing international markets for 
open systems based computing. These skills were only available outside Japan138. 
ICL’s strength in UNIX machines, used for running networks of small computers 
(especially the DRS 6000) backed by Fujitsu’s financial ‘muscle’ could provide 
Fujitsu with a large share of Japan’s UNIX market, estimated to be worth around 
                                                 
133 Computer Weekly, 26/7/90. 
134 Peter Bonfield, as quoted in Financial Times, 31/7/90b. 
135 Financial Weekly, 27/7/90. 
136 Electronics Weekly, 8/8/90. 
137 Interview with Aida, 14/3/96. 
138 Computer Weekly, 26/7/90. 
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US$3.5 billion at the time of acquisition139. 
Arguably, all these benefits could have been accrued with ICL remaining a partner, rather 
than a subsidiary of Fujitsu. In fact, fears were expressed that the performance of ICL 
would suffer if it were to be “controlled in every major decision from Tokyo”140. The ICL 
Fujitsu relationship up to the time of acquisition had been one which relied heavily, 
though somewhat one-sidedly, on co-operation. While STC had been happy to stand on 
the sidelines and not interfere, it was possible that a new owner would not show similar 
restraint. It was also widely recognised that ICL’s recovery in the 1980s had been heavily 
dependent upon support from Fujitsu, and Fujitsu had invested a great deal in the 
company in the form of transferred technology and tacit knowledge. To have that 
investment passed on to a prospective new owner, who was potentially hostile towards 
Fujitsu left the Japanese firm with little alternative than to step in and take control once 
STC had made its wish to divest itself of ICL clear. As can be seen from the chronology 
of acquisition given earlier in Exhibit 6.6, the Japanese firm chose acquisition of the 
majority stake in ICL very much as a last resort, when all attempts to maintain a minority 
shareholding had proved fruitless. 
Post acquisition 
Once the decision to go ahead with the acquisition had been finalised, albeit reluctantly, 
Fujitsu was keen to stress that ICL would be allowed to run as an autonomous company 
within the Fujitsu federation of companies. Fujitsu identified a number of issues and 
principles which it hoped would define the Fujitsu ICL relationship. Firstly there were the 
three ‘critical issues’ summarised by Kitazato & Trevedi (1995):- 
• National identity - Fujitsu seemed well aware of the sensitive nature of the UK’s 
largest remaining computer firm falling into the hands of the Japanese and were keen 
to play this aspect down as much as possible. Fujitsu was very eager to portray ICL as 
a European company, not as a European subsidiary of a Japanese company. 
                                                 
139 Computer Weekly, 2/8/90. 
140 Anonymous STC shareholder, quoted in The Guardian, 17/8/90. 
Japanese innovation strategy and the acquisition of UK IT firms                                                                                             Chapter 6 
 138 
• Management structure - Fujitsu was well aware that it was not only their technology 
that had allowed ICL to achieve such a marked turnaround in performance in the 
1980s. The management team brought in at that time, and now headed by Peter 
Bonfield was highly regarded by the Japanese. Fujitsu wanted therefore to maintain the 
culture of ICL within the Fujitsu group. Given the problems of integration faced by 
any companies following a merger or acquisition (as highlighted earlier in Chapter 3), 
this was going to be no easy task to achieve.  
• Maximum synergy - The combining of Fujitsu’s and ICL’s strengths to produce 
synergistic benefits was stressed as being a critical issue by Fujitsu for the success of 
the acquisition. 
In relation to these three critical issues, immediately after acquisition, the management 
teams worked together to produce five key principles for defining Fujitsu’s relationship 
with ICL (Kitazato & Trevedi, 1995)141:- 
1. Autonomous management - ICL was to be left to set its own strategic direction, 
financial management and personnel management. 
2. Arm’s length operation - Fujitsu was to maintain its distance from ICL as much as 
possible with respect to the operations of the UK firm. 
3. European identity for ICL - As pointed out above, it was very much in the interests of 
both Fujitsu and ICL for ICL to remain to be perceived as a European company. 
4. Maximum synergy - In order to ‘activate synergy’, Fujitsu was not to force its way 
upon ICL. ICL’s strengths were to be played upon in a way so as to achieve some 
unperceived benefit when placed in conjunction with Fujitsu’s strengths. 
5. Mutual goal - Fujitsu announced its intention to have ICL floated on the stock 
exchange within five years of the acquisition. 
The relationship between the two firms is defined by Fujitsu as existing in three distinct 
                                                 
141 Also, interview with Kitazato, 11/1/95. 
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areas: the shareholder relationship, the technology agreement and the business 
partnership142. 
While Fujitsu was the majority shareholder, ICL was left to operate “as a PLC in every 
respect”143 Fujitsu maintains only one director in London who resides on the board of 
ICL and who is responsible for relationships between the two firms. 
The original agreement for technology collaboration which brought Fujitsu and ICL 
together has been revised since the acquisition. The agreement was extended to include 
free royalty and free licensing of intellectual property rights in both directions. Fujitsu 
and ICL were to maintain a commercial relationship, in terms of ICL selling products and 
components to Fujitsu and visa versa. If the products offered by either partner were not 
considered competitive, then neither was obliged to take the other’s products or 
components.  
In the following section, the ways in which ICL and Fujitsu have operated together since 
the acquisition is examined in a number of areas. Examples of specific projects are used 
to act as illustrations rather than provide an exhaustive listing of all that has happened 
between the two companies since 1990 and up to the time of writing. 
Integration issues 
Having been effectively forced to acquire a majority stake in ICL in order to prevent a 
valued alliance partner potentially falling into the hands of a competitor, Fujitsu was then 
faced with the challenging task of integrating the acquisition. Of the spectrum of 
integration options discussed in Chapter 3144, Fujitsu opted for a process of structural 
integration, i.e., as far as possible, the identity of ICL was to be kept intact. The five 
principles announced by Fujitsu immediately following the acquisition provided a basis 
                                                 
142 Interview with Kitazato, 11/1/95. 
143 Kitazato & Trevedi (1995). 
144 In summary, these options are: (1) assimilation, where one party adopts the identity of the other. This can be either 
forced or voluntary; (2) novation, where the two organisations combine and a new identity is created; (3) structural 
integration, where each organisation keeps its own identity, with each accepting the validity of the others working 
practices (Schweiger et al., 1993). 
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for the integration process, which was carried out in an evolutionary manner. 
Much of ICL’s value lies in its engineering creativity, which would suffer if the company were simply 
milked of existing technology or subjected to heavy handed treatment from Tokyo145. 
While it would have been possible, and in many ways quite logical to rationalise certain 
functions across the group as fast as possible, Fujitsu opted not to do this.  
While it would have made more sense to have a singular PC range and common UNIX servers across 
the group, [Fujitsu] haven’t pushed at all. The attitude has been one of ‘companies that grow together, 
stay together’. Companies that are forced together more often than not end up ‘divorced’146. 
Fujitsu seemed well aware of how delicate the situation was with respect to the 
integration of the acquisition. While Fujitsu had professed in the past to giving 
subsidiaries ‘a free hand’, this had not always been achieved in reality, as described by 
one Fujitsu director:- 
Fujitsu will always ask the subsidiary to go their own way, but sometimes, quite frankly, the Fujitsu 
subsidiary will suffer some problems, either financially, or in some other way. Then, Fujitsu must step 
in and tell them what to do. But with ICL, it has been very different. ICL has been a very good 
company managerially, financially and technically. Because of that, we thought that Fujitsu should 
really should have an arm’s length stance. Normally for a Japanese company, they will send a 
significant number of people from Japan to the UK, and they position the Japanese people in key 
areas, but Fujitsu didn’t do that with ICL. We gave the ICL management a good deal of trust147. 
The fact that ICL had been the largest remaining UK owned computer company made the 
integration process somewhat sensitive. Around the time of the acquisition, newspapers 
reflected the disquiet felt as “Japanese invaders claim computer prize”148 resulting in the 
loss of Britain’s “technological independence” which was a “national tragedy”149. 
This disquiet was reflected in the expulsion of ICL from joint European ‘JESSi’ and 
‘Esprit’ R&D programmes into semiconductors and information technology. The reason 
given for ICL’s expulsion was that information on these R&D projects, designed to 
                                                 
145 Financial Times, 27/7/90. 
146 Interview with Davison, 28/2/96. 
147 Interview with Watanabe, 16/11/95. 
148 Headline from the Daily Express, 31/7/90. 
149 Francis Lorentz, Chairman of France’s Groupe Bull, quoted in the Newsweek International, 30/7/90. 
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strengthen Europe’s semiconductor technologies, might find its way back to Fujitsu150. 
The view of the European partnerships was expressed as follows:- 
This is a European project and we rely on European companies. [..] the Fujitsu ICL link-up is not good 
news for European companies as it shows the weakness of Europe’s position in micro-electronics and 
computers151. 
ICL being a UK-based, rather than a US-based company made the integration process in 
some ways easier for Fujitsu. The Japanese firm had experienced a number of problems 
operating in the US, most notably with Amdahl152, but had found the process of working 
with ICL over the previous nine years much less prone to difficulties153.  
Within ICL, there was concern as to how ICL would function now that it was no longer a 
partner of Fujitsu, but a subsidiary:- 
At the time of the acquisition, there was a certain nervousness among the ICL management team as to 
how it [the acquisition] was going to be. It turned out to be on the better side of the best view we had 
of how it might be154. 
The respect of ICL’s management for Fujitsu grew as it became clear that the acquisition 
was not going be managed in a heavy handed manner:- 
Fujitsu [..] know what they know, and they know what they don’t know. They know that they don’t 
understand how predominantly English speaking, Western cultural societies operate, and how business 
in that society operates. [Fujitsu realised that] once you get away from supplying raw technology, such 
as TV sets which are consumed throughout societies without needing to understand how the society 
operates, and move up the value chain, you have to tailor your offerings to what different societies 
want. [..] Fujitsu understand very deeply how Japanese society operates, but if they have to make 
value judgements as to how to enter [other] markets, then unless it was a commodity technological 
product that they were taking, then they would probably get it wrong155. 
Despite the desire to keep ICL operating as an autonomous unit and not to interfere in any 
way that might disrupt the relationship between the two firms, a number of steps were 
                                                 
150 Electronics Weekly, 19/9/90. 
151 JESSi spokesman, quoted in The Independent, 4/8/90. 
152 Yamamoto (1992). 
153 Interview with Kitazato, 11/1/95. 
154 Interview with Davison, 28/2/96. 
155 Interview with Davison, 28/2/96. 
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taken to smooth the process of transformation of ICL from collaborating partner to 
wholly owned subsidiary without interfering with ICL’s independence. These included 
the setting up of exchange programmes to allow the engineers from the UK to work in 
Japan, and Japanese engineers to work in the UK. Also, the process of communication 
between staff in the UK and Japan has been consolidated through the combined use of the 
‘Fujitsu network’, i.e., use of international, intra-company telephone links, widespread 
operation of e-mail, and the regular use of video conferencing between the UK and Japan.  
The role of the person who acts as the main link between the two firms, based in ICL HQ 
in London has been crucial, as is described by the incumbent at the time of writing, Hideo 
Watanabe:- 
I am the only resident director [of Fujitsu] here. Every week I attend the board meeting where we 
discuss the important operational things. Then, I report back to Tokyo what is happening every week. 
Sometimes I seek Fujitsu’s comments on that, but basically I do not interfere or disagree with ICL 
management, because Fujitsu really appreciate Peter Bonfield156, his staff and style of managing the 
company. But sometimes, for the very important strategic issues, such as the middle-term strategic 
plan, if Fujitsu were to stand a very big amount of money for the future, then [ICL] have to seek 
Fujitsu’s approval157. 
The thinking that is often implicit in many take-overs (as discussed in Chapter 3) is that 
the company that is acquiring has won and the company that has been taken over has lost. 
Fujitsu made great pains to ensure that this view was not the one propagated in respect to 
ICL, and the result has been an integration described by one ICL insider as “the antithesis 
of a typical take-over”. 
Joint product development and marketing 
Two examples can be used to show the ways in which Fujitsu and ICL have worked 
together on joint product development. The first of these is the development of point-of-
sale (PoS) technology for use in the retail sector, ‘TeamPoS’. The second example is the 
                                                 
156 Then CEO of ICL. 
157 Interview with Watanabe, 16/11/95. 
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development of ‘groupware’158 software package, ‘TeamWare’. 
TeamPoS159 
The origins of TeamPoS date back before the acquisition by Fujitsu to the early days of 
the Fujitsu/ICL collaboration in the 1980s. Realising the opportunity to be derived from 
the use of information technology within the retail sector, the management of ICL had 
pushed resources into the creation of products for this emerging business area. In order to 
set up the business, ICL had required access to technology from third party suppliers. As 
Fujitsu was at that time working with ICL to provide the basic mainframe technology for 
ICL, the Japanese firm became an option to be considered for the supply of the basic PoS 
technology. Fujitsu had shown itself to be able to supply the technology for ICL and was 
chosen for the development of ICL’s PoS system. Fujitsu was also able to share ICL’s 
development skills in the production of Fujitsu’s own PoS system.  
When the two companies joined in 1990, the retail functions of ICL and Fujitsu became 
closely coupled. Although ICL’s PoS systems had become very successful and it would 
have been quite feasible for the UK firm to produce its own PoS technology, it was 
decided to stick with the basic technology from Fujitsu. The two sides now share the core 
technologies for PoS systems, which were branded ‘TeamPoS’. TeamPoS is an 
architecture, embracing a whole family of products which offers the user the ability to 
configure systems to match requirements.  
The development and procurement of components was carried out jointly by Fujitsu and 
ICL with manufacturing taking place in the UK and Japan. Fujitsu was keen for ICL to 
use Fujitsu’s components, but ICL was less willing to do this. From ICL’s viewpoint, 
some of Fujitsu’s components were less competitive than those of outside suppliers and 
therefore were not the best for the project. An agreement was eventually reached whereby 
ICL was allowed to source from outside160. The splitting of responsibility within the 
                                                 
158 Software which facilitates the linked operation of groups of people working on common projects. 
159 This description of the development of TeamPOS is based on an interview with the former head of ICL’s retail 
business, John Davison (Interviewed 28/2/96). 
160 Interview with Watanabe, 16/11/95. 
Japanese innovation strategy and the acquisition of UK IT firms                                                                                             Chapter 6 
 144 
project was carried out as follows:- 
ICL is stronger than Fujitsu in the retail market sector, so ICL took the leadership role in marketing 
and product definition, but from a technology point of view, Fujitsu took the leadership role161. 
The finished products were, and continue to be branded as ‘Fujitsu-ICL’, and sold by ICL 
in Europe and the US, and Fujitsu for Asia and Japan. Fujitsu and ICL now rank as 
number 3 in the world-wide market for retail IT systems162.  
TeamWare 
In May of 1991, ICL purchased Nokia Data, the information systems division of Nokia, 
Finland’s largest quoted company. This provided ICL with Nokia Data’s strengths in PC 
manufacturing, distribution and software. One key suite of software gained by ICL was 
Nokia Data’s groupware. This was taken on-board by ICL and combined with ICL’s own 
groupware to form a more functionally integrated version163. This product was then 
converted for the Japanese market by Fujitsu and achieved very good sales in Japan164.  
Much of the early development of TeamWare was carried out by ICL, but it was the 
perspective of the Fujitsu project leader that ensured the widespread diffusion of the 
product165. Fujitsu was better able to allocate sufficient resources to this project and to 
give it sufficient momentum to succeed. Such was the success of this venture that ICL 
and Fujitsu formed a joint ‘TeamWare’ operation to address the expanding groupware 
market at present dominated by ‘Lotus Notes’, a product now within the IBM group of 
companies. Fujitsu is marketing TeamWare in Japan and the US, while ICL markets the 
product in Europe. The continued success of this product has lead to TeamWare now 
being ranked third of all groupware products world-wide166. 
Common issues with joint product development 
In both these joint projects and others, there were a number of issues that had to be 
                                                 
161 Interview with Kitazato, 14/3/96. 
162 Company reports. 
163 Interview with Aida, 14/3/96. 
164 Interview with Yurino, 14/3/96. 
165 Interview with Kitazato, 14/3/96. 
166 Lotus Notes is at number one, with Novell at number two (Data from Fujitsu sources, 1996). 
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resolved to allow the smooth functioning of the projects. These were easily identified, but 
it was a much bigger problem finding ways to ‘solve’ them:- 
The major obstacle is the ‘not-invented-here’, or ‘NIH’ syndrome. Fujitsu has NIH syndrome, ICL has 
NIH syndrome. If you allow this to dominate then the project will fail. In some of the projects the NIH 
syndrome was very strong. In the case of TeamWare and TeamPoS, the [project] leaders took a very 
strong approach, and were determined to achieve some form of synergy between the groups. It comes 
down to the leader being able to guide the team towards a common objective167. 
The management of the joint projects was no simple task and was not achieved without a 
great deal of patience of the part of both sides. Referring back to the early co-operation 
between ICL and Fujitsu on PoS development in the mid-1990s, one ICL manager 
summed up the situation as follows:- 
In 1985, it was extraordinarily difficult with the PoS project. Now, it is merely difficult! The reason 
for the difficulties is that often a Western approach to dealing with complex issues is to be terribly 
instinctive, to synthesise from a whole series of issues in your head down to a conclusion quickly, and 
say ‘This is the thing to do’. Japanese people tend not to behave like that at all. They are very 
meticulous. They record everything very carefully. They build-up from the bottom rather than coming 
down from the top. So in the early stages of the project, when we say ‘It’s obvious that this is the right 
thing to do, isn’t it?’, the Japanese will respond with blank looks and say ‘Why is it obvious?’. We’ll 
tend to use instinctive arguments that have fuzzy edges, which Fujitsu and the Japanese in general find 
extremely hard to deal with. [..] Put [Japanese and Westerners] together on a project and you will have 
in-built bumps and crashes. [The Japanese approach to decision making] is such that they are often 
very slow in coming to a decision, but by the time they do, they know exactly what it is, and they have 
a strong sense of consensus. But in a fast moving world, by the time they’ve done that, they’re wrong 
anyway because the world has changed!168 
Formation of alliances 
The acquisition of ICL by Fujitsu provided an assurance of continuity of ownership and 
allowed ICL to consolidate its position in the IT market through a series of its own 
acquisitions (See Exhibit 6.7). 
 
Year Target Product/service Country 
1990 Databolin Information Systems Software Sweden 
                                                 
167 Interview with Kitazato, 14/3/96. 
168 Interview with Davison, 28/2/96. 
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1991 Nokia Data PC manufacturing, distribution, 
software. 
Finland 
1991 Bell Atlantic Customer Services 
International (50% share) 
Computer service operations US parent with 
European 
operations 
1992 Technology PC distribution UK 
1993 Softbank Financial sector software Poland 
1995 Aquarius Robotron Systems PC supplier Germany 
Exhibit 6.7  Key acquisitions by ICL 1990-1995 
Source: Data drawn from FT Profile and Reuter Business Briefing 
These acquisitions have provided ICL with increasing strengths in client-server related 
systems and in particular, PC production and distribution, software and customer support. 
In addition, between 1990 and 1995 ICL set in operation some 40 ‘major collaborations’, 
some with competitors, to bring products and services to the market as quickly as 
possible169. 
Separation of hardware, software and services. 
In line with the wider trend within the IT industry, ICL and Fujitsu are facing a gradual 
shift in the most profitable areas of their business from hardware to software, or more 
broadly, from devices to content and services. For Fujitsu, being a company that has built 
its strengths predominantly on technology, this will be no easy transformation to make. 
However, in the fast moving markets of small computers, Fujitsu does have one distinct 
advantage over some of its competitors: its size. The margins on the production of PCs is 
becoming ever smaller. It is only companies that can operate on a global scale that are 
able to gain sufficient economies of scale to allow them to maintain profitability170. 
Following the acquisition, Fujitsu and ICL began jointly branding their volume products 
(i.e., PCs and network servers). While some saw this as an example of the beginning of 
Fujitsu eroding ICL’s name, this was not the case, according to a Fujitsu director:- 
The joint Fujitsu ICL logo was the idea of ICL, not Fujitsu! We [Fujitsu] agreed to this, and that 
become one of the ways in which we brought the companies closer together, [..] but it really was ICL 
                                                 
169 Chief Executive, January 1995. 
170 Interview with Horne, 20/2/96. 
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who wanted the joint name171 . 
In terms of the shift from hardware to software, the situation is somewhat different for 
ICL than for Fujitsu. The management of ICL have been talking about transforming ICL 
into a systems and services business for a number of years172 and a number of steps have 
been taken to ensure that this goal will be achieved. ICL has been moving though a series 
of stages moving the company far away from the mainframe, product-based ‘old ICL’. 
These stages have been a shift to UNIX-based machines in the 1980s, shifting emphasis 
towards open systems hardware and then on to custom software to solve the needs of 
customers173. By promoting themselves as an IT services company, ICL was able to gain 
custom from established software giants such as Microsoft for the provision of their 
‘customer service needs’174. There has been a gradual process of consolidating hardware 
operations (as can be seen in the acquisitions made by ICL) while at the same time 
drawing a dividing line between the hardware side and the systems and services side (See 
Exhibit 6.8). 
 
Systems and services 
ICL Retail Retail IT solutions (services, hardware, software, systems management). 
ICL Financial services Systems and services to financial sector 
ICL Enterprises Systems and services to central and local government, utilities etc. 
ICL Sorbus Systems and service consultancy 
CFM Outsourcing business, facilities management 
Technology plc Provision of mulitvendor hardware and software products 
High Performance Large computer systems including mainframes 
TeamWare Group Groupware  
Hardware 
Volume products Assembly of PCs and servers (now managed by Fujitsu) 
                                                 
171 Interview with Kitazato 14/3/96. Fujitsu have since taken over the managing of ICL’s Volume Products division, 
and the products now carry the Fujitsu name. This has allowed ICL to focus on services and software, while Fujitsu 
takes over the hardware. 
172 Jebb (1996). 
173 Upside, January 1995. 
174 The Economist, 13/8/94. 
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D2D Contract manufacturing (awaiting a buyer at time of writing) 
Exhibit 6.8  ICL’s spread of interests 
Source: Company reports and Jebb (1996) 
In 1996, Fujitsu announced that the volume products operations of ICL would be merged 
with those of Fujitsu. The aim was to aid the achievement of ‘critical mass’ in the highly 
competitive market for PCs and network servers. Fujitsu’s volume products operations 
were turning-out 1.5 million units per year as compared with 500,000 from ICL. 
The combining of volume products allowed the merged ICL and Fujitsu operations to 
achieve the ‘global volume’ necessary to maintain any profitability in the markets for 
open system based hardware. It has also been announced that the contract electronics 
manufacturing operations of ICL, D2D (for ‘Design-to-Distribution’) will be spun-off as 
soon as a suitable buyer can be found175. This will leave ICL operating largely as an IT 
systems and services firm within the Fujitsu group of companies. Fujitsu, being company 
whose operations are focused on technology, will absorb much of the hardware side of 
ICL. The fact that ICL has manufacturing plants located in Europe is important for 
Fujitsu:- 
The high valuation of the Yen has meant that we must manufacture close to the market. As long as the 
market exists, we must have manufacturing close to that market176. 
In order to be able to manufacture close to major markets, Fujitsu and ICL have also set 
up a joint venture to sell jointly branded PCs in the Asian markets. 
[For Fujitsu] the Japanese and Asian markets are still very much hardware oriented, whereas in the US 
and Europe, markets are split between services and systems integration. Fujitsu has learned from ICL, 
but will do more so in the future, as more attention begins to be focused upon services, systems 
integration and outsourcing177. 
Both ICL and Fujitsu have formed groups to focus their efforts on finding ways of 
deriving added value from the converging fields that will form the digital industry, and 
more specifically, the non-hardware side. Each company has approached this task from 
                                                 
175 Anonymous D2D source. 
176 Interview with Yurino, 14/3/96. 
177 Interview with Aida, 14/3/96. 
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different standpoints. For ICL, the approach taken is one of the delivery of information 
related services:- 
If ICL haven’t been able to add 5% to its net margins [over the next three years] by delivering 
information, alternative methods of communicating and just-in-time delivery of educational and 
training material [..] then we will have failed178. 
Such information-related service represent for ICL a number of areas, which include, 
electronic commerce, the changing world of broadcasting and electronic publishing. For 
Fujitsu, one way it is seeking to operate in the new competitive environment is through 
the hardware and software required by networked small computers. In other words, they 
aim to retain their strengths in devices, but shift emphasis pumping more resources into 
distribution and content. By approaching the future in this way, Fujitsu is able to extend 
its core strengths, while utilising the strengths of its alliance partners where it has 
weaknesses. 
[Fujitsu] aims to get as much as 30% of its revenues from Internet related services, software and 
hardware. [Fujitsu] is ploughing nearly half of the company’s $3.6 billion R&D budget into Internet 
and multimedia related products and services. [..] Alliances are now easing Fujitsu’s entry into the US 
software market as well. [..] ‘We can’t compete on a global basis in software without making use of 
top technical people in the US’ says Tatsuzumi Furukawa [Fujitsu’s board director charged with the 
firm’s multi-media strategy]179. 
Fujitsu’s products focusing on the Internet, and the way in which it is building on the 
firm’s core strengths and those of alliance partners are shown in Exhibit 6.9. 
 
Software Hardware Services 
• Jasmine/ODB II - an object 
oriented database ideally 
suited to Internet-based 
usage. 
• TeamWare - Developed in 
conjunction with ICL, from 
ICL’s acquisition of Nokia 
Data. 
• PCs - With ICL’s capacity, 
Fujitsu has been able to grow 
in this area. 
• Plasma displays - Fujitsu has 
gained strong competence in 
this area. 
• ATM switches - Fujitsu has 
strong competence in this 
• Worldsaway - an on-line chat 
service. 
• NiftyServe - Japan’s oldest 
on-line service provider, 
which is still growing rapidly. 
• InfoWeb - one of Japan’s 
growing Internet access 
providers. 
                                                 
178 Interview with Davison, 28/2/96. 
179 Business Week, 18/3/96. 
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• Atlas - translation software, 
for translating between 
English and Japanese over 
networks. 
area. 
Exhibit 6.9  Fujitsu’s Internet products and services 
Source: Business Week 18/3/96 and Fujitsu related WWW sites. 
One problem that Fujitsu faces, in common with many IT firms trying to map a path into 
the future, is in knowing which emerging technologies to invest in. One solution is to 
apply a ‘grape-shot’ approach:- 
It is so difficult knowing which area will come up. So we must invest in as many areas as possible. 
The problem we face is that the management characteristics of [content] firms is totally different from 
manufacturing firms180. 
Fujitsu and ICL are thus approaching the digital industry in different ways. Fujitsu, being 
fundamentally a technology based firm tends to think in terms of: “How do you apply 
technology to the world markets”181. ICL has already achieved this break away from the 
‘technology product’ focused view of the world (something it has been attempting since 
the early 1980s) and now views the role they can play in the new competitive 
environment as one of the delivery of information:- 
The technology itself is obviously critical, for if it’s not there, you can’t do anything. Once it is there, 
it’s almost a commodity. It’s then what you do with it that counts182. 
Fujitsu and ICL are finding common ground for joint projects. One example of this can be 
seen in the use of Fujitsu’s object-oriented database software, Jasmine, or ODB-II. ODB-
II was launched in Japan in 1994 after eight years of development, and ICL is taking this 
product and customising it for local needs of the European markets.  
An application area that ICL is working on is that of the Internet. ICL’s ‘Publishing 
Content Store’ helps companies manage information delivery over the Internet by 
managing changes in information, controlling access and charging users. ICL is also 
forming links with the BBC which is also providing Fujitsu with access to a huge content 
                                                 
180 Interview with Yurino, 14/3/96. 
181 Interview with Davison, 28/2/96. 
182 Interview with Davison, 28/2/96. 
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and distribution resource. 
Content will become a very big business for Fujitsu. The BBC has a huge asset of content, so we want 
to make a business with them to transport and transfer this content183. 
Performance 
ICL 
Throughout the 1980s, ICL remained the only “consistently profitable broad-based 
computer manufacturer head-quartered in Europe”184 (See Exhibit 6.10). Into the 1990’s 
profits started falling, but this reflected a general squeeze put on computer manufacturers 
as the industry trend shifts towards low-cost, low-margin commodity systems.  
 
Year IBM DEC SNI Unisys Bull Olivetti ICL 
1991 (1894) (408) (267) (922) (387) (245) 62 
1992 (3288) (1851) (217) 239 (590) (349) 39 
1993 (5635) (166) (168) 374 (591) (196) 23 
1994 2000 1427 (138) 67 (255) (278) 28 
1995 4200 81 11 (413) 0 (420) (31)/(152)185 
Total (4347) (3771) (779) (655) (1793) (1488) (31) 
(  ) represents minus 
Exhibit 6.10  Profitability of major computer manufacturers in US$ millions 
Source: Fujitsu internal document 
The cost of restructuring to allow ICL to compete in this increasingly competitive 
environment resulted in ICL being pushed into the red in 1995, the first time since 1981 
(See Exhibit 6.11). This dramatic plunge was caused by the continued cutting of margins, 
but was swollen by the cost of redundancy payments and office closures as the UK firm 
sought to restructure in the face of fierce competition. Fujitsu, who had already injected 
£100 million into the UK subsidiary in 1993 again came to the rescue by underwriting a 
£200 million rights issue. At the same time, ICL announced the merger of its volume 
product operations, and the desire for a partner for contract electronics manufacturing 
                                                 
183 Interview with Yurino, 14/3/96. 
184 Financial Times, 16/3/94. 
185 £152 million represents the exceptional items incurred by restructuring. 
Japanese innovation strategy and the acquisition of UK IT firms                                                                                             Chapter 6 
 152 
operations, D2D, to be found. 
The planned flotation of ICL has been postponed, though it is still hoped to be “sooner 
rather than later” according to a company spokesman186. 
 
 
Exhibit 6.11  ICL turnover and profit before tax 
Source: Company reports 
Note: 1995 profit figures exclude the £152 million exceptional charge for the cost of office closures and redundancy 
payments as the firm sought to rationalise its operations. 
 
Fujitsu 
As the after-shock from the bursting of the bubble economy caught up with Fujitsu and 
profits collapsed (See Exhibit 6.12). Fujitsu did not suffer as badly as its arch-rival IBM, 
but was still forced to restructure in the face of a harsh competitive environment caused 
by the delayed recovery of the Japanese economy, the rapid appreciation of the Yen and 
the depressed state of the US mainframe market187. Fujitsu was in some ways cushioned 
from the impact of the shift away from mainframes towards open systems based 
computing that wrought such havoc with IBM by having major interests outside 
computing, and in particular telecommunications188. Though having to face stiff 
                                                 
186 Lloyds List, 9/3/96. 
187 Financial Times, 10/11/93. 
188 For example, the European telecommunications market was being liberalised by the mandatory elimination of 
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competition from European telecommunications equipment suppliers, non-European 
companies such as AT&T, Nortel and Fujitsu hoped still to be able to benefit from this 
investment boom. 
 
Exhibit 6.12  Fujitsu net sales and net income 1988 - 1995 
Source: Company reports 
 
In 1993, Fujitsu was forced to cut R&D spending and capital expenditure, as well as 
lowering the numbering of employees by 6000 over a two year period through natural 
wastage189. The year’s loss represented the first time that Fujitsu had gone into the red 
since 1949190. 
Closing comments 
ICL has played a strong role in changing Fujitsu to face the new competitive 
environment. In 1993, things were looking bleak for Fujitsu, who had lost money for the 
first time since 1949. Yet the ongoing recession in Japan that was having such an effect 
on Fujitsu’s revenue was also in a way providing an opportunity. The shift towards open 
                                                 
monopolies, the consequent increased level of interest from abroad and the consequent requirements for upgrading. 
189 Financial Times, 8/9/93. 
190 Financial Times, 4/6/93. 
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systems based computing had been slow in reaching Japan, and was being held up in part 
by the lack of desire on the part of Japanese companies to spend money on renewing their 
IT systems in a depressed economy. This gave Fujitsu a ‘breathing space’ to restructure 
and rationalise in order to compete more effectively in the open-systems-based computer 
industry. ICL was playing a crucial role in that process, as was trumpeted in the press at 
that time:- 
Given the tenfold differences in their revenues, it would be ridiculous to talk of ‘reverse take-overs’, 
but if Fujitsu looks to its UK subsidiary for guidance through the [open-systems based] computing 
jungle, then ICL’s influence should grow out of all proportion to its size191. 
It seems that ICL has been able to play an important role in helping Fujitsu move from 
the ‘old’ computer industry, based on selling a relatively small number of large, 
proprietary computing systems to domestic corporate clients, to the open-systems based 
‘new’ computer industry in which high volumes of small computers are sold on a global 
basis. ICL, at the same time, has been able to continue its reformation into the services 
and systems integration firm it has been attempting to become since the early 1980s. As 
one ICL manager described, for IT companies in the open-systems based computing 
environment, and the subsequent predicted shift into the digital industry, “knowing which 
business to give up is the most important thing”192. In a way, ICL has been where Fujitsu 
is now, and has consequently been able to offer outside advice from an internal position:- 
With Fujitsu and ICL working closely together, ICL’s input can help speed up Fujitsu’s thinking. That 
is something very important for ICL. When Peter Bonfield193 talks to the management of Fujitsu, his 
view is sometimes very provocative, but people think: ‘What he says now may be true in Japan in two 
years from now’. People know that, so even if Fujitsu management are not comfortable with the ideas 
presented by ICL, they know that it will happen eventually, so Fujitsu respect and appreciate the input 
from ICL194. 
                                                 
191 Financial Times, 4/6/93 
192 Interview with Davison, 28/2/96. 
193 CEO of ICL at the time of the interview. At the time of writing, Peter Bonfield had been made the chairmen of 
British Telecom (BT), whilst retaining a position within ICL as non-executive chairmen. His move to BT was put in a 
favourable light by Fujitsu: “In some ways it was very good for ICL, as he [Bonfield] had been with ICL for 13 years. 
That is too long to keep one management team. So this has been viewed as a very positive development by some middle 
management” (Interview with Yurino, 14/3/96). 
194 Interview with Kitazato, 14/3/96. 
Japanese innovation strategy and the acquisition of UK IT firms                                                                                             Chapter 6 
 155 
The fundamental difference in culture that differentiates the two companies has been 
managed so as to work in favour of the two organisations:- 
Fujitsu people think in terms of technologies. ICL people think in terms of the market and the 
customer, and change corporate style to meet the change of market and customer. But Fujitsu’s way is 
to start thinking from the product or technology, and to try and adapt that technology or product to the 
market. So sometimes we have become arrogant, thinking that as we have a good technology, we must 
push this technology to the market and the customer. That was OK in Japan, because Fujitsu had a 
very big power influence over the customer. [..] but in the global market, this is not acceptable. You 
have to be more flexible and you have to structure yourself to meet the needs of the market. Then you 
have a better sense of the capabilities you need to catch the changing direction of the market195. 
Fujitsu is reforming itself, and is able to draw upon the resources of ICL to help it do that. 
In some ways, ICL has already been along the road that Fujitsu is now travelling. ICL has 
been moving doggedly along the path of transformation from a highly vertically 
integrated product based company to a services and systems integration company, whose 
focus is now the distribution of information.  
                                                 
195 Interview with Kitazato, 11/1/95. 
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Chapter 7 Case Study B: MELCO-Apricot 
Chapter overview 
In 1990, the Mitsubishi Electric Corporation (MELCO), one of Japan’s leading producers of 
general electrical machinery, acquired 100% ownership of the hardware division of Apricot 
Computers, a UK-based provider of PC hardware, software and related services. 
MELCO had struggled in its attempts to produce a range of PCs to allow the firm to compete in 
the international markets for open-systems based computing. Despite beating IBM to become the 
first company to produce a 16-bit PC in 1981, MELCO had found its skills in heavy electrical 
machinery and industrial products predominately for sales in the domestic Japanese market had 
not provided it with sufficient flexibility to be able to compete in the dynamic, international 
markets for open systems based computers. 
Apricot, despite having a strong services and software business unit was finding its profits held 
down by the hardware side towards the end of the 1980s. It was becoming clear to the 
management of the UK firm that in order to compete in the international markets for open-
systems based hardware, high volume and international manufacturing capacity were needed. 
Apricot was unable to find the financial backing to develop such capacity. In 1990, Apricot 
announced that it was seeking a buyer for its hardware division. Interest was shown from a wide 
range of bidders, but it was MELCO which was able to provide the best terms for Apricot, and 
ownership was acquired in May of 1990 for a cost of £39 million. Apricot has since been 
integrated into MELCO as the Mitsubishi Electric PC Division, though the Apricot brand name 
has been kept for PCs and servers. 
 
Japanese innovation strategy and the acquisition of UK IT firms                                                                                             Chapter 7 
 157 
MELCO  
The Mitsubishi Electric Corporation (MELCO) was founded in 1921 and is now Japan’s 
fourth largest manufacturer of general electric machinery after Hitachi, NEC and 
Toshiba196. 1995’s net sales were over US$36 billion derived from a product range which 
is divided into four main areas:- information, telecommunications and electronic devices; 
heavy machinery; industrial products and automotive equipment; consumer and other 
products197 (Exhibit 7.1 shows the relative split of sales derived from each of the four 
product groups).  
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Consumer and Other Products 30 31 31 28 28 
Industrial Products and Automation 
Equipment 
18 17 16 16 16 
Heavy Machinery 20 20 23 25 24 
Information, Telecommunications and 
Electronic Systems and Devices 
32 32 30 31 32 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Exhibit 7.1  MELCO’s main product areas by percentage sales, and changes 1991-1995 
Source: MELCO Company Reports 
MELCO is located in more than thirty countries world-wide and has over 100 affiliated 
companies. Despite having such a wide international presence, MELCO still consistently 
derives almost 80% of its sales from the domestic Japanese market (See Exhibit 7.2). The 
company is one of the four largest members of the Mitsubishi Group of companies along 
with the Tokyo Mitsubishi Bank, Mitsubishi Corporation and Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries. 
 
 
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
                                                 
196 Asahi (1995). 
197Details of the full product range are given in Appendix III. 
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Japan 78 79 78 79 77 
Europe 5 5 5 4 9 
North America 10 9 9 8 8 
Asia (except Japan) 5 6 7 7 4 
Others 1 1 2 2 2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Exhibit 7.2  MELCO’s percentage sales by region, and changes 1991-1995 
Source: MELCO Company Reports and Extel data 
 
MELCO’s entry into computing198 
MELCO had entered computing in the 1960s following the signing of a MITI co-
ordinated deal to allow Japanese firms access to IBM’s basic computer technology 
patents in return for IBM being allowed access to the Japanese markets. MELCO was one 
of 7 firms who quickly took up the opportunity that this technology agreement offered199.  
In the early stages of MELCO’s development of computing competence, this area of 
interest never represented more than a small percentage of total sales. The majority of 
sales were still being derived from the core heavy electrical machinery business. To 
enhance the ability of MELCO to derive value from this growing area, MELCO formed 
an alliance with TRW in the US. When TRW withdrew from this area in the 1970s, 
MELCO responded by forming alliances with Xerox and Univac. Univac had already 
formed a joint venture with Oki Electric in Japan. Oki-Univac, as the joint venture was 
known, subcontracted part of the computer and peripheral production to MELCO; in 
return, MELCO sold imported Univac machines, as well as machines from the Oki-
Univac partnership. MELCO had limited success in the markets for large computers, but 
focused efforts on the production of smaller machines and peripherals200.  
                                                 
198 This section is drawn from Anchordoguy (1989) and Fransman (1990). 
199 The other 6 being NEC, Fujitsu, Hitachi, Matsushita, Toshiba and Oki. 
200 This was partly due to the way MITI had sought to ‘rationalise’ the Japanese computer industry in order to develop 
an effective response to IBM’s domination. Fujitsu, NEC and Hitachi were encouraged to focus on mainframes, while 
Toshiba, Oki and MELCO were pushed to focus emphasis upon smaller computers and peripherals. 
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MELCO’s entry into the PC market 
In January of 1981, MELCO narrowly beat IBM and Fujitsu to become the first computer 
company in the world to produce a 16-bit PC201. However, this early product, the ‘Multi 
16’, suffered from a number of design faults202. These faults were corrected, and MELCO 
PCs went on to do well in the domestic Japanese market. By acting as an OEM supplier 
for the UNISYS computer company in the United States, MELCO managed to capture 
70% of Japanese PC exports203. Unfortunately, the relationship with UNISYS did not last, 
as the Japanese company found its prices being under-cut by the emerging Taiwanese 
computer manufacturers such as Mitac and Acer204. Eventually, UNISYS switched its 
OEM sourcing to the lower-cost Taiwanese manufacturers. MELCO then attempted to 
continue to sell its PCs under the Mitsubishi Electric brand name in the US, but without 
great success. An additional problem had emerged with MELCO PCs. MELCO had opted 
for the CP/M operating system for their early machines, rather than the Microsoft Disc 
Operating System (MS-DOS) selected by IBM for its PCs. As MS-DOS went on to 
become the de facto industry standard for early PCs world-wide, the early MELCO PCs 
were facing a shrinking market. 
MELCO’s problems with PCs 
Aside from the initial selection of the ‘wrong’ operating system205, MELCO’s problems 
in the PC market stemmed from two major factors. Firstly, while the company’s main 
rivals in the PC field at that time, IBM and Compaq, were acting on a global scale and 
were thus able to reap the cost benefits of international component procurement, MELCO 
was not. The Japanese company continued to procure components almost exclusively 
from within Japan and in smaller quantities than their main rivals206. Consequently 
                                                 
201 MELCO PC History, 1991. 
202 Interview with Daisuke Goto, 15/3/96. 
203 Internal MELCO document. 
204 Interview with Takashi Goto, 15/3/96. 
205 In the early stages of growth of the PC market, it was by no means clear which products would emerge as standards. 
It was only really by chance that IBM had not opted for CP/M for their original PC (Cringely, 1992). MELCO had in a 
sense just been unlucky in backing the wrong operating system. 
206 Interview with Daisuke Goto, 15/3/96. 
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MELCO’s PC prices were less competitive in international markets.  
Secondly, MELCO, being “basically a technology company”207 was less proficient than 
its main rivals at overseas marketing. MELCO’s core business for much of its 75 year 
history had been based in the fields of heavy electrical machinery and industrial 
equipment. The relationship that MELCO had developed with its customers in these 
fields tended to be very different to those needed within the PC market. MELCO’s own-
branded PC business continued to “fail everywhere”208 as the division responsible for 
developing PCs had numerous difficulties getting the right product to market at the right 
time209. 
MELCO’s return to the PC market 
IBM’s change of strategy 
For MELCO in Japan, one of the biggest groups of customers for its computers were the 
other members of the Mitsubishi keiretsu. As MELCO’s computer competences lay 
largely in the production of small computers and peripherals, MELCO was unable to 
provide the keiretsu customers with a full range of computer systems and services. In 
particular, as MELCO had largely withdrawn from the production of their own main-
frame computers, focusing instead on providing components for joint production or the 
importation of non-Japanese machines, they had no choice but to recommend an 
alternative supplier to Mitsubishi keiretsu members. MELCO decided to push IBM 
computers as the best option for Mitsubishi companies so as not to give MELCO’s 
domestic rivals an opportunity to get a foot inside the Mitsubishi camp210. MELCO 
continued to provide all other smaller computers and peripherals, such as monitors and 
terminals, to Mitsubishi companies.  
When IBM released its PS/2 series of PCs in 1987 based in micro-channel architecture 
                                                 
207 Interview with Daisuke Goto, 15/3/96. 
208 Interview with Horne, 20/2/96. 
209 Reviews of MELCO PCs from around this time described the machines as: “.. slow, awkward and expensive” 
(Which Computer, July, 1988) and “.. obsolete and too expensive.” (Wall Street Journal, 17/4/86). 
210 Interview with Daisuke Goto, 1996. 
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(MCA)211 which allowed a high degree of inter-connectability between micro-, mini- and 
mainframe computers within the IBM range, there was a strong incentive for MELCO to 
have access to such technology internally. The PS/2 series of computers was IBM’s way 
of re-gaining the market share it was losing to the ‘clone’ producers by redefining the 
industry standard technology212. Access to MCA technology, it was hoped, would not 
only provide MELCO with the ability to catch the wave of the next range of PC 
technology, but also to produce small computers that would be connectable with the IBM 
machines that they had encouraged other Mitsubishi companies to buy. 
Changes in the Japanese PC market 
At the end of the 1980s and into the early 1990s, there were those within MELCO who 
realised that the Japanese PC market, presently dominated by NEC’s proprietary systems, 
would undergo a dramatic change once computers based around internationally common, 
open standards began to reach Japan213. 
It was actually not until 1994 that the Japanese market started to really open up and move away from 
the NEC/AX consortium. But [MELCO] knew this was going to happen214. 
Vertical integration 
An additional issue relating to the PC market was the missed opportunities that stemmed 
from MELCO being a large semiconductor producer (ranked 9th in the world by sales215), 
without being a high volume PC producer216. More vertically integrated domestic rivals in 
the PC market, such as NEC and Fujitsu, were able to internally source DRAM chips and 
                                                 
211IBM announced its new series of machines based on Micro Channel Architecture in April 1987. The machines were 
more powerful and faster than the previous IBM PCs, but the MCA bus was not compatible with add-in devices for the 
PC-AT series that IBM had produced and that clone makers were now becoming dominant in selling (Chposky & 
Leonis, 1998). IBM saw the PS/2, coupled with a new operating system, OS/2, as a way of regaining PC market share 
gained by the clone makers. This was not to be the case, as customers had grown accustomed to the freedom of being 
able to choose between a wide range of vendors for computer hardware peripherals, and were not interested in having to 
scrap these and invest in new technology, albeit one that offered improved performance. 
212 Chposky & Leonis, (1989). 
213 In March 1991, a group of PC manufacturing companies, under the guidance of IBM Japan set up the PC Open 
Architecture Development Group. The aim of this group was to promote a bilingual operating system which could be 
used with IBM compatible machines and was called DOS/V. This, it was hoped, would open up the Japanese market 
and break the hold that NEC and its proprietary ‘mini-open’ system had on over half of the Japanese PCs (Reuter News 
Service, 11/3/91). See Fransman (1995, Chapter 4) for further information on the evolution of the Japanese PC market. 
214 Interview with Horne, 20/2/96. 
215 Asahi (1995). 
216 Interview with Daisuke Goto, 15/3/96.. 
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thus benefit from improved profit margins for their PCs. MELCO was still selling-on the 
majority of their memory chips to assemblers who then added their own margin and 
increased their own profitability217. 
Wider changes within MELCO 
The emergence and rapid diffusion in Europe and the US of open-systems based 
computing and the widespread realisation that this technology would soon be impacting 
upon the Japanese IT industry acted as an indicator to wider management issues which 
MELCO needed to address if the corporation was to become a truly global company. 
MELCO was consistently deriving over 75% of its sales from the domestic market. The 
company needed to acquire skills in areas such as international marketing if it was ever to 
be able to compete in what was becoming a global business. This view was summed up 
by one Japanese manager:- 
[..] the PC business is getting very open - MELCO wants to have world-wide activities in this 
business. So, from a management point of view, MELCO wants to be a transnational company, and 
from a business point of view - especially the PC business, it must be a transnational company218. 
MELCO had gained a reputation for a wide range of technological competences held 
within an organisational structure which had been described as a “slumbering mess”219. 
The problems faced by MELCO were summed up by one MELCO manager:- 
[MELCO has always found it] difficult to move into new business areas - easier to stay with current 
ones. The senior management are always looking to the future of MELCO. They are looking for 
changes in the technology or the products, but it takes time to change everything.220.  
MELCO, being a part of the giant Mitsubishi keiretsu, had been able for most of its 
history to draw on the strengths that exist among the 29 core members of the Mitsubishi 
group and their affiliates221. In the past, these connections, coupled with competences 
built-up through Japanese Government supported collaborative R&D projects and loose 
                                                 
217 A similar motive was part of the reason for Korea's Samsung acquiring 40% of AST Research Incorporated in the 
US. 
218 Interview with Sawai, 20/2/96. 
219 The Economist, 19/2/94. 
220 Interview with Sawai, 20/2/96. 
221 See Ohsono (1995) for details of MELCO’s keiretsu connections. 
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collaborations with non-Japanese companies222 have proved to be sufficient to allow 
MELCO to respond to changes in the competitive environment for computers, but never 
to compete in the same league as rivals such as NEC, Fujitsu and Hitachi223. 
The management of MELCO were aware that the move towards open systems-based 
computing was the start of a wider series of changes in the industry (as highlighted in 
Chapter 2). Such a highly uncertain environment would almost certainly require resources 
in areas that MELCO lacked. Consequently, MELCO would need to be much more 
flexible than it had shown itself to be in the past. A key skill that would be required in the 
changing competitive environment would be the ability to work closely with external, and 
particularly non-Japanese firms. 
Such thinking did not come easily to some within MELCO, where the development of a 
response to technological discontinuities in the past had stemmed from an attitude 
summed up as:-  
We did it on our own before. We can do it again. MELCO always wants to do everything by itself!224.  
Strategy to respond 
Thus, towards the end of the 1980s, MELCO management realised that they needed two 
things. Firstly, within the Information and Communication Systems Group, there was a 
need to gain the resources which would allow them to develop competence in open-
systems computing. It was not a matter of missing an opportunity to sell a particular type 
of small computer, but rather that these small computers were redefining the entire 
computer industry, and if MELCO wished to remain competitive in computing, it needed 
to have competences in this area. 
Secondly, the international and dynamic nature of the emerging open systems based 
computing and MELCO’s failed attempts to enter the international market for PCs 
                                                 
222 MELCO had gained much of its early computer technology from collaborations with first TRW and then Sperry in 
the US (Anchordoguy, 1989). 
223 Computergram International, 27/8/91. 
224 Interview with Daisuke Goto, 15/3/96. 
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pointed to wider changes that were needed within the organisation of MELCO. As the 
changes resulting from the predicted formation of the digital industry began to impact 
upon MELCO, the uncertain environment that this convergence presented pointed to the 
fact that a high degree of organisational flexibility would be needed225. As such, the 
ability to form, and make effective use of alliances would be of crucial importance. In the 
past, MELCO had focused heavily on the provision of technology. If MELCO lacked a 
specific technology, it would go outside to find it, pulling on the resources of the other 
Mitsubishi keiretsu members. With matters of business, such as marketing and forming 
alliance with other companies, this had been largely left to another member of the 
Mitsubishi keiretsu, the Mitsubishi Corporation226. In the fast moving and international 
environment of open-systems computing, such reliance on a separate company to deal 
with marketing and alliance formation was inappropriate227. MELCO needed to develop 
sufficient flexibility and openness in outlook to allow it to seek out partners on its own.  
MELCO thus needed to find a partner to provide the required technology that would 
allow it not only to re-enter the PC market, but to steal the technological lead on its 
Japanese competitors by having access to MCA technology that would enable it to 
produce machines compatible with IBM’s predicted new industry standard. In addition, 
MELCO realised that it needed to become more flexible and able to respond more rapidly 
to the dynamic environment that the ‘new’ computer industry presented. This was the 
situation facing MELCO as the 1980s drew to a close. 
Apricot 
Apricot, initially trading as Applied Computer Techniques (ACT), was founded in 1965 
by Roger Foster as a computer services provider. The company went public in 1979 and 
                                                 
225 Interview with Daisuke Goto, 15/3/96. 
226 The relationship between MELCO and the Mitsubishi Corporation was described by one MELCO manager as 
follows:- “The Mitsubishi Corporation is a trading company. At business management issues, Mitsubishi Corporation is 
very good - merging companies, making acquisitions and investing in companies. MELCO is a technology company 
and did not want to invest in other companies. They simply wanted to sell their own technology products. They wanted 
to keep the technology and sell on the products. For the new technology areas, MELCO has only a part of the required 
technologies. To get the remaining technologies, they must invest in other companies and form technology alliances.” 
(Interview with Sawai, 20/2/96). 
227 Interview with Daisuke Goto, 15/3/96. 
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in 1981 began the import of a 16-bit PC, the ‘Sirius I’, from the US. This was the first of 
its kind to reach the European market and sold in sufficient quantities to convince ACT to 
set up its own PC manufacturing operation. 
The initial range of ‘Apricot’ branded PCs sold well, but by 1986 a serious problem had 
emerged. Apricot PCs did not conform to IBM’s PC-AT standard. As it became clear that 
maintaining a proprietary standard for Apricot machines would continue to damage sales, 
the decision was made in 1986 to redesign the PCs to allow compatibility with IBM 
machines, and in particular the predicted MCA-based machines which Apricot anticipated 
would become the prevailing design in the PC market228. The cost of this re-design 
resulted in a dramatic fall in profits (See Exhibit 7.3). 
Trends in the PC hardware industry at that time indicated that only companies with an 
international presence were likely to survive229. By the late 1980s, companies in the UK 
computer industry who still only had a predominantly domestic market presence were 
facing problems.  
As a small company in the UK, as Apricot was, we could not afford the ongoing investment to become 
a world-wide manufacturer. If you hadn’t become international by the early 1980s, it was too late to 
start off on that course. The investments were too large and the City wasn’t interested230. 
For Apricot’s hardware side to survive, it needed investment to allow it to develop 
international manufacturing capacity. The volume of PC production needed to allow the 
firm to become a major player in the international markets for PCs was around 1 million. 
In 1990, Apricot was selling just 40,000 units per year231. 
 
                                                 
228 Other manufacturers were less convinced of the ability of IBM to use MCA to change the direction of the PC 
market back in its favour (Financial Times, 12/4/90). 
229 The PC market had reached a stage of maturity that the margins on the products were razor thin, and for firms to 
make a profit, they needed to be either niche players, or to have sufficient global coverage to be able to reap the benefit 
of global procurement and other economies of scale (Interview with Horne, 20/2/96). 
230 Interview with Horne, 20/2/96. 
231 Roger Foster, chairman of Apricot, as reported in the Financial Times (12/4/90). This was, however, well under the 
capacity that Apricot was capable of producing (Electronics Weekly, 18/4/90). 
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Exhibit 7.3  Apricot pre-acquisition sales and pre-tax profit 
Source: Harvey-Jones, 1990. 
Division of hardware, software and services. 
Despite the company having a strong software and services business unit, the hardware 
side was holding down profits. Though possessing world class manufacturing capacity 
they lacked the international presence that would have allowed them to achieve ‘critical 
mass’. It became clear to the management of Apricot that it would be better for the 
company as a whole if the hardware and software sides were separated. The decision was 
made in 1989232 to change the way Apricot did business.  
A number of acquisitions of computer service oriented companies had been made by 
Apricot, and it seemed to be an indicator to members of the hardware division as to the 
direction in which the future of the company lay. Of these, the 1989 acquisition of ITL 
seemed to point clearly to the future strategies of Apricot. ITL was formerly known as 
Computer Technology and had been the UK’s oldest indigenous minicomputer producer. 
ITL’s value to Apricot lay not in its hardware side, but in its software and services 
activities. Apricot was able to merge these non-hardware activities with its own to form a 
                                                 
232 Before the visits, subsequent TV documentary, and well publicised advice by Sir John Harvey-Jones. 
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software and services unit that had potential sales of more than £80 million per year233. 
Having achieved this ‘critical mass’ on the services and software side, it was then 
possible for the hardware side to be spun off.  
Those within the hardware side of the company were keener to stay with the production 
of PCs and servers. Peter Horne, the former head of R&D who went on to manage the 
hardware side of Apricot summed up the views of those working in the hardware side of 
Apricot. His goal was:- 
 .. to help make it a success, because the hardware side of the business is what I’m most interested in. 
Less of the other people at Apricot at that time were234. 
In January 1990, Apricot announced that it was seeking a partner for its hardware 
division235. It soon became clear that a number of companies were interested in acquiring 
the division. These firms saw the potential advantage of having a PC manufacturing 
facility within the European Union when integrated into a wider international 
manufacturing network and consequently able to draw upon economies of scale in 
procurement and distribution. Apricot’s technology was highly regarded within the 
industry, and it seemed clear to the potential buyers that all it lacked was the ability to 
raise sufficient capital to allow it to invest in building an international presence236. 
Having so much interest from around the world (four companies from the United States, 
two from Taiwan and two from Japan) put Apricot in a strong position when it came to 
dictating terms. The management of Apricot decided that it would be in the best interests 
of all concerned if the splitting off of the hardware division were to be carried out as 
quickly as possible. Apricot thus set a extremely tight time-frame of just three months for 
completion of the deal. Owing to the high level of competition for the ownership of the 
division, Apricot were able to bargain hard for a good sale price. 
                                                 
233 Financial Times, 12/4/90. 
234 Interview with Horne, 20/2/96. 
235 Birmingham Post, 18/4/90. 
236 Financial Times, 12/4/90. 
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Acquisition 
In May 1990, Apricot sold its manufacturing arm to Mitsubishi Electric UK Limited (a 
wholly owned subsidiary of the Mitsubishi Electric Corporation in Japan). The final price 
paid for the acquisition was £39m237. This gave the Japanese corporation not only the 
entire hardware R&D, manufacturing and administration facilities of Apricot in 
Birmingham, Scotland and those of its subsidiary in Australia, but also the right to use the 
‘Apricot’ brand name. Use of the brand name was regarded as important, as MELCO 
were aware of the strength of the Apricot brand in the market for open systems hardware.  
Peter Horne was to become Group Managing Director of Apricot Computers. The 
software and services side of Apricot was to revert to its old name of ACT. ACT would 
retain the right to resell and service Apricot machines and maintain links with Apricot’s 
R&D operations238. 
Motives for the Acquisition 
MELCO’s motives for forming an alliance with, though not necessarily acquiring the 
hardware division of Apricot Computers Limited in the UK can be grouped as follows.  
• MELCO’s need to move to open systems based computing. There were specific factors 
relating to the problems faced by the Information and Communication Systems Group 
of MELCO in trying to produce an internationally competitive PC as the company 
headed into the 1990s. MELCO had tried, and failed, to produce and internationally 
market its own PC. The move towards open-systems based computing was continuing 
to increase in momentum and MELCO, like most other Japanese computer 
manufacturers saw the importance of having access to the resources in this area to 
allow it to develop the necessary competences. Apricot coming on the market at that 
time provided an ideal opportunity to internalise the required resources, and to 
combine these with MELCO’s own resources (such as DRAM and monitor 
                                                 
237 The audited net value of Apricot’s hardware division was £16.4 million, which implied that MELCO was willing to 
pay £22.6 million to extend its influence in Europe as well as gain Apricot’s MCA technology (Financial Times, 
12/4/90). 
238 Electronics Weekly, 18/4/90. 
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production) to achieve ‘critical mass’ through vertical integration. Also, IBM’s PS/2 
was anticipated by some to become the new standard for PCs, and consequently 
MELCO wanted to attempt to leap ahead of the competition by investing in what it 
hoped would be the next generation of PC technology. 
• MELCO’s need to become more ‘open’. There were factors which stemmed from the 
more general feeling within MELCO that the company could no longer draw upon 
sufficient resources internally to provide responses to the rapidly changing global 
markets for open systems based computing and the combined products derived from 
the converging technologies of computing, consumer electronics and communication. 
MELCO seemed well aware that being an internally focused organisation was 
inappropriate for competition in the fast moving and internationally focused markets 
for open systems based computing, and the subsequent changes in the competitive 
environment. As such, there were those within the firm who saw the need to form 
links with non-Japanese firms and to learn how to manage these alliances to the best 
advantage of MELCO. 
Post-acquisition 
Integration issues 
Once the deal had been announced, there was anticipation, both internally and externally, 
as to how MELCO would manage the acquisition integration process. As it turned out, the 
Japanese corporation seemed to favour a process of maintaining structural integration239. 
MELCO was almost completely non-interventionist and managed the process by-and-
large as a total ‘hands-off’ approach. In the words of Apricot’s managing director, it was 
as if MELCO was saying:- “OK, you’re part of us, now what do you want?”.  
While this may have been the best approach to take, it illustrated a degree of risk taken on 
the part of MELCO. Unlike Fujitsu and ICL, MELCO and Apricot had no relationship 
                                                 
239 In summary, the spectrum of acquisition integration options varies from (1) assimilation, where one party adopts the 
identity of the other. This can either be forced or voluntary, (2) novation, where the two organisations combine and a 
new identity is created and (3) structural integration, where each organisation keeps its own identity, with each 
accepting the validity of the others working practices (Schweiger et al., 1993). 
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prior to the acquisition. MELCO was “almost the only Japanese company [Apricot] had 
never done business with”240. For MELCO to acquire the former hardware division of a 
non-Japanese company with which they had no previous connection, and to leave this unit 
to function autonomously under the MELCO umbrella showed a high degree of 
sensitivity to the situation. This strategy may have been adopted by MELCO out of a lack 
of confidence of their ability to manage the integration, rather than a highly planned 
process of maintaining structural integration:- 
In some cases, the Japanese do not rush in and changes things, because they don’t know how to! Some 
rush in and say “This is Japan now! Why don’t you understand us?” This often results in failure241. 
Thus, it was MELCO’s inexperience at managing acquisitions, and fear of destroying the 
value of Apricot that may have led them to adopt a hands-off approach to managing the 
integration. 
The delicacy of the situation was clear to Apricot as well as MELCO. There were many 
within MELCO who had made it clear that they were not in favour of MELCO and 
Apricot combining242. Apricot’s managing director, having witnessed a number of mis-
managed acquisitions carried out by Apricot in the past243, was able to provide the 
Japanese with guidance for the management of the acquisition:- 
When you’re acquired, you’ve got your own strong opinions and your own culture. You may feel you 
don’t want to become ‘Mitsubishi’ - I’m ‘Apricot’!” [..]. You have to let this negative feeling have its 
time and manage it well, like a child in a family. You can never force anything upon anyone in life. 
They must see the benefit, and take it on-board themselves - if it’s good, they will, or they’re stupid, in 
which case the person tends to leave244. 
Some within MELCO also seemed to be aware of the benefit of having someone such as 
Peter Horne heading Apricot:- 
                                                 
240 Interview with Horne, 20/2/96. 
241 Interview with Shigiya, 6/11/95. 
242 “There were a lot of people inside MELCO who were against the acquisition. It was by no mean a consensus” 
(Interview with Horne, 20/2/96). 
243 Over the years I’ve seen a lot of acquisitions that Apricot did, and did appallingly, and I’ve tried to some extent to 
learn from those. We were typical of all Western companies by having an arrogant view when acquiring a company, 
and that cannot work” (Interview with Horne, 20/2/96). 
244 Interview with Horne, 20/2/96. 
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We respect Apricot and we don’t want to force things. Peter Horne is very good for us - it is very 
difficult to find such a person as him!245. 
It became clear to the management of Apricot that, in the short term, MELCO really was 
going to be, by and large, non-interventionist in their approach to dealing with the UK 
acquisition. MELCO announced in the Japanese press that “no changes would be made at 
Apricot”246. 
Apricot continued to buy its 3.5” disk drives from Sony, monitors from the Taiwanese 
and memory chips from numerous non-MELCO sources. MELCO management was 
aware that in acquiring Apricot, they had gained a fully functioning PC production and 
development facility, a strong brand image and access to outlets in Europe, North 
America and Australia. Consequently, the Japanese had little need to interfere. 
MELCO stressed the high regard they had for the management of Apricot, and were 
particularly keen to see it remain in place following the change of ownership. There are 
only 8 Japanese permanent employees within Apricot (whose salaries are paid by the UK 
company). Apricot management are keen to stress the view that the Japanese presence 
within the UK division was not a network of “spies within the camp”247. Of the Japanese 
in the UK, perhaps one of the most important is the deputy to the Group Managing 
Director, Yoshihiko Sawai, who acts as deputy to Peter Horne, Apricot’s Managing 
Director. Sawai sees his role as a “cultural translator”. The difficult and delicate nature of 
his work is summed up as follows:-  
MELCO is a Japanese company, a very large company, and Apricot is a British company, a very small 
one. So we have a lot of ‘big gaps’ - I take the time to try and solve problems. Our aim is to try and 
have a successful business for MELCO world-wide248. 
Bringing together these two very different cultures has been no easy task, and this can be 
clearly seen in the later sections on joint product development. 
                                                 
245 Interview with Daisuke Goto, 15/3/96. 
246 Asahi News Service, 12/4/90. 
247 Interview with Horne, 20/2/96. 
248 Interview with Sawai, 20/2/96. 
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Benefits of the acquisition to Apricot 
Survival 
Becoming a member of a $36 billion corporation provided Apricot with a level of security 
for its future that it had never had in the past. In simple terms, MELCO rescued Apricot:- 
We wouldn’t be here today if it wasn’t for Mitsubishi acquiring us. [..] It is an ideal relationship of a 
large financial organisation with deep pockets, but one which also understands manufacturing249. 
The financial institutions of ‘The City’ had in recent years come to regard Apricot as a 
‘fallen angel’. Having shown great potential for growth since its floatation in 1979, it had 
gone on to make a number of poor strategy decisions. The financial institutions did not 
seem to be predisposed to helping a company which they regarded as having ‘lost its 
way’:- 
[The City] judged that there had been too many changes in direction; the range of computers, while 
technically advanced, was not designed with any particular marketing strategy in mind. Here was a 
company which promised a lot, but which continually failed to deliver profits250. 
Apricot as a whole had become an easy take-over target, and a hostile take-over could 
have resulted in the destruction of a company whose basic technology and brand name 
was still highly regarded. MELCO’s purchase of the hardware division and the formation 
of links between the newly separated software and services division of ACT ensured that 
not only would Apricot’s future as a hardware manufacturer be ensured, but also that 
ACT would be in a much stronger position having a guaranteed source of revenue from 
MELCO. 
The ‘Mitsubishi Electric’ name 
Having the MELCO name associated with that of Apricot effectively provided a 
guarantee to the world that Apricot would survive. What was needed, however, was a 
way of combining the identities of the two firms in the eyes of consumers so that the 
strengths of both parties could be leveraged to maximum effect. Apricot had a brand 
image that consumers associated with high quality PCs and servers. MELCO’s image was 
                                                 
249 Interview with Horne, 20/2/96. 
250 Harvey-Jones (1990:73). 
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one that was not particularly well known in European computer markets, but which being 
‘Mitsubishi’ presented an image of robust technology. The firms needed to find a way of 
combining the two brand images in the most effective way. Initially, Apricot PCs 
continued to be sold with Apricot as the main name, plus the addition of a discrete 
MELCO logo. Recently, the MELCO name has been pushed further forward. As will be 
discussed further on, with the formation of the Mitsubishi Electric PC Division, Apricot 
has become the brand name of MELCO PCs and servers. See Exhibit 7.4. 
 
Exhibit 7.4  Changes in branding of Apricot PCs 
Source: Company material. 
 
Access to the Japanese market 
Being part of the MELCO family gave Apricot an opportunity to expand its horizons. By 
having a parent based firmly inside the Japanese market, in just two years, Apricot was 
able to use its new parent to help it gain 37% of the market for file-server systems in 
Japan251. The managing director was able to say that “Apricot now has two home 
markets, the UK and Japan”252. Machines are now sold in Japan under the Apricot brand 
name, but through MELCO distribution channels. Access to Apricot’s strength in UNIX 
systems came at just the right time for MELCO, as the Japanese market for these systems 
was growing fast. 
                                                 
251 Computer Weekly, 1/4/93. 
252 Peter Horne, as reported in Computer Weekly, 1/4/93. 
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Benefits of the acquisition to MELCO 
MELCO acquiring technology 
Despite the professed high regard for the management of Apricot, it seemed that MELCO 
viewed most of Apricot’s value as lying in its technology.  
The PC industry is technology driven, so when MELCO decided to buy Apricot, they understood that 
they were buying the technology, not the business253. 
It became clear that access to MCA technology, which had been one of the major factors 
influencing the decision to buy Apricot254, was not going to give MELCO the advantage 
it had hoped. IBM’s MCA based PS/2 system had not been at all successful. IBM had 
found that it was no longer able to dictate the direction of technology within open systems 
based computing. As consumers had begun to enjoy the freedom and choice provided by 
access to clone products and a wide range of third party peripheral providers, they had no 
wish to return to what would have effectively been a proprietary IBM system. The market 
for PC-AT compatible machines continued to grow, while the market for PS/2 hardware 
running OS/2 operating system remained a niche product.  
However, Apricot had more than just MCA technology. Apricot had also developed 
competence in producing PC-AT standard machines. Another technological benefit for 
MELCO was Apricot’s strengths in UNIX based systems for file servers. This provided 
MELCO with valuable technology just at the time when the market for these devices was 
developing in Japan. MELCO had found it hard to build up business in this area, and 
needed to broaden its product range255. As the UNIX market grew in Japan, Apricot 
became MELCO’s “secret weapon”256 in the battle for market share257. 
                                                 
253 Interview with Sawai, 20/2/96. 
254 Interview with Daisuke Goto, 15/3/96. 
255 Newsbytes, 8/8/90. 
256 Computer Weekly, 1/4/93. 
257 In addition, the year after acquiring Apricot, MELCO went on to sign an agreement with Hewlett-Packard in the US 
for the right to sell the US firm’s workstations in Japan under the MELCO name, as well as working on joint UNIX 
hardware and software development projects (Computergram International, 14/5/91). 
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Knowledge of how to sell PCs 
When MELCO bought Apricot in 1990, there were those within the Japanese corporation 
who seemed to justify the acquisition by placing it in terms of the acquisition of 
technology, in this case MCA technology, a concept with which MELCO was more 
familiar with than acquiring a complete business:- 
MELCO was still thinking in terms of technology. So it was not really much of extension of the old 
attitudes - it was simply getting technology from outside. They were not really thinking of the 
business issues, just how to get the technology. They just thought they could buy this technology from 
Apricot and apply it in Japan for their own products258. 
However, since the acquisition, there has come the realisation that there is also the 
business skills that have been gained by acquiring Apricot. 
But the PC technology is getting very simple, so they started to take the product as it was and sell it to 
the Japanese market. There are those outside of the information technology group who realised that 
they had bought the knowledge of  how to sell the PC world-wide.259. 
In line with wider trends, MELCO was facing the challenge of how to move away from 
being a company which was highly focused on providing technology for the domestic 
Japanese market. Apricot provided MELCO with a set of skills for developing the 
business of selling PCs internationally. 
Use of acquisition to drive a change in management style 
For MELCO, the acquisition of Apricot marked the Japanese corporation’s first attempt at 
managing the ownership of a foreign firm. There had been many joint ventures with non-
Japanese firms in MELCO’s 75 year history, but never before had MELCO attempted a 
complete take-over of a foreign company. Consequently, there was a great deal of 
uncertainty that surrounded the deal itself and the management of the post-acquisition 
integration process:- 
There had been investment in foreign companies before, but this was the first 100% ownership. So 
nobody [in MELCO] knew how to manage this kind of company. So it was quite unique for us. [..] 
We need to be a more transnational, a more globalised company. In that sense, Apricot is at the 
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frontier!260.  
Apricot management realised that MELCO was undergoing a period of change, and that 
Apricot was the experiment that would, to some extent, map out the future of certain 
areas of MELCO’s strategy in the information technology sector:-  
In a way, we are leading that change [in MELCO’s management style]. I’m not trying to sound too 
presumptuous, but basically, we are the experiment that will prove or disprove the ability [of MELCO 
to change its management style], so a lot of responsibility rests on our shoulders to see ‘Does it work, 
or not?’261. 
Apricot as a cultural filter 
The fact that Apricot was a UK based company also played a part in persuading MELCO 
that there was a good chance that the companies would be able to work together. Having 
a UK subsidiary specialising in PC development, production and distribution of PC 
products allowed the Information and Communication Systems Group of MELCO a 
‘filter’ when dealing with the US computer component suppliers:- 
One advantage of having a UK company is that they are very close to talk with US people, as they are 
both English speakers. Communication via such a company as Apricot is much better than direct from 
a Japanese company, for example when dealing with Intel or Microsoft262. 
Such comments indicate the level of problems faced by MELCO in attempting to 
compete in non-Japanese markets and work with non-Japanese companies. 
MELCO using Apricot as a ‘learning partner’ 
Apricot, having been a small player in the IT industry had always been forced to rely 
upon external relationships. As such, they were an ideal ‘learning partner’ for MELCO:- 
My classical way of describing this is as a family, where you have mutual respect and trust. If you 
don’t, almost nothing can be done to resolve problems, and I think this is true of business as well. You 
have to start off on the basis that they are like me, and say ‘I trust people’, and view them as innocent 
until proved guilty. It means that you have to be slightly naive, but I think that is the best way to build 
successful long-term partnerships. It doesn’t mean that you can’t check detail, but it is a basis on 
which you can start off. The PC industry is one in particular which works in that way. Nobody, apart 
from maybe Intel and Microsoft, really controls anything. The rest of us have to rely on lots of 
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relationships where there has to be a lot of trust. We have a good foundation to start with: we are an 
open company, we wanted to work with people, we like working with people, we like learning from 
other people. It’s great to gain knowledge from other people you work with. [..] Of course, you are 
bound to get some frustrations and ups and downs, but hopefully never so great that you can’t resolve 
them263. 
Peter Horne’s positive attitude towards the Japanese parent has allowed the UK 
subsidiary to surmount the more tricky issues of attempting to integrate the competencies 
of two very different companies following an acquisition:-  
[MELCO’s] management style is never to criticise, ever. What is the benefit of criticism? Anyone can 
criticise. The main issue is ‘How can I help?’ You may get some of the junior [MELCO] guys 
criticising, but never the senior guys. They are always supportive. They have a good management 
style capable of overcoming these issues. So we were really involved quite a lot on just day-to-day 
things - discussing business issues and attempting to understand how we got on. At first, there was the 
financial planning process, which seemed burdensome, and the planning process. Obviously, at first 
we had to provide a lot more information than we had done in the past. For the first year or so, it 
appeared like a huge amount of work, but then I clicked on that this was actually great. For the first 
time we were actually questioning our own business in detail.264. 
However, the fact remained that the two companies had fundamentally different cultures. 
MELCO was a very large, Japanese company who had grown strong in the manufacture 
of heavy electrical machinery for the Japanese market. Apricot was a small UK based 
company with limited international experience, whose strengths lay in producing 
technologically excellent computer products for a fast changing, predominately Western, 
market. Putting these two very different organisational and national cultures together was 
clearly going to raise a number of managerial issues, if the identity of Apricot was to be 
retained and allowed to function autonomously within MELCO. The experiences of both 
sides in joint product development illustrate these issues most clearly. 
Joint Product Development 
Despite the companies’ professed mutual high regard for each others abilities, there were 
problems in trying to get the two companies to work together on joint projects. One 
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MELCO manager put a very positive slant on the issues that emerged:-  
At first, both parties were unhappy. Apricot engineers complained that ‘We cannot understand 
MELCO!’ But, after long discussions, it became clear that the most important issue was how to open 
access to information. Apricot is always open - this we think is a typical Western style - but Japanese 
style is always to hide information, to be confidential with all information. This was the reason for a 
lot of the problems and misunderstandings. After we had opened the way for discussions, things 
became better265.  
He went on to describe an example problem area in joint product development:-  
Apricot is always surveying the market to find the best chip-set - they don’t automatically always 
choose Intel. New chips always have some bugs in them, so sometimes, Apricot will choose a chip-set 
with bugs in for a new product. Engineers on the Japan-side will always ask ‘Why did you do that? 
Why didn’t you ask us first?’ We have a lot of information we can give to Apricot. Now, they always 
ask us to recommend a chip set before they decide. This is the way things should be - always 
discussing things openly. [..] So, at first we had a lot of problems, but now we are much better. It is a 
learning process266. 
Problems such as those which emerged during the joint development of a network server 
are a particularly graphic illustration of the issues that arise. In 1994, MELCO mainframe 
engineers were brought to the UK to help on the development of Apricot’s ‘network 
superserver’, code-named ‘Shogun’267:- 
[..] the problem is that in the MELCO case, they have more formal procedures than Apricot. So, when 
we decide to make a product like the Shogun, there are some problems. The first thing we do in 
MELCO is to always write down some goal specifications. After fixing such goals, it may take one or 
sometimes two years for the product to be developed. In that time the market may have changed. So, 
we may have to ‘spec-up’268. For Apricot, they are very flexible to change the specifications - almost 
every day! If something happens, or some new technology appears, they [Apricot] will change, and 
this is very easy for them to do.  
For MELCO, it is more difficult. So Apricot cannot understand whether the delay from MELCO is a 
real delay, or just a delay in the ‘spec-up’ process. When they ‘spec-up’, MELCO engineers must go 
through a series of point checks. We [MELCO] have been around for 75 years and mainly operating in 
the heavy industry sector. In such areas, the goal is fixed early on - for an elevator or a factory 
machine. In the PC field, it is very different, but MELCO has not changed. Apricot is much more 
                                                 
265 Interview with Daisuke Goto, 15/3/96. 
266 Interview with Daisuke Goto, 15/3/96. 
267 Computer Weekly, 31/3/94. 
268 Formally modify the specifications and goals of the project. 
Japanese innovation strategy and the acquisition of UK IT firms                                                                                             Chapter 7 
 179 
flexible [than MELCO]269. 
Overall, attempts to jointly develop products have not met with great success, but have 
had one use in highlighting what the companies cannot do together. The development of  
certain products has used engineers from both MELCO and Apricot, but the view from 
Apricot’s side was that:- 
 [..] it is just too difficult. You just increase the problems of the project without their being enough 
benefits270.  
Even with other joint R&D projects there have been problems which have resulted in 
Apricot’s reluctance to work too closely with MELCO. The solution, from Apricot’s side 
is to use the resources of MELCO on what the Apricot Group Managing Director 
describes as “a consulting basis”. 
Organisational changes within MELCO 
The appointment of a new president, Takashi Kitaoka in June 1992 was trumpeted as the 
beginning of a new era for MELCO. In 1994, he announced the beginning of a project 
entitled ‘Vision 21’. This project will attempt to “develop new businesses and is aimed at 
transforming Mitsubishi Electric into a transnational company”271. 
In an effort to increase the synergy between the diverse product groups their number has 
been increased from six to nine, and integrated the overseas marketing function, formerly 
under the control of a separate group, into each systems group. In the past, each of the 
systems groups had focused on production and domestic marketing only. If products were 
to be shipped overseas, they were passed on to the Overseas Marketing Group. However, 
with the appreciation of the Yen making it necessary to shift some of the manufacturing 
functions (especially in the field of heavy machinery and consumer electronics) overseas 
in order to remain competitive, having a separate group handling all overseas actives 
made little sense. For the Information and Communication Systems Group, shifting the 
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overseas function to within the group has been particularly important.  
As MELCO attempts to build-up its skills in open systems based computing and to 
compete again in the highly volatile PC market, to have overseas production and 
marketing facilities tied into the heart of the Information and Communication Systems 
Group is essential272. 
Changes in the computer industry and convergence 
The anticipated formation of the digital industry is impacting upon the strategy of 
MELCO:- 
MELCO realise that in the long term, their business has to change. In the 21st century, it will not be 
about solely building objects. There’s not much money to be made in building PCs and TVs and 
VCRs. Things have to change. However, the culture of [MELCO] is a manufacturing company, so 
how do you go about changing that?273. 
What MELCO is attempting to do, and what ‘Vision 21’ in part entails, is to find ways of 
gaining synergistic benefits from having diverse interests in communications, consumer 
electronics and computers, i.e., three major elements of the digital industry. But as to how 
such interaction will be achieved, this remains unclear:- 
It should happen. But each group is still very different. They each have their own problems and don’t 
want to take new ones from another division!274. 
MELCO also seems to clearly realise the importance of learning how to manage alliances, 
and how this will become ever more critical as they head into the digital industry:- 
In such an industry, it is very difficult for one company to succeed alone. [..] As we move from 
analogue to digital no one company can have such a big product line as to cover all digital 
technologies quickly. That is the main problem for MELCO - how to respond quickly275. 
Formation of alliances 
MELCO is forging ahead with its plans to externalise to allow the firm to compete more 
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effectively in the new competitive environment276. In the six months prior to March 1996, 
MELCO had set up some thirty alliances. In 90% of these cases, there was no capital 
participation on the part of MELCO. Such alliances are “easy to manage and easy to 
divorce”277.  
A number of the more prominent alliances formed since the acquisition of Apricot and 
aimed at boosting MELCO’s ability to compete in the changing competitive environment 
are given in Exhibit 7.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
Partner Date Purpose 
News Corporation 1996 Development with Digi-Media Vision (DMV), a subsidiary of News Corporation, to 
develop digital TV set-top boxes for world-wide MPEG-2/DVB markets. 
E&S 1996 Alliance formed with Evans & Sutherland to develop professional 3D graphics 
products for PCs. 
Sun Microsystems 1995 MELCO sign agreement to use Sun’s Java programming language for use with 
digital TV set-top boxes and Internet related products. 
Pippin 1995 MELCO joined the tie-up between Bandai and Apple Computer to produce a CD-
ROM multimedia software player for use as an audio player, games machine and 
Internet gateway, to be called ‘Pippin’. 
Aimnet 1995 Alliance formed with Aimnet, a California-based Internet technology developer, to 
initiate new Internet services in Japan. 
Oracle 1995 Agreement reached with Oracle to incorporate the US firm’s New Media software 
with MELCO TV set-top boxes. 
Sun Microsystems 1995 MELCO, in conjunction with Sun, to develop 3D-RAM technology for use in Sun’s 
workstation to improve ability of machines to process 3-D graphics. 
General Magic 1994 MELCO joins the growing number of Japanese firms having a stake in the Apple 
Computer software spin-off, General Magic. 
                                                 
276 Though not without opposition from within: “We will have more alliances and acquisitions, but unfortunately there 
are a lot of people who still want to control and co-ordinate everything inside - it is still their mentality” (Interview with 
Daisuke Goto, 15/3/96). 
277 Interview with Daisuke Goto, 15/3/96. 
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Cheyenne Software 1994 MELCO signed an agreement to market the US firm’s networking software in 
Japan. This software will be sold in conjunction with networking hardware from 
Apricot, such as the FTServer. 
IBM 1993 MELCO announced the beginning of production of an IBM developed PDA. The 
device was developed in conjunction with MELCO in the US, and were planned to 
be marketed by BellSouth Corporation in the US. 
Samsung 1993 MELCO agreed with Korea’s Samsung to multisource a new type of memory chip 
for use with video image processing. 
HDTV alliance 1991  MELCO joined Matsushita, Sharp, Victor, Pioneer, NEC, LSI Logic and VLSI 
Technology to produce low cost integrated circuits for use in high definition TV 
(HDTV). 
Hewlett-Packard 1991 MELCO announced in May 1991 to jointly develop UNIX operating systems and 
UNIX-related technologies. This work would tie-in with that of Apricot. 
Exhibit 7.5  MELCO’s alliance partners 
Source: Data from Ft Profile and Reuter Business Briefing  
 
Performance 
MELCO’s profits fell dramatically in the early 1990s with the collapse of the ‘bubble 
economy’ and the continued appreciation of the Yen. The company’s net profits fell from 
over ¥80 billion in 1991 to around ¥20 billion in 1994 (See Exhibit 7.6). 
 
Exhibit 7.6  MELCO’s net turnover and net income 
Source: Company reports 
A recent recovery in profits has been more due to changes in the world markets for 
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semiconductors and mobile telecommunications equipment than to any radical 
organisational or managerial changes. The sharp increase in sales of DRAM chips, the 
growing market for client-server based computer networks and the increasing demand for 
mobile phones have supported MELCO’s profitability recovery. Other product areas, 
such as heavy machinery, have seen a fall in sales due in part to "excessively strict 
manufacturing standards”278 which have made prices for power and industrial systems 
less competitive than those provided by other firms. In addition, the extended recession in 
Japan has led to a fall in demand for construction related products, such as escalators and 
elevators279. 
In 1991, MELCO announced that it would gradually begin phasing out production of its 
own mainframes in favour of machines produced by IBM280. MELCO had, since its entry 
into computing in the 1960s, found it difficult and expensive to attempt to compete with 
domestic mainframe rivals such as NEC, Hitachi and Fujitsu. In 1993, the announcement 
was made that MELCO would withdraw completely from the mainframe market281, as the 
general trading situation in Japan for many of MELCO’s products worsened, and 
mainframe sales world-wide continued to fall282. MELCO announced that it would focus 
its efforts in computing on smaller machines283. As discussed earlier, MELCO went on to 
sign agreements with Hewlett-Packard for selling the US firm’s workstations in Japan 
under the MELCO brand, as well as working on the joint development of UNIX software 
and technology284. 
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(Computergram International, 27/8/91). 
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Closing comments 
On April 1, 1996, MELCO announced the formation of a Personal Computer Division 
within MELCO with Peter Horne (formerly the Group Managing Director of Apricot 
Computers Ltd) appointed as President of this new division:-  
This move is the next logical step in Mitsubishi’s global strategy for its PC business following the 
rapid growth of Apricot Computers Limited.285. 
MELCO also announced that it would be investing $200 million in the new PC division. 
At a recent press conference286 following the formation of the new PC Division, Peter 
Horne said that the aim was to put MELCO in the top 10 PC makers world-wide by the 
year 2002. He proposed sales targets of 1.2 million PCs by the year 2000, and a 
concurrent doubling of the number of staff in MELCO’s PC Division to 1,600. He 
announced that MELCO plans to get back into the US PC market by forming a sales 
partnership with a US company during 1997 or 1998. 
This latest development in the MELCO/Apricot relationship would seem to indicate that 
the acquisition has been a ‘success’ from certain standpoints. MELCO, in acquiring the 
Apricot, has gained not only the technological capability to re-enter the global market for 
PCs, but has also now gained a strong, ‘Western’ management team to help run the 
division responsible for the development of MELCO’s open systems based computing 
competence. Apricot’s experience in PCs, added to their powerful brand image and 
reputation for technological innovativeness, when combined with MELCO’s ‘patient’ 
capital and reputation for technological quality is hoped by MELCO to result in a 
powerful contender in the global PC market. 
It will be interesting to observe how the process of joint product development in the new 
division will be managed, bearing in mind the lack of success noted amongst the 
participants from both Apricot and MELCO in previous combined projects as detailed 
earlier. The announcement of the formation of the PC Division included such statements 
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as “collaboration between the UK and Japan on new product design is vital” and talked of 
the “unified work environment” that will exist in the new PC Division. How to overcome 
the problems observed in previous attempts to get Apricot and MELCO engineers to work 
together will be a challenge for both organisations. The companies have had 6 years to 
work together, and obvious areas of conflict have been identified which may smooth the 
process of on-going integration. 
The announcement of the formation of a PC Division within MELCO, and that MELCO 
plans to get back into the US PC market287 by forming links with an, as yet, un-named US 
company in 1997 or 1998 may be one indication of how MELCO has recognised, and is 
using, the strengths of its UK acquisition to learn how to become more of a ‘globalised’ 
company. MELCO seems to be realising that to be truly global involves more than just 
having a presence in many locations world-wide. In some ways, the Information and 
Communication Systems Group has acted as the path-finder for the ‘new’ MELCO as 
described by President Kitaoka in his ‘Vision 21’ document.  
To change a corporation with a culture such as MELCO’s requires far more than simply 
having a new corporate vision288. It may be that the newly-formed PC Division will be the 
catalyst for change within the MELCO structure, or it may result in all the innovativeness 
and ‘external-thinking’ people congregating in this area with little diffusion of this newly 
acquired strength. 
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Chapter 8 Case Study C:  Kao-Protoscan 
Chapter overview 
In 1991, the Kao Corporation, one of Japan’s largest consumer goods producers, acquired 100% 
ownership of Protoscan Software Services Limited, a small UK provider of software duplication 
support services. 
Although Kao had been successful in the domestic Japanese market and in south east Asia with its 
range of household and chemical products, Kao had never really been able to make the leap to 
becoming a ‘global corporation’. The growing market for PCs provided one opportunity for Kao. 
As the demand for PCs grew, so did the demand for removable storage to distribute software and 
for transporting data. The most popular form of removable data storage was the ‘floppy disk’. 
These disks conformed to international standards and consequently needed minimal 
customisation for local markets. Kao was able to enter this market by applying its competences in 
‘surface technology’, initially to provide the raw materials for other disk producers, then in the 
production of the disks themselves. However, in order to compete in the market for this 
commodity-like product, Kao needed to develop international production capacity quickly. This it 
did through a program of acquisitions in North America. In addition to producing the disks 
themselves, Kao began to see the benefit of becoming involved in related services, such as disk 
duplication, packaging and distribution for software companies. 
Protoscan Software Services was set up in the late 1980s to provide services relating to the mass 
duplication of software on floppy disks. Despite doing well initially, the firm lacked the capital to 
invest in emerging technologies, such as CD-ROM duplication. Without this, the firm would have 
been unable to attract the custom of the big software houses. Protoscan needed to find a way of 
raising sufficient capital to break out of the ‘start-up mode’ in which it found itself stuck. Kao 
approached Protoscan having selected them from a search of potential duplication facilities 
across Europe. After some hard negotiations, Kao bought the company from the founders and 
Protoscan has since been integrated into the Japanese firm as Kao Infosystems UK.. 
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Kao Corporation 
The origins of the Kao Corporation date back to 1897, when the Kao Soap Company was 
founded to produce “a high quality soap that was as good as any imported brand at a more 
affordable price for the Japanese consumer”289. The corporation has since grown into 
Japan’s largest toiletries manufacturer290, with a turnover of almost US$8 billion. It has 
managed to acquire the label of “the Proctor & Gamble of Japan”291 and has been ranked 
as one of Japanese ‘top ten excellent companies’292.  
Kao’s product range has diversified from its original core of detergents into  five main 
areas (See Exhibit 8.1 and Appendix III). However, its ‘Household Products’ (the three 
product groups based on detergent, cosmetic and hygiene products) still account for 87% 
of turnover.  
 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Household Personal care and cosmetics 34 34 35 36 34 
 Laundry and cleaning 40 40 39 39 39 
 Hygiene and bath additives 12 12 13 12 13 
Chemical Fatty chemicals and edible oils 4 4 4 4 4 
 Speciality chemicals and IT products 9 9 9 9 9 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 
Exhibit 8.1  Kao’s main product area by percentage sales 
Source: Company reports 
 
Kao consistently draws around 80% of sales from the domestic Japanese market (See 
Exhibit 8.2). 
 
 
 
                                                 
289 Ghoshal & Butler (1992). 
290 Leading Japanese competitors in the domestic market are Lion, Uni-charm, Tsumura and Sunstar, plus the non-
Japanese affiliated firms of Nippon Lever, Proctor & Gamble, and Johnson & Johnson (Ohsono, 1995). 
291 Associated Press, 25/4/95. 
292 Butler (1995) using data published in Nikkei Business, 9/4/90. 
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 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Japan 85 80 79 81 81 
Outside Japan 15 20 21 19 19 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Exhibit 8.2  Kao’s percentage sales by region 
Source: Company reports 
Domestically, the corporation has one quarter of the shampoo market, half of the laundry 
detergent market, over half of the market for household cleaners and three-quarters of the 
market for bleach293. Kao has managed to weather the worst effects of the Japanese 
economic downturn remarkably well, with both net sales and net income showing steady, 
if unspectacular growth over the past 15 years. 
The corporation has acquired a reputation within Japan of being a highly innovative 
company which is able to dominate the markets it chooses to enter. Two well publicised 
examples illustrate the firm’s developmental and marketing prowess. Firstly, in 1983 Kao 
developed the ‘Merries’ brand of nappies which managed in the 12 months following its 
launch to overtake the market leader from the giant multinational Proctor & Gamble. 
Secondly, in 1987 Kao launched its concentrated laundry detergent, named ‘Attack’ 
which went on to gain almost half of the market for detergent in Japan294. 
One recent example of their innovative management activities which has caught public 
attention is the setting up of a ‘virtual factory’ in Japan. If the test link-up of two Japanese 
plants in Kyushu and Wakayama are successful, it is planned that all of Kao’s nine 
domestic production facilities will be controlled centrally via a fibre optic network, 
operating as one ‘virtual factory’295.  
Kao has maintained a strategy of steady expansion and owes its success to a number of 
factors. Firstly, the company is highly vertically integrated, owning not only the facilities 
providing much of its raw material requirements for the detergents and cooking products, 
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but also its own network of distributors which deal exclusively with Kao goods. These 
distributors, or hansha, provide a secure outlet for Kao goods. They also act as a conduit 
for channelling valuable information on consumer trends back to the decision makers 
within the company296. 
Secondly the management have a clear understanding of the role that scientific research 
plays in producing successful consumer products. R&D spending has remained 
consistently high, at around 5% of sales297, throughout the recent upheavals in the 
Japanese economy following the ‘bursting of the bubble’. The composition of the board 
of directors reflects this key factor - over half the members of the board have a scientific 
or engineering background298.  
The third factor that has aided Kao’s successful growth has been the efficient use of 
information technology to keep in touch with changing consumer needs and demands. In 
common with the other toiletry manufacturers in Japan, Kao has been facing increasing 
competition from large non-Japanese companies (including Proctor & Gamble, Nippon 
Lever and Johnson & Johnson) who have entered the Japanese market. These 
multinational firms are able to apply global economies of scale to manufacturing of their 
products and thus compete on price within the Japanese market299.  
One way for firms to maintain a competitive edge in this market segment has been to find 
ways for getting closer in touch with the needs of the consumer. Kao, the largest of the 
domestic toiletry producers, has successfully implemented an organisation-wide 
information network which links sales outlets, distribution facilities, production facilities, 
market research and R&D departments, so as to allow the corporation to respond rapidly 
to changes in demand300. 
                                                 
296 The role of the hansha and the transfer of information in Kao’s operations in Japan is described in detail by Butler 
(1995). 
297 Data from FT Extel. 
298 Interview with Imamura, 18/3/96. 
299 Ohsono (1995). 
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Kao’s need to globalise 
Kao’s success has been very much focused within Japan. (See earlier Exhibit 8.2). Since 
the 1960s, the firm has been attempting to become more international, but during the 
1980s, only really achieved any degree of success in pushing into the South East Asian 
markets for its core household products. These markets grew to account for 70% of the 
non-Japanese sales of Kao products in the late 1980s301, but total non-Japanese sales 
remained relatively low. As the 1990s drew closer, Kao needed to find a way of breaking 
into international markets to be able to compete on a global scale. The then president of 
Kao gave some idea of the level of the task that faced the firm:- 
Proctor & Gamble, Unilever and L’Oréal are now our competitors. We cannot avoid fighting them in 
the 1990s302. 
These international competitors were well aware of the potential threat that Kao 
presented. Having seen the way Kao had produced a stream of innovative products (such 
as ‘Merries’ and ‘Attack’ mentioned earlier) and rapidly achieved market share with them 
in the Japanese market, they were awaiting with some trepidation the entry of Kao onto 
the international stage.  
Kao did not have a company-wide strategy for globalisation303. Rather, each product 
division was to develop its own strategy for international expansion. The three main 
options available for expanding production on a global level - joint venture, acquisition 
and greenfield development - have all been attempted by Kao.  
Joint ventures do not seem to have fitted in well with Kao’s strategies, and this has been 
blamed in part on the problems of finding a partner who shares the Japanese corporation’s 
philosophy, and in particular who is willing to share a perspective on building long term 
market share as opposed to short term profits.304. 
                                                 
301 Ghoshal & Butler (1992). 
302 Yoshio Maruta, former President of Kao, as quoted in Ghoshal & Butler (1992). 
303 Butler (1995). 
304 Interview with Imamura, 18/3/96. 
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There have been numerous acquisitions carried out by Kao and they seem to have been 
more successful on the whole than joint ventures, especially in the North American 
markets.  
Basically, Kao likes to have 100% ownership acquisitions, because this is simple, and Kao can make 
the decisions and take on the responsibilities. But we try to pull on their [the acquisition employees’] 
expertise on how to grow and how to become stronger in the market305. 
Kao entered the European and North American markets by making a number of 
acquisitions. Among the most prominent of these was the take-over of Andrew Jergens in 
the US (hair care products) and Goldwell in Germany (cosmetics). However, Kao still 
found that competing in the mature markets of these two trading areas were very different 
to the growing markets of South East Asia. Kao did not achieve the anticipated share of 
the toiletries market and, to the relief of the established players in these markets “did not 
turn out to be a serious threat”306. 
Kao continued to attempt to find ways of gaining market share in Europe and North 
America, but it became clear that success would not come in these markets as easily as it 
had done in Japan307. Two factors that had played a great part in Kao’s domestic success 
had much less of an influence in non-Japanese markets. Firstly, a factor which affected 
the outcome of these attempts was that when operating outside the Japanese market, the 
valuable consumer information so readily available from the network of hansha - the 
Kao-dedicated distribution channels - was no longer there. Lack of experience in 
attempting to predict consumer demand in the US caused withdrawal from the US market 
of certain Kao product lines. 
Kao’s fundamental problem was not inappropriate products or marketing strategies, but its inability to 
understand the differences between markets and adapt appropriately. [Acquisitions and joint ventures] 
did not provide the local sensitivity and market understanding the company needed, or the 
entrepreneurial capability to convert such understanding into appropriate product-market strategies308. 
                                                 
305 Interview with Imamura, 18/3/96. 
306 Anonymous source within Proctor and Gamble.  
307 Bartlett & Ghoshal (1989). 
308 Bartlett & Ghoshal, (1989:8). 
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Secondly, Kao’s use of information technology networks to monitor and distribute 
information on consumer trends in Japan’s domestic market is something which has 
allowed the corporation to gain competitive advantage over its domestic rivals in its 
‘traditional’ product areas, such as detergents and shampoo. Such competitive advantage 
has not been transferred to the non-Japanese markets. In the US in particular, as so many 
companies having been using IT to gain competitive advantage for so many years, Kao 
gained little by using IT. 
It became clear that attempting to globalise using the markets for toiletries would be 
extremely difficult for Kao to do. What Kao needed to find was a product that was 
inherently ‘international’ in nature, i.e., one that required very little customisation for 
local markets. The growth of the PC market at that time provided one such product. 
Kao’s entry into IT related products 
Attractiveness of the market for ‘information consumables’ 
Aside from toiletries, Kao had a second product area it was hoping to use to help the 
company acquire a wide international presence. In the mid-1980s, Kao had seen one 
potential area presented by the growth of the PC. As the demand for PCs grew, so did the 
demand for ‘removable data storage’ to distribute software, and for transporting data. The 
most popular form of removable data storage for PCs was the ‘floppy disk’.  
This disk is a relatively simple device consisting of a magnetically coated plastic disk 
encased in a protective sleeve. These disks conformed to international standards and 
consequently needed minimal customisation for local markets. If Kao could enter this 
market, floppy disks then represented an ‘easier’ way for Kao to achieve an international 
presence than toiletries, which required a high level of localisation and an intimate 
knowledge of consumer needs. 
How to apply existing resources to this new product area? 
By having a strong focus on R&D, Kao was able to leverage its competence in surface 
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science “relatively easily”309 into floppy disk related products:- 
The manufacturing process for the production of floppy disks is just like any other manufacturing 
process, it’s just that in this case there are very high tolerance levels required310. 
By breaking down the various component processes that were involved in the production 
of the floppy disk, Kao saw that it was possible to apply their knowledge of fine powders 
and coatings accumulated in the development of cosmetics to the production of ‘magnetic 
media’ (See Exhibit 8.3). 
Having seen a way of leveraging their competence to provide a point of entry, Kao 
entered the information storage media industry in 1985 with the establishment of the 
Information Business Center in Japan. The following year, an Information Sales Office 
was set up in California and the first Kao brand 3.5 inch, 5.25 inch and 8 inch floppy 
disks were shipped. The division responsible for the production of these disks was the 
‘Infosystems’ division. 
Kao realised that selling directly to end users through the retail channels competing 
against industry leaders with strong brand images such as Maxell and TDK would be very 
difficult. Instead, Kao chose to focus on the OEM and public sector markets. The service 
they were able to offer as an OEM supplier pushed them to gain the largest share of the 
market in the US (See Exhibit 8.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
309 Interview with Godfrey, 25/4/96. 
310 Interview with Godfrey, 25/4/96. 
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Exhibit 8.3  Kao’s application of surface technology to diverse product areas 
Source: Kao Corporation, 1996 
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Exhibit 8.4  Leading OEM disk suppliers in US, 1992 
Source: Santa Clara Consulting Group, 1992 
To achieve success in the world-wide markets for floppy disks, Kao needed to expand 
rapidly. Magnetic media as the predominant means of removable data storage in the 
computer industry is predicted to have a limited future. At the time of the Kao’s entry in 
the information storage sector, the market for floppy disks was expanding rapidly, but this 
was not predicted to last indefinitely311. It was therefore necessary for Kao to have a 
global network of floppy disk manufacturers and duplicators up and running as soon as 
possible in order to derive maximum profit from the market, before demand declined too 
greatly. The cut-off point for exiting the market has been predicted as the first decade of 
the next century312. Kao management confessed that they were not so much interested in 
the technology or managerial skills of the target companies. What was of interest to them 
was to have the basic business infrastructure in place, ready to receive the investment and 
strategic guidance from Kao. This was the way in which Kao has expanded into the North 
                                                 
311 In a recent interview, the CEO of one US removable data storage producer said:- “We believe that the floppy disk is 
essentially obsolete technology. It isn’t big enough to do anything with and it’s very, very slow. Software is all shipped 
on CD-ROM. In fact it’s really shipped on the hard drive. Gateway 2000 Inc., for example, pre-configures their 
machines with the software right on the hard drive. Microsoft Corporation has announced that they’re going to stop 
providing software on floppies. I think that is a huge signal.” (Investor’s Business Daily, 6/5/96). Some within the 
industry believe that the peak of output of 3.5 inch disks is believed to have been the first quarter of 1996 (Interview 
with Godfrey, 25/4/96). 
312 Interview with Godfrey, 25/4/96. 
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American market:- 
Kao needs to have the basic infrastructure. It is then Kao’s way to bring our technology and money to 
expand and utilise this infrastructure. This is the way that Kao develops the technology or business, 
and that is the way we are expanding into Europe313. 
Within six years, following a number of acquisitions of disk manufacturers in North 
America, Kao had become the world’s leading producer of 3.5 inch floppy disks (See 
Exhibit 8.5).  
 
Exhibit 8.5  Top ten producers of floppy disks, 1992 
Source: Magnetic Media Information Services, 1993. 
The world-wide demand for 5.25 inch and 8 inch disks was gradually declining as 
technology advanced and user requirements changed. Kao quickly invested money in 
transferring much of their 5.25 inch production facilities to 3.5 inch production314. The 
convenience and capacity of the 3.5 inch disks had given it the edge in the explosively 
growing PC-users market, and the 3.5 inch disk had become a de-facto standard for much 
of the low-capacity removable storage requirements of computer users world-wide315 (See 
                                                 
313 Interview with Imamura, 18/3/96. 
314 Reuter News Service, 17/8/94. 
315 The 3.5” ‘micro floppy disk’ was an invention of Japan’s Sony Corporation in 1980, but achieved widespread 
diffusion with IBM’s selection of this device for the removable storage requirements of the majority of its personal 
computers. Following IBM’s lead, producers of IBM ‘clone’ PCs have made the 3.5 inch drive a standard feature of 
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Exhibit 8.6).  
 
 
Exhibit 8.6  3.5 inch disks sold as percentage of total floppy disks sold in Japan 
Source: Electronic industries Association of Japan, 1996 
A large number of Kao’s OEM customers were involved in the duplication of software. 
These firms were contracted by the software developers to mass duplicate the software 
onto floppy disks. As such, Kao was effectively still providing a ‘raw material’ for other 
firms who were acting further down the software distribution ‘food-chain’ (See Exhibit 
8.7).  
 
 
Exhibit 8.7  The FD/CD-ROM software distribution ‘food-chain’ 
Kao saw the potential benefit of becoming more vertically integrated by offering 
production and duplication services. In addition, many firms involved in duplication were 
also involved in packaging and distribution. As such, it was attractive to the software 
developers to be able to have a ‘one-stop-shop’ to deal with the process of getting the 
software to the end users. 
                                                 
PCs.  
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In order to become more vertically integrated, Kao needed to have duplication facilities in 
key strategic locations. Having acquired a number of duplication facilities in North 
America, Kao also needed to gain a presence inside Europe. The first step in this process 
was the setting up of a disk production plant in Barcelona316. This provided Kao with a 
guaranteed source of disks for its planned software duplication service which lay inside 
the European Union and would thus avoid any import tariffs that would apply if Kao were 
to bring in disks from North America. Having set up the production plant in Spain, Kao 
then sought to find a suitable disk duplicator within Europe. After an exhaustive search of 
possible targets, Protoscan Software Services, then based in St Ives near Cambridge in the 
UK, seemed to be an ideal target.  
Protoscan Software Services Limited 
Protoscan was set up near Cambridge in the UK in 1987 by two entrepreneurs, Mike Hall 
and Andy Eltis to provide services connected with the mass duplication of software. The 
main services offered were duplication of software on floppy disks,  and the protection of 
software against unauthorised duplication. The company achieved remarkable levels of 
growth in the early stages by responding to the demand for the ‘shareware317’ disks 
bundled with home-user computing magazines. During its first three years of trading, the 
company’s turnover doubled every year, from £1.2 million in 1988 to £3.4 million in 
1990, and moved from employing 6 people, to 35 full time staff and around 60 part-time 
in the early 1990s318. 
The company continued to expand and bought-out one of its main competitors. This 
continued expansion brought with it a real risk of “over-heating”319, so the founders 
sought ways to maintain controlled growth. They developed a three year business plan 
which would hopefully stabilise the growth of this still very young company.  
                                                 
316 This greenfield site was set up in 1990, at a cost of $120 million (Computergram International, 7/8/90). 
317 Software, often written by hobbyists, and distributed free of charge. Computing magazines were able to bundle 
together the best of the available shareware and give it away free with their magazines. To do this, they needed to be 
able to mass duplicate the software on floppy disks. 
318 Costello (1992). 
319 Interview with Tosh, 18/4/96. 
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The software support services industry was growing rapidly at the time Protoscan was 
having to re-think its strategy, but demand for the services offered by the UK company 
was also highly unstable. In the words of one Protoscan manager, “In this industry, it’s 
not so much peaks and troughs, as feast and famine”320. What Protoscan needed was an 
injection of capital which would allow them to move beyond the ‘hand-to-mouth’ 
existence they had faced up until then, and on to being able to offer the big software firms 
a complete service package, encompassing floppy disk and CD-ROM replication, as well 
as packaging and distribution. 
Growing out of ‘start-up’ mode 
In common with many young companies in the high technology sectors of industry, 
Protoscan were facing problems in raising sufficient capital to allow them to continue to 
invest in the latest equipment. Investment in state-of-the-art technology would be vital if  
Protoscan was to remain competitive in a fast growing industry. The equipment being 
used by the UK firm in the late 1980s was technologically advanced, but new 
technologies were fast emerging. Aside from the increases in speed of the newer 
duplicating machines321, there was the emergence of optical data storage, in the form of 
the CD-ROM, as a viable means of software distribution. The investment required to be 
competitive in this field would have been hard for Protoscan to raise.  
Beyond the issue of moving to CD-ROM replication, was perhaps a realisation that 
removable storage technology for software distribution has a limited future in terms of 
long-term growth. While consumers will always need some form of storage media for 
their own use, the distribution of software is predicted to be shifting away from magnetic 
media to optical media (CD-ROM) and then on to direct electronic distribution via the 
Internet322. In addition, it was becoming increasingly common for software firms to enter 
into agreements with PC manufactures for software to be ‘bundled’ with the computer. 
                                                 
320 Interview with Tosh, 18/4/96. 
321 In 1990, the average time for the duplication of one floppy disk was 2 - 2.5 minutes. The newest machines can now 
duplicate in just 22 seconds. 
322 Interview with Godfrey, 25/4/96. 
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Users would receive a computer with all the basic software they needed pre-installed on 
the computer’s hard disk. As such, there was no need for ‘hard’ versions of the software 
on a floppy disk to be passed on to the consumers. 
The first stage of this transformation in software distribution was already happening when 
Protoscan managers were considering the future directions for the company323. The future 
of removable storage for uses other that software distribution was also uncertain. A 
number of alternatives to floppy disks were emerging, such as magneto-optical disks, 
recordable CD-ROMs and ‘flash’ memory cards324, that would require a whole new range 
of skills and assets to be internalised by the small UK firm. Aside from the issues relating 
to whether Protoscan could raise sufficient capital to move into these new fields, there 
was the problem of knowing which technology was most likely to dominate. There was 
no one obvious contender to replace the floppy disk. Various niche standards had 
emerged (such as the SyQuest cartridge drive in the graphic design industry), but there 
seemed to be no obvious lead-contender for general purpose removable storage325. 
There were additional factors relating to the growth of the company that the Protoscan 
managers had to consider. In order to attract the attention of the large software developers 
and publishers whose custom would help Protoscan to break out of the ‘feast or famine’ 
cycle, it would be necessary for Protoscan to have an appropriate ‘front’ to present to 
potential clients that differentiated them from the “garage operations”, which proliferated 
in the industry326. Coupled with the desire to attract the bigger names in software 
publishing was the need to have an international presence that went beyond Europe. 
Kao’s first contact with Protoscan 
As all these issues were being considered, Protoscan received a cold-call from 
                                                 
323 Interview with Tosh, 18/4/96. 
324 Non-volatile memory (i.e., memory that is retained after power-supply is disconnected) which can be used as 
removable storage. Its most common application is in the form of  standardised plug-in ‘cards’ conforming to a world 
standard (PCMCIA) for use with portable computers. They provide RAM-like access speeds with removable data 
storage capability. 
325 Investor’s Business Daily, 29/5/96. 
326 Interview with Tosh, 18/4/96. 
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representatives of the Kao Corporation who expressed a strong interest in acquiring an 
ownership interest in the UK company. While there was a degree of wariness on the part 
of the Protoscan managers, what Kao had to offer seemed to be just what Protoscan 
needed, i.e., an international presence, financial strength and a record of success in the 
software services industry. 
Protoscan managers were flattered to have been selected as the best out of the twenty or 
so European producers that Kao had been considering327. The Japanese corporation’s 
experience with acquisitions in the US had given them useful insights when it came to 
dealing with the negotiations leading up to a take-over of a non-Japanese company328. 
The management of Protoscan seemed to appreciate this and while having some 
reservations about turning into a subsidiary of a Japanese firm:- 
[..] We weren’t keen on the idea of turning into another Nissan in Sunderland, with the exercise and 
the uniforms, but Kao did seem to be the obvious solution to the financing problems329. 
Kao made it clear that it was not interested in working with Protoscan on any joint 
venture project, or in taking a minority share-holding in the company330. They simply 
wanted to turn Protoscan into the UK division of Kao Infosystems, and derive the 
synergistic benefits that were predicted to arise from having disk manufacturing plant 
(already constructed in Barcelona) and a disk duplicating plant within the European 
Union. 
Acquisition 
The initial deal presented by Kao for a take-over of 100% ownership of the company was 
rejected by the founders of the UK company (somewhat to the surprise of the 
Japanese331), but eventually an agreement was reached which allowed Mike Hall and 
Andy Eltis a potentially lucrative earn-out from the company they had set up. This they 
                                                 
327 Interview with Tosh, 18/4/96. 
328 Interview with Imamura, 18/3/96. 
329 Interview with Tosh, 18/4/96. 
330 Interview with Imamura, 1918/3/96. 
331 Costello (1993). 
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did, and in 1993, after trading as ‘Kao Protoscan’ for a just over two years, the founders 
left and the company became ‘Kao Infosystems (UK)’. 
Motives for the Acquisition 
The motives for Kao’s acquisition of the ownership of Protoscan Software Services can 
be summarised as follows:- 
• The need to achieve critical mass in production and duplication quickly: At the time 
of the acquisition of Protoscan, Kao was still developing its capacity in floppy disk 
manufacturing. To achieve success in the world-wide markets for floppy disks, Kao 
needed to expand rapidly. Magnetic media as the most popular means of removable 
data storage in the computer industry is predicted to have a limited future. At the time 
of the Kao’s entry in the information storage sector, the market for floppy disks was 
expanding rapidly, but this was not predicted to last indefinitely332. It was therefore 
necessary for Kao to have a global network of floppy disk manufacturers and 
duplicators up and running as soon as possible in order to derive maximum profit 
from the market, before demand declined too greatly. The cut-off point for exiting the 
market has been predicted as the first decade of the next century333. Acquiring 
Protoscan was part of this need to grow quickly. 
• Need to be inside Europe: As part of Kao’s plans to globalise, it needed a presence in 
all major global markets. Though Kao had already entered the European Union 
through their acquisition of Goldwell in Germany, that move had been firmly centred 
on expanding the company’s share of the toiletries market. As stated earlier, Kao’s 
globalisation strategy rested with each product division. Thus the Information 
Technology Products division needed to achieve a global presence in its own right. In 
                                                 
332 In a recent interview, the CEO of one US removable data storage producer said; “We believe that the floppy disk is 
essentially obsolete technology. It isn’t big enough to do anything with and it’s very, very slow. Software is all shipped 
on CD-ROM. In fact it’s really shipped on the hard drive. Gateway 2000 Inc., for example, pre-configures their 
machines with the software right on the hard drive. Microsoft Corporation has announced that they’re going to stop 
providing software on floppies. I think that is a huge signal.” (Investor’s Business Daily, 6/5/96). 
Some within the industry believe that the peak of output of 3.5 inch disks is believed to have been the first quarter of 
1996 (Interview with Godfrey, 25/4/96). 
333 Interview with Godfrey, 25/4/96. 
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terms of this division developing a European presence, this had begun with Kao’s 
construction of the Barcelona facility. 
• Need to have both disk production and duplication within Europe: Kao saw the 
advantages of being vertically integrated within the European Union. In order to 
prevent ‘unfair’ competition for the domestic producers through the dumping of 
imported floppy disks into the European markets, the European Commission (EC) had 
threatened importers with penalty tariffs on non-EU produced disks. These threats 
were ‘temporarily’ implemented in 1995, following a flood of low-cost Chinese disks 
into the EU. In 1996, these penalty tariffs were made permanent. For Kao, having a 
manufacturing plant in Spain and a duplicating plant in the UK, they were able to 
avoid these tariffs. Other manufacturers, such as 3M and TDK were able to negotiate 
their way around them334. 
Post acquisition 
Integration issues 
Having a clear strategy for what was expected from the target company, and having had 
experience of integrating acquisitions in the US, Kao was able to use the acquisition of 
Protoscan as a way to gain rapid access to the software services market in Europe. The 
process of integration used was one of assimilation335. Kao had little need for the name of 
Protoscan, although as stated earlier, the acquired company did trade as ‘Kao Protoscan’ 
for the two years following its acquisition, before becoming ‘Kao Infosystems (UK)’. 
Kao’s experience at managing acquisition integration 
Kao’s experience of managing acquisitions in the US prior to the take-over of Protoscan 
had undoubtedly helped those involved to avoid many of the more common pitfalls 
associated with such cross-border acquisitions. 
                                                 
334 Newsbytes, 18/4/96. 
335 In summary, the spectrum of acquisition integration options encompass the following: (1) Assimilation, where one 
party adopts the identity of the other. This can either be forced or voluntary: (2) Novation, where the two organisations 
combine and a new identity is created: (3) Structural integration, where each organisation keeps its own identity, with 
each accepting the validity of the others working practices (Schweiger et al., 1993). 
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The information technology related acquisitions date back to the mid-1980s when Kao 
began its diversification programme. The first acquisition as part of Kao’s new strategy 
occurred in 1986, when the corporation bought-out a Canadian floppy disk manufacturer, 
Didak. Kao then went on to purchase a number of other companies in North America, 
including West Coast Telecom, Sentinel, American Helix and the packaged software 
operations of Microsoft. Attention was focused on North America, as this was where Kao 
perceived that the biggest market for information consumables lay.  
Kao’s experience with partnerships had provided them with a keen knowledge of what 
the corporation was not capable of doing. It was clearly imperative for Kao to build on its 
strengths in surface science through the production of information storage media as 
quickly as possible. Consequently, Kao needed to move rapidly, and to handle the 
management of the acquisition integration firmly. Kao seemed well aware that they 
needed to achieve global presence as quickly as possible, but lacked the resources to do 
this on their own:- 
If Kao tries to enter the UK market, they will find it very difficult to communicate with UK or Irish 
people. If we have to set up each part of the infrastructure [R&D, production, marketing, sales, finance 
and administration] and interview people and sort out salary, job descriptions, it takes too much 
time!336 
The management of Kao had also learned from dealing with the acquisition of non-
Japanese companies that it would be necessary to accept that a variety of different 
cultures would have to be integrated into forming the global Infosystems division. It was 
not an easy realisation, despite what had been learned through their experiences in North 
America:- 
I think they [Kao] came here looking to impress their management style upon our company, but soon 
realised that Europe is not ‘just Europe’. It is a host of over 14 different countries. They quickly 
realised that in order to manage  that ‘melting-pot’ of cultures, a very different management style was 
required. I think that is the beauty of working with the Japanese - they are very reflective and 
understanding, but react to things very quickly and do not force, or attempt to impose their style if it is 
not required. However, ultimate guidance, profit and loss responsibility and ultimate strategic 
                                                 
336 Interview with Imamura, 18/3/96. 
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responsibility does come from Japan337. 
Kao management realised that flooding the acquired organisation with Japanese personnel 
would not necessarily result in effective control being held over the acquisition. 
Following a flurry of visits from senior representatives of the Kao Corporation, only one 
Japanese national remains permanently at the UK operation. This is a policy in common 
with all the other non-Infosystems regional companies in the EU under the control of the 
Kao Corporation. The Japanese transfer’s role is summed up by Simon Godfrey, OEM 
Manager at the Huntingdon plant:- 
[The Japanese personnel] do have very key roles. They are directors of the regional companies. Some 
would say that they are here to act as spies. They are not - they are here to cast a parental eye over 
what is happening. They hold their discussions internally on a Europe-wide basis, regarding the 
business as a whole. They manage us in a very ‘hands-off’ way!338 
The view from Japan seems to be that the acquisition has worked as well as could be 
expected339. Kao’s approach of targeting companies in financial difficulty and then 
applying a set of rigorous financial controls had worked in the past, but not without a few 
problems340. The UK company still suffered from the peaks and troughs of the demand 
for information consumables, causing the UK firm to post a pre-tax loss of £1.9 million in 
1994341:- 
[The acquisition] is getting more stable, but we still have a lot of head aches!342 
Clear strategy 
Kao had a simple strategy with respect to its entry into IT related markets. This was 
clearly transmitted to those within the acquired organisation as “to be the biggest and the 
best”343 in the field.  
The simplicity and logic of integrating Protoscan into the Kao Infosystems network of 
                                                 
337 Interview with Godfrey, 25/4/96. 
338 Interview with Godfrey, 25/4/96. 
339 Interview with Imamura, 18/3/96. 
340 Interview with Imamura, 18/3/96. 
341 Data from FAME company database. 
342 Interview with Imamura, 18/3/96. 
343 Interview with Tosh, 18/4/96. 
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companies was explicitly communicated to those in the UK company344. There seemed to 
be a clear idea of what was required of the acquisition:- 
Frankly speaking, we just purchased the infrastructure and the people. We then bring our technology 
and money. [..] Sometimes these companies are facing very hard times, maybe almost bankruptcy, as 
they had no real R&D and no access to capital. We are able to use the ‘dreams’ of the [non-Japanese] 
workers within the structure of a Japanese company345.  
Protoscan as an appropriate target 
Protoscan, being a small, young company which was facing problems raising capital to 
fund further expansion made itself a very attractive target for acquisition. The UK firm 
had built up a reasonable customer base, had acquired a reputation for quality and had 
invested in equipment that had allowed it to grow rapidly up to the point where Kao 
entered the scene. There were doubts as to whether Protoscan could have continued for 
long on its own without further investment:- 
I don’t think that Protoscan would have survived. It might have done, but would definitely have had 
problems shifting to CD [technology] and would not have not have been able to have the Internet as a 
strategy, and to have the financial clout to bring that to market quicker than anyone else346. 
Among the management of Protoscan, there was a feeling that if the UK firm was to 
succeed, it needed to have the ability to operate on an international scale. This it was 
unlikely to be able to do on its own347.  
Protoscan’s attraction to Kao was, as described earlier, its business infrastructure, but 
there were also other benefits that Kao saw in the UK firm:- 
Protoscan was perceived as a quality company with a good client base. There were certain clients that 
Kao Infosystems was serving in the US, but not in Europe. The management style of Protoscan had 
less to do with it than the footprint of the company, and the springboard into Europe provided by the 
UK facilities. Maybe it was a decision based 70% on location!348 
                                                 
344 Interview with Tosh, 18/4/96. 
345 Interview with Imamura, 18/3/96. 
346 Interview with Godfrey 25/4/96. 
347 Interview with Tosh, 18/4/96. 
348 Interview with Godfrey 25/4/96. 
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Kao as a ‘good parent’ for Protoscan 
The attraction of having access to the resources of not only the rapidly developing Kao 
Infosystems network of companies in North America, but also the huge resources of the 
parent company back in Japan, made Kao a very attractive acquirer from Protoscan’s 
standpoint.  
For us [the Protoscan employees], the acquisition was seen very much as a positive move349. 
Becoming a part of the (comparatively) resource-rich Kao Corporation brought a number 
of benefits to Protoscan. Firstly, the injection of capital made it possible to move from the 
old facilities, described as the “little shack down the road”350 to the larger, more 
prestigious premises located on an expanding business park on the outskirts of 
Huntingdon in Cambridgeshire. This was a very important move in terms of changing 
customers’ view of the UK firm:- 
It’s certainly a matter of perception as far as our clients are concerned. When they come to our 
facilities, they see that they are very clean and well organised, and that gives us many, many points in 
the eyes of our biggest customers. There are many of the ‘garage’ type operators who never win the 
better accounts351. 
A second benefit of this connection with a resource-rich parent was that the future of the 
UK operation became much more secure. Having the financial backing of a large 
Japanese parent removed any doubt as to the ability of the UK firm to survive all but the 
worst of the ‘famines’ that strike young companies in this sector of high technology 
industry. 
The third benefit Kao provided was that it now gave Protoscan an international presence. 
Companies such as Microsoft352, Novell353 and Compuserve354, who, in the past might 
never have considered outsourcing some of their software distribution requirements to a 
                                                 
349 Interview with Tosh 18/4/96. 
350 Interview with Tosh 18/4/96. 
351 Interview with Godfrey 25/4/96. 
352 The world’s largest producer of PC software, and developer of the world’s leading PC operating systems, 
‘Windows’, and ‘Windows 95’. 
353 The supplier of ‘NetWare’ the world’s most popular software for networked PCs. 
354 A leading Internet service provider. 
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small operation such as Protoscan, were much more willing to use a company with global 
presence:- 
In being global, you attract a certain sort of customer who is global as well, and this has a knock-on 
effect. If we had been just one duplicating plant, Microsoft would not have entertained the idea of 
using us, because we simply wouldn’t have been big enough. Novell will use us because we are big. 
They would not use some little operator down the road, because they cannot bring any clout to 
market355. 
Kao as an atypical Japanese company 
Within Japan, Kao has gained a reputation for being a highly innovative company. Its 
structure, management and history have been studied by academics as “a true pioneer of 
knowledge management”356. Its sudden and successful move into information technology 
products through a spate of successful acquisitions, rapidly increasing the company’s 
market has been looked upon with much admiration by observers357. Choosing to fuel this 
diversification strategy by acquiring companies in North America could easily have gone 
wrong. As discussed in Chapter 3, Part III, Japanese firms have faced a number of major 
problems when attempting to acquire overseas. By having a clear view of what was 
expected of the acquisition (“We just wanted the business infrastructure [..]”358), Kao 
managed to integrate the resources of the acquired organisation successfully into the 
newly formed Infosystems division.  
By entering the market for information technology related products through these 
acquisitions in the US and by selling predominantly to the OEM market, the ‘Japanese-
ness’ of Kao was almost diluted away to Western observers. The name itself is almost 
neutral in sound. Consequently, by not being perceived as a Japanese company, certain 
aspects of the “culturally frustrating incidents”359 that plague cross-border acquisitions 
were avoided.  
                                                 
355 Interview with Godfrey 25/4/96. 
356 The Economist, 30/3/96. 
357 Butler (1995); Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995). 
358 Interview with Imamura, 18/3/96. 
359 Osigweh et al. (1993). 
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The strong influence of the North American side of Kao Infosystems has meant that, 
while the Kao Corporation in Tokyo may remain staunchly mono-cultural, the 
Infosystems division is remarkably multi-cultural in outlook, by Japanese standards.  
Kao Infosystems is really a Japanese company, run by Americans and managed by Europeans!360 
This view was heard elsewhere in a slightly different form:- 
The good part about Kao Infosystems is that it is not just a Japanese company. It is an American 
company as well. So you have the application of the Japanese, the vitality of the Americans with their 
vision and enthusiasm, and you have the common sense of the Europeans. And these three groups 
balance each other very well. You will always have cultural difficulties when you have three groups 
like that out together, but it can work, and when it works well, it works really well361. 
Changes in the computer industry 
Kao and information storage media 
In the early 1990s, the changes in the computer industry were having a marked impact 
upon the strategy of Kao’s Infosystems division in two ways. Firstly, there was a need for 
Kao to know which of the emerging media, aimed at replacing the 3.5 inch floppy disk, to 
back. Secondly, the dramatic growth of the Internet had shown that there was an 
alternative to ‘hard’ software distribution. 
Which media to back? 
As the PC industry grew, a feed-forward cycle of hardware and software development 
gathered speed. As computers grew faster and more powerful, it became possible to run 
more complex software. As the software grew more demanding in its requirements for the 
hardware, so the hardware had to leap ahead to match predicted software requirements. In 
turn, the software developers were able to add more features to each application. As 
mainstream applications began to incorporate graphics, sound and video, the need for 
high capacity data storage for making back-ups and transporting data increased. The 3.5 
inch floppy disk, which had been developed in the 1980s was becoming too slow and 
                                                 
360 Interview with Tosh, 18/4/96. 
361 Interview with Godfrey, 25/4/96. 
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small to meet the requirements of computer users in the mid-1990s362. Many new storage 
technologies had emerged since the introduction of the floppy disk in the 1980s, but none 
had shown itself to be a clear winner in the race for a replacement for the floppy disk for 
both user storage requirements and software distribution. These two markets were 
becoming increasingly separated. For the users to backup their data, the MO disk was 
showing itself to be popular choice, but still there were niche strongholds that opted for 
other choices, such as the SyQuest cartridge and DAT. As software applications grew 
larger, the most common form of ‘hard’ distribution was the CD-ROM. If Kao was to 
remain strong in the field of removable storage, then it needed to have competences in all 
of these areas, as well as emerging technologies, such as DVD and CD-R for home use. 
Moves away from ‘hard’ software 
The future of the software distribution and storage industry is predicted to lay in areas 
other than magnetic media363. The explosive growth in the use of the Internet364 has 
opened up a new opportunity area for the distribution of software. Instead of the transfer 
of software from the developer to the duplicator, the transfer to ‘hard’ copy, the 
packaging, distribution, retail marketing and then final transfer to the end-user, the 
Internet provides a ‘direct’ link from developer to end user (See Exhibit 8.8). 
 
 
Exhibit 8.8  Use of the Internet for direct software distribution 
                                                 
362 “[..] the floppy disk is essentially obsolete technology. It isn’t big enough to do anything with and it’s very, very 
slow. (Investor’s Business Daily, 6/5/96). Some within the industry believe that the peak of output of 3.5 inch disks is 
believed to have been the first quarter of 1996 (Interview with Godfrey, 25/4/96). 
363 Interview with Godfrey, 25/4/96. 
364 See Chapter 2 for further details. 
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Consequently, competences far removed from the ‘surface science’ technologies that 
provided Kao with an entry point into the IT sector would be required in order to maintain 
market share. It was in these areas that Kao management realised they lacked expertise. 
The acquisition of businesses already operating in the software distribution industry gave 
the Japanese access to much tacit knowledge relating to the ‘next stage’ of the industry’s 
development. 
Kao’s emerging strategy 
It still remains unclear which removable storage media will dominate. In addition, the use 
of direct electronic distribution of software will result in a whole new area of skills being 
required by those involved in its publishing and distribution. There is also a continuing 
realisation that in an industry where the ‘hard’ products are becoming ever more 
commodity-like, there is a need to find other ways of deriving value from the 
requirements of the end users.  
In the computer industry, this trend has emerged in the form of hardware manufacturers 
becoming more and more interested in the ‘content’, i.e., the software and connected 
services, as opposed to the hardware itself. In the field of information storage, this trend is 
becoming visible as a shift from ‘back-end’ (storage media manufacturing) to ‘front-end’ 
(support services) provision for the consumer. 
The view taken by Kao management as to the corporation’s future in the field of 
information systems is one of acting as a bridge, or messenger between the clients (the 
software publishers) and the end users (of the software)365. The management of the 
Infosystems division realise that it is necessary for them to move further towards 
becoming a ‘front-end’ service provider. In the short- to medium-term the ‘back-end’ 
production of the consumables will continue to provide steady, if declining revenue366. A 
number of alliances have been formed which reflect this shift of emphasis, and these are 
discussed in later sections. 
                                                 
365 Interview with Imamura, 18/3/96. 
366 Interview with Nakamura, 19/12/94. 
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Two examples of areas where Kao is providing front-end service are:- 
• Provision of ‘call center’ services. These services provide a pan-European, multi-
lingual customer support call-up service. A typical use for this service is illustrated 
through its use by a US computer manufacturer. When it was found that one of the US 
company’s products had a fault, customers in Europe were given a toll-free number to 
call. These calls were then routed to Kao Infosystem’s call centre, where advice in the 
language of the caller was given by Kao agents367.  
• Customer data management. This is a joint development with Hewlett-Packard to 
produce a software package which acts as an electronic registration screen. It is important 
for software publishers to gain as much information as they can about their customers. 
Traditional software registration cards have a very low return rate (typically around 20%), 
so if this customer information can be gleaned electronically via the Internet, it will add 
greatly to the software publishers knowledge of customer demographics368. The stage 
beyond that is to provide a software package that can interrogate the user’s computer hard 
disk drive automatically369. Kao Infosystems range of services now reflect the balance of 
front-, and back-end user requirements, varying from project management to information 
management, and software replication to full ‘turnkey services’. 
Changing role for duplication plants 
The role of a disk-based plant such as that in Huntingdon will have to change370. Kao 
management stress that they view the key role of the Huntingdon plant as one of 
“distribution and fulfilment to end-users”371. One Kao manager goes on to describe the 
way in which he sees the future for Kao Infosystems in the UK:- 
[..] the company will progress down the Internet route and, in parallel with that, people will be able to 
buy their software (or at least the basic ‘building blocks’) over the Internet. We intend to capture that 
information on behalf of the customer [software publishers]. We will build and maintain that database 
                                                 
367 Communications Week International, 22/5/95. 
368 This service, named ‘I-Reg’ was launched in October 1996 (PR Newswire, 17/10/96). 
369 Interview with Godfrey, 25/4/96. 
370 Interview with Nakamura, 19/12/94. 
371 Interview with Godfrey, 25/4/96. 
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on behalf of customers [software publishers]. We will have shared ownership of that database to such 
an extent that we will only ship ‘hard’ copies of the software to those [end-users] who actually request 
it. [..] That is the path we are taking. I don’t ever see ‘hard’ copy disappearing, but its volume will 
certainly be much diminished372. 
As stated earlier, Kao was able to enter the market for information consumables because 
the organisation was able to apply its skills in surface science to the manufacture of a 
range of products based on the coating of plastics with magnetic material. Around the 
time of the acquisition, the world production for floppy disks could not keep up with 
demand. As software grew ever more complex and space consuming, programmes that 
could easily be distributed on one 3.5 inch disk were being replaced by programmes that 
required between ten or twenty similar disks373. By applying principles of high quality, 
customer backup service and high volume international manufacturing capacity, Kao 
were able to dominate the market rapidly. However, the industry requirements for 
removable storage are now moving away from products based on such technologies. 
Kao’s core surface science skills are required less and less as the trend shifts towards 
adding value through services. Kao has had to build a new series of skills, and the 
acquisitions seem to have been an efficient way of doing this374. 
Formation of alliances 
To respond to the growing uncertainty of the removable storage market, and the shift 
away from ‘hard’ software distribution, the Infosystems division of Kao has formed a 
number of alliances in recent years. A number of the most significant of these are shown 
in Exhibit 8.9.  
 
Partner Date Purpose 
Cybersource 1996 Kao will gain access to Cybersource’s secure electronic transaction processing and 
software distribution, in particular their ‘Internet Commerce Services’ package. 
Microsoft 1996 Three year contract for Kao to produce “virtually all” of Microsoft’s packaged 
products in North America. 
                                                 
372 Interview with Godfrey, 25/4/96. 
373 Microsoft’s Windows 95 operating system now requires twenty-four 3.5 inch disks (Computer Reseller News, 
13/3/95). 
374 Interview with Imamura, 18/3/96. 
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DVD Beta Program 1996 Kao joined with Toshiba, Sonic Solutions and others to work on ways of ensuring the 
smooth transfer of DVD technology through to the consumer. 
Personal Computer 
Buyers Club (PCBC) 
1996 Kao acquired PCBC, a clearing house for personal computer makers, which markets 
consumer software and provides CD-ROM based marketing information. 
Pacific Coast Sound 
Works (PCSW) 
1996 Partnership with PCSW to provide studio facilities for ‘content creators’ based 
around the use of DVD technology. 
DEC 1995 Kao joins with DEC to provide software duplication and packaging services. The aim 
is to combine Kao’s duplication and logistics with DEC’s software publishing arm. 
WIN 1995 Kao to access to WIN’s skills in pay-per-use multimedia to the consumer market. 
Exhibit 8.9  Kao’s alliances in the IT sector 
Source: Data from FT Profile and Reuter Business Briefing 
These acquisitions illustrate clearly the way in which the Infosystems division of Kao is 
moving away from ‘back end’ to ‘front end’ services. 
Performance 
Kao has managed to weather the worst effects of the Japanese economic downturn 
remarkably well, with both net sales and net income showing steady, if unspectacular 
growth over the past 10 years (See Exhibit 8.10). 
 
 
Exhibit 8.10  Kao’s net sales and net income 1985-1995 
Source: Company reports 
Kao still derives over 80% of net sales from the domestic Japanese market and almost 
90% from its core household products division. The Infosystems division has shown 
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remarkable growth, moving from a new market entrant in the removable data storage 
industry in 1985, to the worlds largest producer of floppy disks by 1992. As demand for 
the core products of the Infosystems division declines, it remains to be seen whether Kao 
will be able to maintain a lead in the software distribution market based predominantly on 
the provision of front-end services. 
Closing comments 
Despite a reputation for excellence within Japan, certain observers believe that Kao is not 
markedly different from other Japanese corporations, and that it too suffers from many of 
the commonly observed ills that are perceived to plague Japanese big business in the high 
technology industry (such as slow response to change, excessive bureaucracy and 
difficulty in integrating non-Japanese into the decision making process)375. Kao’s 
anticipated threat to global competitors such as Procter & Gamble and Unilever never 
really materialised. Kao seemed unable to transfer its success in toiletries overseas. By 
setting up in a new industry sector, and using a product that required little local 
customisation, Kao was quickly able to develop a strong overseas presence with its 
Infosystems division. 
The decision to locate the headquarters of the Infosystems division not in Japan, but in the 
US may have had implications that move beyond the motives expressed (i.e., 
“Information technology is the first truly global business for Kao, and it is being driven 
from the United States, where most of the customers are located”376). As one Kao 
Infosystems manager in the UK put it: “Kao Infosystems is not just a Japanese company”. 
There may have been advantages in situating the headquarters (and the semi-autonomous 
decision making centre) of the Infosystems Division far away from Tokyo. 
Despite the success of the tri-cultural (Europe, US and Japan) structure of Kao 
Infosystems division, praised by managers in the UK377, there are those within the Kao 
                                                 
375 The Economist, 30/3/96. 
376 John Depuy of Kao, as quoted in Reuter News Service, 17/8/94. 
377 Interview with Godfrey, 25/4/96. 
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Corporation who do not see how the semi-autonomous off-shoot can feed back to Tokyo 
and help change the headquarters’ thinking. The management style of Kao as opposed to 
that of Kao Infosystems division remains much less ‘international’ in outlook:  
Kao’s unique management style may not fit well with American and European companies378. 
The formation of the Infosystems division of the Kao Corporation has allowed the 
Japanese corporation to take the first steps towards achieving a truly global presence. The 
Infosystems division of Kao has achieved remarkable successes world-wide in the short 
time since its formation. It remains to be seen whether the successful dynamics of the 
non-Japanese operations can be transferred to the core of the Kao Corporation in 
Tokyo379.  
                                                 
378 Anonymous Kao board member reported in The Economist 30/3/96. 
379 The recent transfer of the Japanese chairman and president of Kao Corporation of America, Toshio Hoshino, to the 
position of managing director of Kao Corporation, Tokyo, may be one move aimed at increasing the flow of knowledge 
back to the Japanese HQ. 
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Chapter 9 Discussion and conclusions 
Chapter overview 
In this chapter, the aim is use the case study data to provide one step in the process described by 
Eisenhardt (1989) of building an “incrementally more powerful” theory. By combining the case 
study material with the theoretical constructs provided by the resource-based view of the firm, an 
approach can be developed for viewing the behaviour of firms faced with a dynamic and 
uncertain environment driven by rapidly evolving technologies. 
This chapter is divided as follows: Following a brief summary of the conceptual approach so far 
developed, the cases are discussed in terms of the Japanese firms developing a response to the 
changes in the computer industry which were being felt in the late 1980s. The most important of 
these was caused by the emergence of the PC which lead to the trend towards open systems based 
computing and the consequent redefinition of the structure of the computer industry. In response 
to this change, the acquisitions can be viewed as largely related to the acquisition of resources to 
help build competence in areas related to open systems based computing. 
The case study acquisitions are then viewed with respect to the anticipated convergence leading 
to the formation of the digital industry. While at the time of the acquisitions, the impact of this 
convergence was not being directly felt to any great extent, it was becoming clear that issues 
relating to convergence could be of critical importance to the future strategies of the Japanese 
firms. In response to this anticipated change, the acquisitions can be related to the enhancement 
of capability, i.e., the gaining of skill in the organisational process of corporate acquisitions that 
would improve the firms’ ability to compete in an uncertain and dynamic environment. 
The next section draws together the ideas developed from the literature and the material collected 
from analysis of the case studies with respect to these two technological discontinuities, and 
presents a refined conceptual framework. Following this, we return to the question posed at the 
beginning of the thesis, and show how the building of this conceptual approach has provided us 
with a means for viewing the behaviour of firms in a fast changing and uncertain environment. In 
closing, suggestions for further work are made. 
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Introduction 
The previous three chapters presented the ‘basic story’ of each of the case study 
acquisitions, describing the background of each company, the lead-up to the acquisition, 
and the events that followed. In this chapter, the aim is to apply this material to the 
conceptual approach so far developed to build up a broader understanding of the use of 
acquisitions by the Japanese firms. Certain readily apparent motives for the acquisitions 
can be easily identified from the case study material, and the theoretical underpinnings for 
these motives can be seen to be embedded in the mainstream literature on strategic 
management, the management of innovation and the management of acquisitions as 
reviewed in Chapter 3. For example, for Fujitsu, the acquisition of ICL represented a 
defensive strategy to prevent a valued alliance partner of some ten years standing being 
acquired by a third party.  
When ICL’s parent, STC, expressed interest in divesting itself of its majority stake in the 
UK firm in the late 1980s, Fujitsu risked losing a valuable partner in the UK if ICL’s new 
owner proved to be less ‘open to co-operation’ than STC had been. Acquisition of the 
majority of ICL’s shares was an effective strategy for ensuring the continued relationship 
between the two firms, though one which contained a level of risk. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the act of acquisition of an attractive firm can actually destroy the firm’s 
attractiveness380. However, by implementing an ‘arm’s length’ approach to integration, 
and leaving ICL to function largely as an autonomous member of the Fujitsu Group, the 
relationship has been maintained. The acquisition of ICL by Fujitsu can thus be viewed 
simply as a defensive, friendly/collaborative take-over (Buono & Bowditch, 1989) 
implemented to protect an alliance partner. 
With MELCO, in fulfilling the desire to become a player in the fast growing market for 
open systems based computers, they were faced with a problem of how to enter this 
dynamic and international competitive environment. MELCO needed to gain access to the 
appropriate skills. In terms of the technology strategies identified by Granstrand et al. 
                                                 
380 E.g., if the target firm is attractive because of its highly motivated workforce, a change of ownership may result in 
the de-motivating of that same workforce. 
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(1992), MELCO was faced with a choice of internal development, formation of a joint 
venture, technology purchasing, technology scanning or the acquisition of a firm 
possessing the desired technology. While MELCO prided itself on “doing everything by 
itself”, previous attempts to use internal skills to enter the international markets for small 
computers had not met with lasting success.  
At the same time that MELCO was attempting to re-enter this market, changes were 
becoming evident in the Japanese approach to the use of corporate acquisitions. With the 
build-up of cash on corporate balance sheets caused by the booming Japanese economy 
coupled with the increasing desire of Japanese firms to ‘internationalise’, the previously 
unattractive option of using corporate acquisitions became a potential strategic tool 
MELCO could use. As these issues were being discussed in Japan, the manufacturing arm 
of one of the UK’s most successful open-systems based computer companies was put up 
for sale. This seemed to present an ideal solution for MELCO’s problem of how to enter 
the market for open systems based computers. MELCO was thus able to acquire not only 
the technology and other knowledge of how to make and market open systems based 
computers, but also to gain a manufacturing facility within the European Union for a 
product range with an established and respected brand image. MELCO’s acquisition of 
the manufacturing arm of Apricot can thus be viewed in part as a technology acquisition 
strategy (Granstrand et al., 1992) and also as a related diversification through acquisition 
(Johnson & Scholes, 1993). 
For Kao, the acquisition of Protoscan represented one step in an on-going strategy of 
unrelated diversification through acquisition (Johnson & Scholes, 1993) which aimed to 
leverage Kao’s ‘core science skills’ into the potentially lucrative market for data storage 
media. The management of Kao had seen an opportunity presented by the growth of the 
market for open systems based computing. By applying their skills in surface science, 
Kao was able to enter the market by first producing the coatings for floppy disks, before 
moving on to the production of the disk themselves, and then the duplication of software 
onto disks. This process of forward, vertical integration through acquisitions had been 
implemented successfully in North America, and with the gradual uniting of European 
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markets, Kao management saw the need to have a presence within a member state of the 
European Union. Following a trawl of potential duplication plants in Europe, Protoscan 
was found to fit most closely with Kao’s needs and was duly acquired.   
Thus we can see that the motives for the acquisitions were clearly visible and represented 
the application of well understood strategic thinking. What has remained less visible is an 
understanding of the long term benefits that the Japanese firms have been able to gain 
from acquiring ownership of the UK firms that counteracted the high risk and complex 
managerial issues presented by the integration of cross-border acquisition. The conceptual 
framework, developed using material from case studies upon the foundations of the a 
priori constructs drawn from the literature on resource-based view of the firm provides us 
with a means of viewing the acquisitions that encompass consideration of changes in the 
competitive environment, and links these changes with the development of appropriate 
business processes to respond to these changes. 
Examination of the case study material quickly reveals one underpinning factor which is 
important from the standpoint of building the conceptual framework. The firms were not 
simply facing the emergence of a new technology which they needed to internalise, they 
were facing two technological discontinuities381.  
The first of these discontinuities was the result of the emergence of the PC and the 
subsequent changes that this caused on the structure of the computer industry. The second 
was the anticipated convergence of the computer, consumer electronics and 
telecommunications industries to form the ‘digital industry’. The firms were not simply 
facing the emergence of a new technology which they needed to internalise, but the 
radical re-structuring of the competitive environment which would require firms to 
possess a high level of organisational flexibility and adaptability. Analysis of the case 
studies with respect to these two discontinuities, using the resource-based constructs (See 
Exhibit 9.1), provides us with an alternative perspective on the use of acquisitions, and 
                                                 
381 “Technological discontinuities are those rare, unpredictable innovations which advance a relevant technological 
frontier by an order-of-magnitude and which involve fundamentally different product or process design”, (Burgelman et 
al., 1996: 190). 
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leads to the refinement of the analytical approach for viewing the behaviour of firms 
faced with a dynamic and uncertain environment. 
 
Core resources  
The store of tangible and intangible firm specific resources that the firm has internalised. Such resources 
include in-house knowledge of technology, skilled personnel, brand names and contracts. 
Complementary resources  
The additional resources which may be required to be combined with certain core resources to form a 
competence. Such resources may include sales, distribution, complementary technologies or competitive 
manufacturing facilities. 
Competences  
The ways in which resources are bundled together to form specific and distinctive skills areas. 
Capabilities  
The routines or processes which allow the firm to reconfigure its resources. These include resource 
concentration, accumulation, complementing, conserving and recovery. 
Competitive environment  
The influence of competitive pressures in the firm’s external environment will influence how rapidly and in 
what way the firm must reconfigure resources. 
Path dependencies  
A firm’s previous investments and activities will, to a certain extent, restrict its behaviour. Attempts to 
reconfigure and adapt resources will naturally tend to close in on previous successful activities. 
Exhibit 9.1  Core constructs of the resource-based perspective 
Source: Adapted from Wernerfelt, 1984; Teece, 1986; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Stalk et al., 1992; 
Teece et al., 1992 
 
These six constructs provide a language for describing the behaviour of the case study 
firms. In particular, they focus attention upon the way in which firms are able to acquire, 
augment and adapt resources to form new competences, and how they are able to enhance 
their capability to do so in order to pre-empt or react to change in the future. 
In the following sections, the cases are analysed in terms of these constructs, firstly with 
respect to the emergence of open systems based computing, and secondly with respect to 
the anticipated effects of convergence. 
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Technological discontinuity 1: The emergence of open systems based computing 
Nature of the open-systems based computer industry 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a series of upheavals have punctuated the development of the 
computer industry. The 1950s saw the development of the mainframe computer, in the 
1960s, the mini-computer had emerged, and the 1980s saw the arrival of open systems 
based computing. Concurrent with this third upheaval, wide reaching changes were taking 
place which were affecting a range of markets and industries. A new competitive 
environment for firms was being created, driven by three forces: intense international 
competition, fragmented markets and sophisticated customers, and diversified and 
transforming technologies (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991). 
The nature of the products and services upon which this ‘new’, open-systems based 
computer industry was built forced changes in the strategy of the existing computer firms 
and gave opportunities to new firms to exploit market opportunities. The products of the 
new industry were typified by four main characteristics: open, systemic, rapidly changing 
and international. 
These four characteristics of the products of the open-systems based computer industry 
also provided an opportunity for a wide range of service providers, such as all those 
offering services included under the umbrella of ‘systems integrators’. As hardware and 
software from a wide range of companies was being put together to form IT solutions for 
businesses, the systems integrators were able to profit from the relative weakness of the 
consumer when faced with a varied and rapidly changing and growing range of hardware 
and software products. 
This environment presented a paradox for firms. In some ways it favoured the small, 
nimble firm which is able to respond rapidly to signals from the market, or to apply 
emerging technologies into niche opportunity areas (Mills, 1996). In other ways, it 
seemed to favour the large firm, able to operate on an international level and maintain a 
wide portfolio of resources which could be leveraged into opportunity areas as and when 
they emerged.  
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This new competitive environment presented many challenges for firms shifting from the 
‘old’ computer industry, or from unrelated industries, into the ‘new’ computer industry. 
To compete effectively required more than just accessing the relevant technologies: it 
required organisational capabilities that would allow the firms to respond to the dynamic, 
uncertain and international nature of this new competitive environment. 
In the following sections, the case study acquisitions are discussed in terms of the key 
constructs of the resource-based perspective to examine the behaviour of the Japanese 
firms at the time of the technological discontinuity that marked the emergence of the 
open-systems based computer industry of the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Case A:  Fujitsu and ICL 
As “Japan’s IBM”, Fujitsu suffered the same problems that were facing the majority of 
the large computer producers in the late 1980s. The growth of the market for PC-based 
computing had taken these firms by surprise, and they were being forced to find ways to 
adapt to the changing competitive environment. In Japan, the uptake of open systems 
based computing was slower than in the US and Europe, but was nevertheless forecast to 
have a major impact in the near future. Fujitsu therefore needed to develop competence in 
this area if it wished to remain a major force in computing as the demand for the 
company’s core computing product, the mainframe, declined. Fujitsu was not entirely 
reliant on computing, having well-established additional competences in 
telecommunications systems and electronic devices. Despite this, Fujitsu was still 
determined not to be left behind as the computer industry transformed itself. 
Fujitsu’s entry into the open systems based computer industry was hindered in part by its 
history, or its path dependencies. Fujitsu had always seen itself very much a technology-
based firm. It saw its skills as resting in the pushing of technology to markets rather than 
responding to the needs of markets. This can be illustrated by its relative lack of success 
in marketing the ‘FM-Towns’ home-use PC, which represented a leap forward in 
technology, but was too advanced for the needs of the consumer at that time. The 
resources it had accumulated over the previous decades, and the capabilities it had for 
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reconfiguring these resources had provided it with a very different set of skills to those 
required within the open-systems based computer industry. The competence the firm had 
gained in mainframe computing in a way acted as a rigidity which hindered Fujitsu’s 
ability to respond to the changes caused by the new technologies. The firm had also 
developed its computing competences predominantly within the domestic Japanese 
market, working largely with Japanese corporate customers for the big computer systems. 
Honing their competence in the production of market leading mainframe computers had 
not provided Fujitsu with the skills needed to compete in the highly volatile, high volume, 
international market for small computer systems. Fujitsu did have access to a number of 
the resources required for the development of open systems computing, such as memory 
chips, monitors and disk drives, but lacked others, such as open systems design skills, 
appropriate international marketing and distribution, and international manufacturing 
capacity. 
The open system design resources that Fujitsu required to allow it to compete on an 
international level within the ‘new’ computer industry were skills in the design of the 
client machines (open architecture PCs), servers (UNIX workstations and very high 
performance PCs), and associated software. In addition, it was clear that as the PCs and 
related products became increasingly generic in nature, with competition increasing and 
margins reducing, success would fall to those firms who were able to maintain large scale 
production capacity and associated distribution on an international scale. Although 
products were becoming hard to differentiate in terms of technology, there was still a 
need for an appropriate brand to be presented to the consumer. Fujitsu thus needed the 
complementary resources of an international manufacturing capacity and distribution 
network, and a suitable brand image for non-Japanese markets.  
Faced with this situation, Fujitsu needed to find a way to build competence and to access 
complementary resources that would allow it to compete in the open-systems based 
computer industry. The company’s long standing partner in the UK, ICL, provided one 
source of the resources that Fujitsu lacked. 
Japanese innovation strategy and the acquisition of UK IT firms                                                                                             Chapter 9 
 225 
ICL had transformed itself throughout the 1980s from a highly vertically integrated IT 
product-based company, into a leading developer of open systems technology and IT 
services. Fujitsu’s collaboration with the UK firm, built around the provision of the 
resource of core mainframe technology in return for the use of ICL’s distribution network 
in Europe, had given the Japanese firm a good understanding of the strengths of the UK 
firm. Fujitsu needed to have access to ICL’s open systems competence and related 
complementary resources, and was eager to strengthen ties. When ICL’s parent, STC 
expressed its desire to divest itself of the UK firm, Fujitsu saw the threat that ICL (its 
source of resources to allow the development of competence in client-server computer 
systems) could be pulled away from its grasp. Acquisition provided one means to ensure 
that access to these core and complementary resources was maintained and internalised. 
Through the acquisition, Fujitsu was thus able to acquire access to the resources of open 
systems design skills, international marketing and distribution skills, and international 
manufacturing capacity. The long relationship with ICL and the trust shown towards 
ICL’s management by the Japanese had lead to Fujitsu handling the acquisition 
integration in a very ‘hands-off’ way. By successfully integrating the acquisition, Fujitsu 
was also able to enhance its organisational capabilities, in particular the ability to 
accumulate resources from external sources. Having learnt many lessons from the process 
of integration, Fujitsu would be able to apply these to any future acquisitions. 
Case B:  MELCO and Apricot 
MELCO’s attempts to enter the PC market in the early 1980s had achieved varied degrees 
of success. Despite beating IBM to produce the world’s first 16-bit PC, MELCO’s PC 
business had suffered a number of problems and they had withdrawn from this area 
before the end of the decade. It became clear that internally they lacked the required 
resources, or the required organisational capabilities, to be able to develop competence in 
PCs. 
However, the PC market and trend towards client server computing was developing fast. 
To be unable to compete in this market, other than in the provision of resources in the 
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form monitors and memory chips to other firms seemed to be missing a valuable 
opportunity.  
MELCO, like Fujitsu wanted to gain competence in the design, production and sale of 
open systems hardware and software in order to reposition itself within the open systems 
based computer industry. Doing so would also provide MELCO with one means to break 
out of its heavy reliance upon the domestic Japanese markets. 
MELCO was a technology-based firm whose competences in propulsion systems, 
industrial automation equipment and satellites developed largely within the Japanese 
market had given it a very different set of skills to those required to compete within the 
market for open systems based computers. The vast array of resources which gave 
MELCO its competences in such a wide range of product areas had not proved sufficient, 
or at least had not cross-fertilised to help provide MELCO with some of the skills needed 
to compete in the international markets for small computer systems. Its failure to diffuse 
the know-how gained from its consumer electronics division can be taken as one indicator 
of how it lacked organisational flexibility and adaptability. It can be seen that faced with 
the changes in the computer industry, MELCO lacked certain capabilities, i.e., it lacked 
the ability to reconfigure its resources effectively to respond to the demands of the open 
systems based computer markets. This factor was in a way the result of the rigidities 
imposed by the previous activities of the firm. The competences that MELCO had 
developed in the markets for heavy electrical machinery, and even the skills in larger 
computers could be regarded as rigidities which hindered the development of competence 
in open systems based computing. 
In order to develop competence in this area, MELCO required access to the core 
resources of skills in the design of the client machines, servers, software, large scale 
international production and distribution capacity and an appropriate brand. MELCO thus 
needed the complementary resources of an international manufacturing capacity and 
international distribution network and a suitable brand image for non-Japanese markets. 
Certain required complementary resources MELCO had already internalised, such as 
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those the firm held in electronic devices, monitors and disk drives. 
Unlike Fujitsu, for MELCO there was no one partner who seemed to fill the role that ICL 
had done for Fujitsu in providing access to the required core and complementary 
resources which together would form competence in client server computing. 
At the time that MELCO was standing on the side-lines of this changing environment, 
Apricot Computers in the UK announced that they were seeking to divest themselves of 
their hardware division. The management of Apricot realised that the future profits of 
client-server computing lay in the provision of services, and that hardware would only 
make money if produced in high volume on an international level. MELCO saw the 
opportunity that this divestment presented to them, and were keen to gain access to 
Apricot’s hardware production resources. However, MELCO had never before attempted 
the take-over of a non-Japanese firm. In the past, MELCO had relied heavily on their 
diverse product groups to provide all the resources needed to develop a required 
competence. Acquisition was a step into the unknown for MELCO, and the suggestion 
was met with resistance internally. 
MELCO’s history to a large extent dictated its unsuitability to compete in the open 
systems based computer industry. The resources needed to develop competence in the 
production and sales of heavy electrical machinery had been very different from those 
needed to compete in the new computer industry. Also, despite having developed 
competence in the development and sales of consumer electronics (which should have 
provided resources useful for the marketing of home-use computers), MELCO lacked the 
organisational capability to combine and adapt these resources with those from its IT 
division.  
By taking the bold step of acquiring Apricot, MELCO was able not only to access 
resources but also to enhance its organisational capabilities. The task of integrating the 
acquisition was not an easy one, as was seen in the problems faced during joint product 
development projects. How much MELCO has been able to learn from these problems 
will be one indicator of how effectively it has enhanced its capabilities. 
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Case C:  Kao and Protoscan 
Kao had seen the opportunities presented by the growth of the IT industry fuelled by the 
emergence of the PC in client-server and home-use markets. Kao was able to apply its 
competences in surface sciences to one of the many systemic products that made up the 
industry - the floppy disk. Having found that it could reconfigure its resources to provide 
the raw materials for other disk producers, Kao began to see the potential gains to be 
made in being a vertically integrated producer of disks. However, Kao also realised that 
in order to be successful in this market, a global presence was required. In addition, it was 
becoming clear towards the end of the 1980s that the future of the floppy disk was 
relatively limited. The speed of development of PCs meant that increasing amounts of 
storage capacity were required. While the market for removable storage would continue 
to grow, the use of floppy disks for software distribution was predicted to decline as 
programmes became larger and alternative forms of storage and distribution became 
available. If Kao wished to compete in this market, it needed to develop, or access, the 
required complementary resources to develop coverage of international markets quickly. 
Kao had already acquired a number of firms in North America, and needed to strengthen 
its position within Europe. A search of potential targets revealed that Protoscan had 
certain resources that Kao needed, in the form of disk duplication services and a good 
range of industry contacts around Europe. By acquiring Protoscan, Kao gained the 
resources it lacked to allow it to continue to grow as a major player in the floppy disk and 
software duplication markets. 
In addition, as the structure of the market for software distribution altered, Kao was in a 
position where it could access a wide range of resources based on the emerging 
technologies and services. The then emergent technology of CD-ROM for software 
distribution and the growth of software publishing related services such as disk 
duplication and packaging represented potential areas of future growth, but these were in 
areas in which Kao had no expertise. What Kao needed, and was able to gain through 
acquisition, was access to the ‘soft’ knowledge resources of firms already well 
established in the industry. 
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Summary of key issues 
All three Japanese firms were able to develop competence in business areas related to 
open systems based computing through the use of acquisitions. Each one of the target 
firms was able to provide their new parent with access to a particular resource or 
collection of resources. The Japanese parent was able to combine these with existing 
internal resources to form the required competence that would allow them to enter or 
strengthen their positions within the competitive environment of the new computer 
industry.  
In each case, the Japanese parents had been unable to develop these resources themselves, 
for reasons related to the rigidities imposed by their histories (their path dependencies) in 
combination with the competitive environment dictated by the dynamic nature of the open 
systems based computer industry. This had resulted in each of the Japanese firms being 
unable to react in a manner which would have allowed them to develop the competence 
internally.  
Also, by acquiring, the Japanese firms were able to enhance their ability to augment their 
resources from external sources in future. Thus, it can be viewed that the acquisitions not 
only provided the Japanese parents with access to the resources to develop a competence, 
but also enhanced their capability to do so again in the future. With the convergence of 
IT, consumer electronics and telecommunications on the horizon, this may have been one 
of the most beneficial elements of the acquisition for the Japanese firms.  
Technological discontinuity 2: The digital industry 
The nature of the digital industry 
The factors leading to the anticipated formation of the digital industry were discussed in 
Chapter 2. At the time of the lead-up to the case study acquisitions, the influence of this 
convergence could only be guessed at. However, it was clear to IT firms that such 
convergence, if and when it occurred, would present a highly complex and uncertain 
competitive environment. Consequently, as firms were unable to anticipate what lay 
beyond this technological discontinuity, they aimed to prepare themselves for change.  
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While certain aspects of the world that lay beyond the technological ‘warp’382 were 
making themselves felt at the time of the acquisitions, such as the trend towards client-
server computing and the widespread diffusion of PCs among home and work locations, 
much of what lay beyond was highly opaque. All that was clear was that attempting to 
compete effectively in this environment would require the development or acquisition of 
certain organisational skills. Such skills include the ability to operate flexibly (to allow 
them to adapt to rapidly changing conditions), openly (to be able to manage alliances 
skilfully) and with an international outlook (to be able to operate in global markets). 
In the following sections, the case studies are discussed in relation to three issues linking 
the potential effects of convergence with the behaviour of the firms:  
• Firstly, around the time of the acquisitions, the Japanese firms could see convergence 
on the horizon, but could not necessary see how effectively they could, with the 
competences they had developed in the years prior to the acquisition, compete in that 
uncertain environment. By entering the market for open systems based computers, this 
would put them in a more advantageous position to prepare for the anticipated 
convergence leading to the formation of the digital industry. What they required was a 
‘carrier competence’ to get them out of their present situation in relation to 
technologies and markets, and reposition themselves within the open-systems based 
computer industry (See Exhibit 9.2). It would put them, in affect, closer to the 
technological ‘warp’. 
 
                                                 
382 A term used by the Director of Interactive Services at ICL to describe the sense of uncertainty presented by 
convergence: “I felt like Captain Kirk looking at the big screen and seeing a ‘warp’ approaching. Beyond that ‘warp’ is 
a world of pervasive networking and multimedia services the like of which people had imagined to be possible” 
(Interview with Davison, 28/2/96). 
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Exhibit 9.2  Positioning to prepare for convergence 
 
• Secondly, having a subsidiary firmly positioned within the open-systems based 
computer industry meant that each Japanese parent was able to access a wider range of 
resources and knowledge through the subsidiaries’ suppliers, customers and partners. 
Whereas with looser alliance partnerships, access to a partner’s resources could be 
extremely limited, by acquiring, the parent gained access to effectively all of the 
subsidiaries resources (See Exhibit 9.3). For example, ICL’s connections with the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) potentially gave Fujitsu access to a vast 
content resource.  
 
 
Exhibit 9.3  Accessing third-party resources through acquisition 
• Thirdly, as discussed earlier, it was recognised that competing effectively in the digital 
industry would require a set of organisational capabilities that would allow a given 
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firm to be flexible, open and international in outlook. Of key importance among these 
capabilities would be the capacity to work with external companies, to form alliances 
and, if necessary, to acquire ownership of a firm. As has been stressed throughout this 
thesis, the act of integrating an acquisition is fraught with difficulty, and in the 
majority of cases, will result in failure. For Japanese firms, based in a system of 
corporate governance where acquisitions are a rarity, to lack capabilities in this area 
when attempting to compete in fast changing environment, such as that presented by 
the digital industry, could be a major disadvantage.  
Each of the case study acquisitions is now briefly discussed from a resource-based 
perspective in terms of these three issues. 
Case A:  Fujitsu and ICL 
Carrier competence 
By acquiring ICL, Fujitsu was able to gain access to competence in client server 
technologies and the complementary resources to allow the Japanese firm to compete in 
the open-systems based computer industry on an international level. ICL’s skill in open 
systems hardware and software provide the necessary ‘carrier competence’ to bring 
Fujitsu forward into this new competitive environment. Acquiring ICL, a firm which had 
built up strengths in open systems based computing and was transforming itself into an 
integrated service provider, Fujitsu was repositioned advantageously to prepare for the 
formation of the digital industry. 
Wider access to resources 
Once ICL was within the Fujitsu family, the Japanese firm was able to access additional 
resources through ICL. Examples of this can be seen in the way in which Fujitsu was able 
to access the ‘groupware’ software that ICL had obtained by its own purchase of Nokia 
Data, and the way in which Fujitsu has now obtained a connection to the resources of the 
BBC through ICL. ICL is continuing to move into services and systems integration, and is 
seeking more ways to derive business from the provision of information rather than the 
provision of products. As the UK firm builds competences in this area, Fujitsu too will be 
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able to benefit from this. Fujitsu itself is seeking to gain competence in Internet related 
services, which it is doing by building up networks of alliances world-wide. 
New organisational capabilities 
As Fujitsu pushes further into the digital industry, using the stepping-stones of 
competence in open-systems and then Internet related services, it will need to form more 
alliances and it is likely that the need to acquire ownership of external firms will emerge. 
The capability to manage acquisitions that it has learnt through the integration of ICL will 
be invaluable in the future. The act of successfully integrating an acquisition can be 
regarded as an enhancement of Fujitsu’s capabilities. It has provided a means by which 
Fujitsu is able to break away from certain organisational rigidities imposed by its history. 
Case B:  MELCO and Apricot 
Carrier competence 
Having failed to develop competence in open systems based computing internally, 
MELCO was forced to go outside to access the required combination of resources and 
complementary resources. In a similar way to Fujitsu and ICL, access to Apricot’s 
resources allowed MELCO to develop the competence it needed to enter the open-
systems based computer industry and thus reposition itself more favourably with respect 
to uncertain competitive environment presented by the convergence towards to digital 
industry. 
Wider access to resources 
Apricot’s non-Japanese customer base and network of suppliers provided a valuable 
resource for MELCO. Being a company which for much of its 75 year history had been 
based in the production of heavy electrical machinery, and had prided itself on being able 
“to do everything by itself”, MELCO was in many ways intrinsically ill-suited to the 
dynamic, open and international environment of the open-systems based computer 
industry, let alone the highly uncertain digital industry. By having a non-Japanese firm 
within the MELCO fold, MELCO was able to learn from Apricot’s relationships with 
non-Japanese firms and customers. MELCO was able to use Apricot as a ‘cultural filter’ 
to allow the highly Japan-centric MELCO to work with companies in the US. For 
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example, Apricot’s good relationship with Intel and Microsoft has been used to 
MELCO’s benefit. 
New organisational capabilites 
Having never managed an acquisition before, much attention within MELCO was focused 
on seeing whether the acquisition would be a success. If MELCO was to be able to 
compete in the new dynamic environments of open-systems based computer industry and 
the digital industry, it could potentially need the capability to manage acquisitions. In that 
respect, the acquisition of Apricot served as a useful testing ground for such partnering 
and provided an opportunity to learn a new organisational capability. Whether, in 
integrating future acquisitions, MELCO will have the patience and show the level of trust 
towards other subsidiaries as they have towards Apricot remains to be seen. 
Case C:  Kao and Protoscan 
Carrier competence 
Kao was well aware that the carrier competence selected for bringing the firm into the 
open-systems based computer industry was one with a finite life. It was clear that new 
technologies would soon surpass the magnetically coated plastic disc. The Kao case in 
many ways illustrates most clearly how the Japanese firms were able to use a ‘carrier 
competence’ (in this case the floppy disk) to enter the open-systems based computer 
industry. 
Wider access to resources 
By using acquisitions, rather than the setting up of greenfield sites, Kao had been able to 
access not only the required complementary resources to allow the firm to become the 
world’s leading producer of floppy disks, but also to access a wide range of resources that 
would be useful as the demands of the market changed. For example, as the use of CD-
ROM’s for software distribution grew, Kao needed to develop competence in this area. 
The acquisitions made by Kao in the US had provided the Japanese firm with many 
contacts with firms possessing resources needed for the formation of competences within 
the digital industry, such as resources to build competence in DVD and software 
distribution via the Internet. Kao’s acquisition of Protoscan to a certain extent has added 
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to that access of a wide range of resources. 
New organisational capabilities 
Kao had used acquisitions consistently as a means to access resources and build its 
competence in floppy disk production, and then software distribution and support 
services. The management of the Infosystems division of Kao had realised that the 
technology selected as the carrier competence had a finite life, and consequently it was 
important for them to gain the required complementary resources as soon as possible. In 
addition, by acquiring North American and European firms, Kao was able to access a 
wide range of knowledge as to non-Japanese management skills. Though applying a 
strong hand in the integration of the acquisitions, Kao nonetheless learned a great deal 
from each of the acquisitions it carried out. These skills stood to serve Kao well as it 
entered the digital industry. As Kao shifts away from the production of removable storage 
into Internet related services and publishing services, such capability will stand the firm 
in good stead for competing in the dynamic, open and international world of the digital 
industry. 
Summary of key issues 
It can be seen that each of the case study acquisitions can be regarded as a method by 
which each of the Japanese parent companies accessed core and complementary resources 
to allow them to compete in some areas of the open-systems based computer industry. It 
can also be seen that the acquisitions have provided the Japanese firms with access to 
resources (as well as enhancing their ability to access and reconfigure resources in the 
future) that improve their potential to compete successfully within the uncertain, dynamic 
and international competitive environment that is predicted to characterise the digital 
industry. 
Viewing the case study acquisition from a resource-based perspective has provided a 
means to consider the acquisitions in terms of strategy to respond to uncertainty. In 
particular, it has allowed us to view the acquisitions in terms of the acquisition of 
resources to develop competences, and the enhancement of capabilities to allow the firms 
Japanese innovation strategy and the acquisition of UK IT firms                                                                                             Chapter 9 
 236 
to compete in conditions of rapid change. 
Refinement of the conceptual framework 
Having examined the case study material from a resource-based perspective with respect 
to the two technological discontinuities, we can now return to build upon the foundations 
provided by the basic conceptual approach developed in Chapter 4.  
From examination of the case study material, a number of weaknesses in the original 
conceptual framework built upon the constructs provided by the literature on the 
resource-based view of the firm (shown again in Exhibit 9.4) become obvious. 
In viewing the actions of firms in such a manner, there is a weakness in the link between 
internal and external considerations. The framework is highly supply-side based, focusing 
on the internal processes within the firms without linking closely with the external 
industrial environment. As the case study material revealed, it was the nature of the 
changes in the competitive environment that was dictating the organisational processes 
and structures required by firms. Firms would require the ability to maintain a high level 
of responsiveness to change, and the resultant ‘ideal’ organisational form blurred 
distinction between internal and external considerations. Internalising a wide raft of 
redundant resources was inappropriate. What was needed was the ability to access 
resources (in whatever form) in a timely and efficient manner in response to the changes 
in the environment.  
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Exhibit 9.4  Basic conceptual approach 
In addition, the case study material revealed the importance of consideration of past, 
present and future factors. It can be readily seen from the case studies that the previous 
strategies and activities of the firms had a strong influence on their ability to react to 
changes in the competitive environment. Also, it was clear that the activities of the firms 
in response to changes in the competitive environment at the beginning of the 1990s 
would have an impact on their ability to respond to changes in the future. Combining 
consideration of factors such as these with the basic conceptual constructs of the 
resource-based perspective identified in Chapter 4, it now becomes possible for us to 
construct a framework for enhancing our understanding of the use of acquisitions by 
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firms faced with a dynamic and uncertain environment (See Exhibit 9.5). 
 
 
Exhibit 9.5  Refined conceptual approach 
In this framework, we are viewing the emergence and demand for new technologies as 
the core driving force behind the conditions of uncertainty faced by firms such as those 
used as case studies for this research383. These new technologies will drive the 
development of new products and the emergence of new service sectors. These may result 
in the formation of new markets, alter the barriers to entry of existing markets and open 
                                                 
383 There are of course a number of other factors which depending on the research perspective taken, could be equally 
considered as ‘core’ in forming environmental conditions of uncertainty. For example, the formation of trading blocks 
and the impact that this has upon the strategy formulation could equally be considered as the fundamental root of 
uncertainty for firms operating on an international level. However, this thesis is based around consideration of emerging 
technologies as the underlying key factor. 
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up the field to new competition. They may even result in the formation of complete new 
industries. The case of the PC industry illustrates this graphically. These factors interact 
to create a complex environment for firms in which to develop a strategy that will ensure 
continued growth.  
Using the approach so far developed, the options open to the firm become dependent 
upon internalised, or accessible, resources, competences and capabilities. These 
resources, competences and capabilities are largely defined by the firm’s previous 
activities, but can all be augmented by the implementation of an appropriate strategy. 
Viewing the behaviour of the firm in this way reveals the role acquisitions may play 
within a strategy to respond to a dynamic and uncertain environment. The use of 
corporate acquisitions allows a firm not only to access the resources of an external firm so 
as to form a competence, but also by successfully implementing the acquisition, to 
enhance the firms capabilities to do so again in the future. 
This framework represents the result of applying the case study material to the original 
conceptual constructs drawn from the literature on the resource-based view of the firm. It 
represents one stage of the process of building incrementally more powerful theory from 
case study material (Eisenhardt, 1989), and provides us with a means to structure the 
analysis of the behaviour of a firm when faced with conditions of uncertainty, driven by 
fast emerging technologies. 
Conclusions 
The case studies have provided us with material for the development of a framework built 
around the constructs drawn from the literature on the resource-based view of the firm 
which allows the research question stated in Chapter 1 (How have Japanese firms been 
able to benefit from the acquisition of UK IT firms to enhance their ability to compete in 
the complex and dynamic environment of the IT industry?) to be addressed. 
A starting point for the research has been an examination of the competitive environment 
facing the Japanese firms, or the relevant division of the firms, around the time of the 
acquisitions. Examination of the IT industry in the lead-up to the acquisitions in the late 
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1980s revealed a number of wide reaching changes of sufficient magnitude for them to be 
labelled as a paradigm shift. The root of this upheaval was the emergence of the open-
architecture PC and the consequent linking of these machines to form the basis of client-
server systems. The speed and spread of these changes caught many of the established 
computer manufacturers off-guard while at the same time providing opportunities for new 
firms to enter the market. The diffusion of the PC greatly increased the number of 
computer users world-wide and forced firms whose competences lay in the production of 
low volume, large and expensive computer systems to adapt rapidly.  
Examination of the industry in the years that followed the acquisitions revealed another 
major upheaval that was beginning to impact upon the strategies of IT firm. The first 
effects of the much talked of convergence of the fields of consumer electronics, 
computing and telecommunications were beginning to be felt. The anticipated formation 
of the digital industry was starting to influence the strategies of firms and was redefining 
the structure of the separate industries. Instead of firms operating in largely discrete 
industries or industry sectors, the ‘digitisation’ of data and the development of new 
families of products made the boundaries between industries increasingly transparent. 
Firms were beginning to find themselves operating in an environment where the 
flexibility to respond to rapidly changing technologies, openness to work with firms from 
different industries and with contrasting cultures, and an international outlook and 
presence was vital. 
Once this competitive environment had been examined, the next stage was to explore the 
literature to see where the areas of knowledge lay that might be able to explain the link 
between the use of acquisitions by Japanese firms and the changes in the competitive 
environment driven by emerging technologies. The first stage was to examine the 
literature on strategy, and in particular the connection between strategy in the face of 
change, and strategy and growth within a dynamic environment driven by rapid and wide-
reaching technological change. The literature pointed to the ability of a firm to manage 
innovation effectively as being a key competent of a successful strategy to maintain 
growth in the face of such conditions. 
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Examination of this literature (relating to the firm’s ability to manage innovation 
effectively in the face of a dynamic and uncertain environment) pointed to the importance 
of the ability of a firm to create, adapt or acquire knowledge and new technologies, and to 
integrate these effectively into the parent organisation. In order to access fast emerging 
technologies in the face of widespread and rapid change would often require the forming 
of alliances. However, this body of literature also revealed that the dynamics of effective 
innovation and alliance partnering are often incompatible, and may result in a 
‘fundamental tension’ existing between these two elements of strategic management. At 
this point, it becomes evident that acquisition of ownership of a firm may provide many 
of the benefits of alliance partnering without a number of the difficulties.  
However, while acquisition may be a preferred option from the standpoint of innovation 
in the face of a dynamic environment, the literature on acquisition management reveals a 
number of potential stumbling blocks, among the largest of these being the complex 
managerial challenges presented when attempting to integrate two different organisational 
cultures. 
What was required for this research was a means of examining the behaviour of the firms 
in a more holistic way, which included consideration of the processes within the firm as 
well as the influence of the external industrial environment. The body of literature which 
provided a resource-based perspective on the behaviour of the firm provided such a 
means to analyse the behaviour of the firms. 
Analysis of the literature emerging from the resource-based view of the firm revealed 
works that provided a plethora of terminology and an inconsistency of usage, but which 
nonetheless did provide a number of valuable theoretical constructs for linking analysis of 
the behaviour of firms with conditions in the environment.  
The resource-based perspective provides us with the ability to view the firm in terms of 
its competences (the bundles of skills and technologies) and its capabilities (the way in 
which the firm is able to reconfigure its skills and technologies to form new 
competences). For this research, the resource-based perspective provided a number of 
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constructs which, when combined with the case study material, formed the basis of a 
framework for viewing the behaviour of the Japanese firms faced with a dynamic and 
uncertain environment. The framework allows us to combine consideration of the changes 
in the external environment with the development of the organisational processes to react 
to these changes. 
Using this resource-based framework allows us to reach two concluding comments:  
• Each of the case study Japanese acquisitions can be viewed in terms of the acquiring 
of resources and the enhancing of capabilities. The former refers to the internalising 
of skills, knowledge and technologies from an external organisation. The latter to the 
learning, or improving, of business processes to allow the organisation to be flexible 
to respond to change in the future. 
• Each of the cases can be viewed in terms of changes that were happening at the time 
of acquisitions - the shift towards open system based computing - as well as in terms 
of the anticipated far reaching changes that would be the result of the convergence of 
computing, communications and telecommunications. The uncertainty presented by 
this loosely defined ‘convergence’ pointed to the need for firms to maintain flexibility 
and openness, rather than to remain closed and focus on internalising resources to 
hedge bets against the future. 
Thus, through the development of the framework built upon the concepts drawn from the 
resource-based view of the firm, it can be seen that the Japanese firms benefited from the 
acquisition of ownership of the UK firms not only by accessing resources of immediate 
use, and also by enhancing the ability to access resources in the future. 
Further work 
Four possible directions for further work which would build upon the research described 
in this dissertation are outlined in the following sections (See Exhibit 9.6). 
 
Japanese innovation strategy and the acquisition of UK IT firms                                                                                             Chapter 9 
 243 
 
Exhibit 9.6  Options for further work  
From theory building to theory testing 
The research described in this dissertation has sought to use the principles described by 
Eisenhardt (1989) of combining conceptual constructs with evidence from cases studies 
to build “incrementally more powerful theory”. A further iteration of this cyclical process 
of developing theory is to use the “accumulation of both theory building and theory 
testing empirical studies” (Eisenhardt, 1989:547). In this case, this second stage involves 
the application of the conceptual approach outside the restricted environment of the 
‘critical’ case studies. The further application of what Yin (1994) describes “replication 
logic” provides a means to ascertain the ‘usefulness’ of the framework. It can be seen that 
the utilisation of the conceptual approach developed from this research in a wider range 
of cases will provide a means of determining the generalisability of this approach. 
While this possible avenue for further work links closely with the approach taken so far, 
the following suggestions for further work tie-in the use of M&A with wider patterns of 
activity. 
Evolution of the Japanese corporate and industrial system 
An underlying determinant in forming the research question at the beginning of this thesis 
was the noted inexperience of many Japanese firms in the strategic use of international 
M&A. This inexperience has been identified as being linked to a number of factors 
(Kester, 1991). Among these, it has been well-documented that the nature of the Japanese 
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system of corporate governance does not encourage the use of international M&A. 
However, it is becoming clear that the institutional arrangements that have provided the 
structural foundations of Japan’s corporate and industrial system (and the backdrop for 
the research detailed in this dissertation) may themselves be about to undergo a period of 
change. The much-trumpeted “Tokyo Big Bang”, or restructuring of the Japanese 
financial markets has been predicted to have a potentially dramatic impact on the 
ownership structure of Japanese firms. While this restructuring has been talked about for 
many years, the administration of the present Japanese Prime Minister, Ryutaro 
Hashimoto, recently announced that it would seek to implement the changes that would 
allow the Japanese financial markets to become “free, fair and global” by the year 2001 
(Keizai Koho Center, 1996). Such reforms, if implemented, could allow increased foreign 
ownership of Japanese firms, raise the likelihood of increased shareholder influence upon 
the strategies of Japanese firms and increase M&A activity by Japanese firms.  
While some commentators have pointed out that these reforms have been promised for 
many years without any real action being taken, there are indications that initiatives are 
now being made, and that certain developments have been on-going for a number of 
years, ‘behind the scenes’:- 
Changing patterns of corporate finance are altering the crucial relationships with traditional suppliers 
of capital. At the same time, strategic restructuring is diversifying many large manufacturers. [..] 
Accompanying these developments have been several small but important changes in the Japanese 
market for corporate control. Some traditionally stable shareholders are showing signs of disloyalty to 
incumbent management and willingness to sell out for profit. [..] Even unfriendly foreign bidders are 
finding opportunities to acquire equity stakes in Japanese targets, and their threats are being taken 
more seriously. In short, there is a gradual movement towards a more open, Anglo-American style 
market for corporate control (Kester, 1991:6). 
This would seem to point towards the development of a corporate environment whereby 
M&A becomes integral to the portfolio of strategic options open to Japanese firms in the 
same way it is to their Anglo-American counterparts. As such, the learning curve for the 
use of national and international M&A by Japanese firms, especially those in the rapidly 
changing high technology industries will have to be extremely steep. This presents a most 
interesting environment for research which could utilise the consideration of the use of 
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M&A to enhance competence and capability as developed in this thesis. 
Growth of UK high technology firms 
While the option for further research detailed above would build upon existing work and 
analyse elements of the increasing role of M&A activity among Japanese firms, an 
alternative would be to shift the focus of attention more to their potential international 
‘targets’. Research in this area would focus on combining consideration of the use of 
M&A to enhance competence and capability with growth problems facing UK high 
technology firms. In particular, attention could be devoted to analysis of the situation 
whereby fast-growing firms are unable to raise sufficient capital from ‘patient’ sources to 
ensure the maintenance of long term growth, and find themselves an easy target for 
acquisition. Linking in with the work of Shah & Garnsey (1993-4) it should be possible to 
develop the resource-based approach developed in this thesis to encompass study of 
certain short-comings of the UK system of corporate governance. Research effort could 
be directed towards consideration, from a resource-based perspective, of the situation 
where successful and growing firms are unable to raise capital to maintain their desired 
level of growth without their being a requirement to deliver short term profits for 
shareholders. Acquisition by an organisation with sufficient resources to provide capital 
for a fast-growing firm may prove to be an attractive option (albeit one that may affect the 
capacity for independent innovative development, uninfluenced by the parent’s strategy). 
Strategic use of M&A in the IT competitive environment 
It has been illustrated throughout this research that the IT industry is at present 
undergoing a period of intense change. The convergence of IT, CE and 
telecommunications is leading to the formation of a highly uncertain and dynamic 
competitive environment. Within this environment, the pace of change and intensity of 
competition is leading to the proliferation of alliance formation and M&A activity: a 
recent survey revealed that an astonishing 72% of companies operating in the IT industry 
were planning to use M&A within the following 12 months (Investors Business Daily, 
19/12/96). At the time of writing, M&A activity within the IT industry was at “record 
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levels”, according to analysts (Financial Times, 1/2/96). Yet, is still seems that the 
management complexities that accompany the use of M&A for strategic rather than 
financial reasons are little understood. Failure rates remain high, and continue to be 
blamed upon a poor understanding of the intricacies of the post-acquisition integration 
process (Angwin, 1997). As much of this M&A activity reflects the international nature of 
the IT industry by taking place across borders, a deeper understanding of the complex 
management issues that are an integral part of the stratgic use of international acquisitions 
in a fast changing competitive environment is one that, particularly at present, requires 
further consideration.  
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Appendix I  Japan’s industrial & corporate system 
 
Japan does not have an abundance of land or natural resources; neither can the qualities of the 
Japanese people be considered particularly outstanding. [..] One cannot say [..] that the Japanese are 
blessed with a superior intelligence, especially if one notes that even today, most of the basic creative 
advancements in science and technology come from North America and Europe. Rather than creative 
advances, it can only be said that the Japanese have generally been better at applying and improving 
them. In short, there are no convincing explanations for the tremendous development of Japanese 
industry to be found in either land, or natural resources, or in the diligence or intelligence of the 
Japanese people. On the other hand, the Japanese corporate system is unique. [This suggests] that 
quite a strong argument exists for linking Japan’s economic development to its unique corporate 
system (Matsumoto, 1991:109, Emphasis added). 
The aim of this Appendix is to describe the basic elements of this ‘unique corporate 
system’ which, along with the changes in the computer industry described in Chapter 2, 
provides part of the backdrop for this research.  
Introduction 
In the century following the beginning of the move from isolationism in 1868, Japan’s 
economy has shown remarkable capacity for growth, adaptability and resilience (Yuzawa, 
1994). Despite the almost complete destruction of the industrial infrastructure following 
defeat at the end of World War II, Japan has recovered and grown to be one the world’s 
most powerful economic superpowers (See Exhibit AI.1 and AI.2). 
The speed and resilience of this growth, overcoming the oil shocks of the 1970s, the 
doubling in value of the Yen in the 1980s and the collapse of the ‘Bubble’ economy in the 
1990s has resulted in the generation of a large body of literature which attempts to 
‘explain the secret’ of Japan’s success. 
As McMillan (1985) points out, attempts to rationalise Japan’s success invariably tend to 
be grouped in one of three categories:- 
First, there is the cultural argument about the pattern of social values and institutions which give rise 
to consensus and group collectivism [..]. Second, there is the superman theory of the Japanese who, 
with very low defence expenditures and an overwhelming commitment to economic success, are 
creating an industrial superstate, egged on by a desire to be number one. [..]. A third view, [..] is that 
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the Japanese are applying textbook management principles in everyday work life (McMillan, 1985:3). 
 
 Japan USA UK Germany France Italy Canada 
1990 2932 5522 983 1496 1195 1095 572 
1980 1036 2626 524 821 656 396 253 
1970 197 974 120 187 149 94 84 
1960 43 504 72 73 62 35 38 
Exhibit AI.1  GDP at 1996 prices in G7 countries (US$ billion). 
Source: Miwa (1996:4) 
 
 Japan USA UK Germany France Italy Canada 
1990 237 221 171 237 211 190 215 
1980 89 115 94 133 122 70 106 
1970 19 47 22 31 29 17 39 
1960 5 28 14 14 14 7 21 
Exhibit AI.2  Per capita GDP at 1996 prices in G7 countries (US$ billion). 
Source: Miwa (1996:4) 
As for the structure within which the Japanese firms operate, it remains unclear as to what 
impact this has upon the success factors:- 
[Japan’s] remarkable growth and resilience raises fundamental questions concerning the nature of 
Japan’s own form of capitalist economy. Put starkly: is Japan’s performance primarily the result of the 
effective harnessing of fundamental economic forces within the same market capitalist institutions as 
exist in other advanced economies [..]? Or has Japan crafted new institutions or transformed pre-
existing institutions in ways so basic that they bring into question the belief in the inevitable 
convergence towards single, universally rational form of economic organisation [..]? (Gerlach, 
1992:2). 
The search for a robust response to the issues such as those posed above has proved hard 
to develop and has generated much debate. Here, the aim is not to add to the open-ended 
discussion on what are the critical factors in Japan’s success. Rather, it is to point to the 
functions of some of the underpinning institutions and concepts that combine to form 
what may arguably be a ‘unique’ industrial and corporate system. 
The firm 
Within Japan’s industrial and corporate system, the firm, or kaisha, represents one of the 
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three basic forms of industrial organisation (Fruin, 1992). The other two are the factory 
(see Dore, 1973; Whittaker, 1990) and the interfirm network (see Gerlach, 1992; Fruin, 
1992). The manner in which these three elements are aligned and interact constitutes one 
the underlying characteristics of the Japanese industrial system. Abegglen & Stalk (1985) 
describe at length the structure and behavioural characteristics of the ‘typical’ large 
Japanese firm, while Yuzawa (1994) presents a simple comparison of the characteristics 
of a generic Japanese firm with those of the a generic ‘Western’ (in this case US) model 
(See Exhibit AI.3). 
These characteristics and the managerial systems which are used to enact them are upheld 
by  the ‘three pillars’ of the Japanese industrial relations system: lifetime employment, 
nenko (seniority plus merit) wages and enterprise unionism (Whittaker, 1990). 
The issue of ownership in relation to Japanese firms is one that has received much 
attention, as it seems to differ markedly from the concept of ownership in relation to 
Western firms. The complexity of ownership of Japanese firms is summarised by 
Abegglen & Stalk (1985) as follows:- 
[..] the shareholder in the kaisha is in the position of investor, but is in no operational sense in control 
of the company. With adequate return on investment, the shareholder’s role is largely ended. 
Furthermore, it is no longer useful nor accurate to view the kaisha as being under the thumb of their 
banks, soliciting borrowings and deferring to bank judgements on decisions. The successful kaisha are 
as free from bank control as are their Western counterparts. Finally, describing the kaisha as group 
members and thereby under some form of control that membership is of limited value. Those kaisha 
that have led the post-war international competitive thrust are generally separate from Japan’s 
traditional groupings of companies384, and operate independently (Abegglen & Stalk, 1985:191). 
 
 
 
 Japan US 
Aim of the company Long-term marginal value Short-term profits 
Capital Mainly loan Mainly reserved 
Company ownership Employers and employees Shareholders 
                                                 
384 See later section on the role of vertical and horizontal groupings, or keiretsu. Here, Abegglen & Stark are referring 
to the groupings which have emerged from the pre-World War II zaibatsu. 
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Shareholding pattern Stable (reciprocal) Fluctuating (seeking high return) 
Strategy Growth-oriented Profit-oriented 
Division of profit For reserves initially For dividends initially 
President Representative of all employees Representative of shareholders 
Trade union Single union Functionally organised plural unions 
Decision-making Bottom-up Top-down 
Education On-the-job training Off-the-job training 
Worker Plural jobs, general Single job, specific 
Employment Lifetime Contract 
Wage, promotion By years of service By ability 
Exhibit AI.3  Comparison between Japanese and US corporate characteristics 
Source: Yuzawa (1994:15) 
While much the attention of the literature is focused upon the large firms, the small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) form a large part of the Japanese industrial and 
corporate system. The post-war growth of the Japanese economy has lead to an uneven 
expansion of two sectors of the economy, the so-called ‘dual structure’ (Sasaki, 1990). 
The first sector is that of large firms, and the second that of SMEs. The first feature of this 
dual economy that is readily apparent upon examination of the relevant data is that 
Japan’s economy is dominated by small firms: almost 97% of Japanese manufacturing 
companies have less than 100 employees (See Exhibit AI.4). 
A second feature of this ‘dual structure’ economy is the high productivity of the big 
firms.(See Exhibit AI.5).  
In terms of manufacturing organisations, the Japanese corporate and industrial system is 
thus dominated by a large number of SMEs who have low productivity, and a relatively 
small number of large firms with high productivity. 
 
 
Number of 
employees 
1966 1970 1976 1980 1981 1984 1986 
1-9 72.8 73.4 76 76 57.5 56.7 56.7 
10-19 13.7 13.6 11.5 11.3 20.2 20.1 20 
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20-99 11.3 10.6 10.5 10.8 18.9 19.7 19.7 
100-299 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.4 2.4 2.6 2.7 
300-999 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.7 
1000+ 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Total number of 
firms 
594,832 652,931 727,427 734,623 436,463 428,998 436,004 
Exhibit AI.4  Size distribution of manufacturing establishments (by percentage) 
Source: Sasaki, 1990:20 
 
Number of 
employees 
1966 1970 1972 1978 1981 1986 
1-3 23 22     
4-9 35 36 34* 33* 35 35 
10-19 46 46 48 47 44 43 
20-99 53 54 54 54 50 50 
100-299 68 67 69 72 67 67 
300+ 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Exhibit AI.5  Value added productivity differentials by size of enterprise 
Source: Sasaki, 1990:20 
*Figures for 1972 & 1978 refer to firms with 1-9 employees 
Interfirm networks and industrial groupings 
An often described feature of the Japanese industrial and corporate system is the role of 
links, ties and networks that join Japanese firms. This is discussed in length by Gerlach 
(1992) who points to five ‘defining tendencies’ of these relationships between Japanese 
firms and how these differ from those linking companies in the West:- 
1. Affiliation ties. Transactions often take place through alliances among affiliated enterprises, 
creating a vast sphere of life intermediate between anonymous markers and vertically integrated 
firms. 
2. Long-term relationships. Intercorporate relationships in their ideal form are stable and long-term, 
relying on diffuse sets of obligations extending over time. 
3. Mulitplexity. Transactions tend to be overlapping, with equity investment and personal interlinks 
used to consolidate financial, commercial and other business ties. 
4. Extended networks. Bilateral relationships are set in the context of a broader family of related 
companies. 
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5. Symbolic signification. Active efforts are made to infuse intercorporate relationships with 
symbolic importance, even in the absence of formal, legal arrangements or contracts (Gerlach, 
1992:4). 
These interfirm links are most evident within the Japanese industrial and corporate system 
when formalised into identifiable industrial groupings, or keiretsu. The keiretsu play a 
key role in defining the Japanese business environment, yet companies belonging to 
keiretsu account for only one-tenth of 1% of all incorporated business in Japan (though 
group members tend to be larger than the average Japanese firm (Kester, 1991)).  
The typical keiretsu structure is characterised by three features (Ohsono, 1995). Firstly, 
there are the bonds of cross-shareholding, of around 3-5%, between members. Secondly, 
there is shared access to capital through a member bank, as well as other shared services, 
such as distribution and shipping. Thirdly, there is the vertical integration within 
industries and sectors. The keiretsu members are not merely subsidiaries of holding 
companies, and their guidance comes from the ‘co-ordinating’ role of the regular 
meetings of the top management of member firms (Miyashita & Russel, 1994; Ohsono, 
1995). The keiretsu can also be categorised as being either horizontal or vertical (See 
Exhibit AI.6). The horizontal keiretsu members tend to be grouped around a central bank, 
and represent the development of Japan’s pre-war historically important groups of 
companies, the zaibatsu (Abegglen & Stalk, 1985), whereas the vertical keiretsu members 
tend to be constructed in a pyramid form under a large central manufacturing firm. 
These relationships provide the member firms with access to reliable sources of loan 
capital, a core of long-term and patient shareholders, and may also provide a partially 
internalised market for intermediate products. 
 
 
Type Characteristics Examples 
Horizontal Common ties to a powerful bank. Core companies 
will typically include trading company, insurance 
companies and key manufacturing companies 
Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa, 
Daiichi-Kangyo 
(These are known as the ‘Big Six”) 
Vertical Large manufacturing company at the ‘top’ of the 
pyramid, with hundreds of smaller companies 
Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Matsushita, Hitachi, 
Toshiba, Sony. 
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below. Overlaps with horizontal keiretsu as many 
of the large vertical keiretsu lie within borders of 
‘Big Six’. 
Exhibit AI.6  Vertical & horizontal keiretsu 
Source: Miyashita & Russell, 1994 
These relationships differ from the networks of strategic alliances increasingly found in 
high tech industrial environment in the West in a number of ways. Most fundamentally, 
strategic alliances create a framework upon which a relationship is constructed for the 
purposes of some specific project outcome, and the underlying relationship between the 
two firms involved will not alter the core integrity of each organisation. In keiretsu 
arrangements the situation is somewhat different:- 
Japan’s major business groups [..] comprise direct and indirect linkages among banks, industrial firms 
and commercial enterprises that shape a complex web of interests affecting the company as a whole. 
They engage in a wide variety of activities by opening up sources of capital flows between banks and 
corporate borrowers, setting a framework for the exchange of raw materials and intermediate product 
trade and providing a forum for the information exchange of information. Most importantly, they 
define, though patterns of share cross holding and business linked equity investment, the underlying 
ownership structures of their participants - those actors who are assigned ultimate control over the 
basic decision making apparatus of the company through the formal mechanism of corporate control 
(Gerlach, 1992:8). 
The strongest distinction between keiretsu groupings and the Western alliance networks 
can be seen as follows: in the case of alliance networks, the relationship will not actually 
alter the integrity of ownership of the participating organisations, whereas for keiretsu 
arrangements, ownership structure will change. 
Corporate governance 
The key factors which differentiate the system of corporate governance that has evolved 
in Japan from the system underpinning the functioning of Western corporations are 
described in Kester (1991):- 
1. Heavy reliance upon reciprocity in equity ownership and commercial trade. 
If the business relationships lasts long enough and becomes close enough, the trading firms can 
become virtual extensions of one another in a vertical or horizontal production and distribution 
system, though without some of the management control problems that plague large corporations 
integrated under a single corporate hierarchy. Since the relationship is arm’s-length and equity 
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ownership is restricted to minority positions, market incentives are preserved and bureaucratic 
disabilities held to a minimum (Ibid., 61). 
2. Use of flexible ‘implicit’ contracts founded upon trust. 
Trust and implicit contracting is engendered in several ways. Japanese ethnic homogeneity is certainly 
one factor. Well-defined and widely adhered to social and religious norms regarding obligations to 
others makes it easier to form reliable expectations about the behaviour of counterparts in an exchange 
relationship. The virtual absence of significant non-Japanese stakeholders in Japanese corporations 
creates a cultural homogenous business community inside Japan (Ibid., 64). 
3. Selective intervention by major equity-owning stakeholders to correct problems before 
they become insurmountable. 
Perhaps the most important safeguard [in ensuring the effective functioning of the system of corporate 
governance] is the ability of one or more major share-owning stakeholders to intervene when 
necessary to resolve conflicts in the coalition or to turn around a company’s deteriorating 
performance. Usually the intervening stakeholder will be the company’s main bank, although it might 
be a large trading company or a major industrial firm constituting the core of an industrial group 
(Ibid., 69). 
4. Alignment of managerial incentives toward growth and away from wealth transfers 
among stake holders. 
[..] the bias of Japanese corporations toward growth preceded the war and has extended well beyond 
the period of reconstruction and the realisation of modern economies of scale. This suggests a wider 
role for growth as a proxy for value maximisation. [..] Managers might pro-actively seek to secure 
their firms position by investing heavily in those assets that they have a special expertise in managing, 
even to the point of expanding beyond the point justified by profit maximisation considerations. 
Alternatively, by pursuing unrelated diversification strategies, some managers may create highly 
complex organisations that perhaps only they can understand well enough to mange effectively (Ibid., 
75). 
The role of government 
The ‘visible hand’ is an image has been used to describe the relationship between 
business and government in Japan. There is considerable controversy as to how much of a 
role the government has played in Japan’s post war success, and how much it continues to 
play. The two extremes of this controversy are summed up by the following two 
passages:- 
[..] it is the special and unique way in which the Japanese government has guided the economy’s 
development and the interaction of government and enterprise which has been the hall mark of the 
Japanese economy (Kaplan, 1972, as quoted in McMillan, 1985:43). 
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At the other end of the spectrum, there is the following view:- 
Careful examination of Japan’s post-war trade and industrial development in comparison with general 
performance world performance indicates that the Japanese pattern was not unique as all; thus while 
government policy may have been important, its impact on economic performance was not ‘uniquely 
Japanese’ (Patrick & Rosovsky, 1976, as quoted in McMillan, 1985:43). 
Such confusion in viewing the impact of Japanese government intervention on past 
performance is mirrored in identifying the actual role of the government in the 
contemporary industrial and corporate system. Useful summaries of the relationship 
between private and public sector, the role of government intervention, and the use of the 
various ‘targeting polices’ are provided by Miwa (1996: Part III), Fruin (1992, Chapter 
2), Sasaki (1990, Chapter 5) and McMillan (1985, Chapter 3). 
Conclusions 
The intricate nature of Japan’s corporate and industrial system merits a much deeper 
description than space permits here. The purpose of this section has been to highlight the 
features of the basic components of this system (the firm, the interfirm network, the 
system of corporate governance and the role of government) and to point towards the 
relevant literature which provides a greater level of detail for each of these areas.
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Appendix II  Sources of data for the case studies 
 
The two main sources of material which provide the rich contextual evidence for the 
building of the case studies can be grouped as primary and secondary sources. Primary 
sources relate to those providing material specifically for the present programme of 
research, whereas secondary refers to sources of data collected for another purpose and 
kept archived in some form (Stewart & Kammins, 1984). 
Primary sources 
The primary material for this research was obtained through the use of semi-structured 
interviews with individuals from the case study companies and their competitors, as well 
as financiers and journalists. The basic structure of the interviews was broadly the same 
for each interview, and was built around the format shown in Exhibit AII.1385. The 
individuals listed in Exhibit AII.2 were interviewed to provide either the material for the 
building of the case studies, or the developing of an understanding of trends within the IT 
industry. While some were willing to be taped and to have their comments quoted, others 
requested that direct quotes not be included in this thesis. Their wishes have been 
complied with.  
Secondary sources 
The secondary sources of material for the rich contextual evidence required for the case 
studies included: company reports386, previously published case studies, industry reports 
(from private sector sources, e.g., DataQuest, and public sector sources, e.g., JETRO), 
and news archives (e.g., ‘Reuter Business Briefing’, ‘FT Profile’). The specific 
publications selected within the news archives are listed in Exhibit AII.3. The titles of the 
actual news articles used are listed in the main bibliography. 
 
                                                 
385 With the exception of those interviews carried out in 1993, where the aim was to build an understanding of the ‘big 
picture’ with respect to the strategy of Japanese firms in the IT industry. 
386 In addition, the FT Extel and FAME company data archives provided background material for certain financial 
figures not available from the companies themselves. 
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Basic interview structure for internal sources 
• Interviewee background (present position, career path). 
• Perception of trends within IT industry and position of interviewee’s firm with respect to those 
trends. 
• Present relationship with parent/subsidiary. 
• History of relationship. 
• Benefits of relationship. 
• Areas of concern. 
• Impact of relationship on future strategies. 
 
Basic interview structure for external sources 
• Interviewee background (present position, career path). 
• Perception of industry trends. 
• Perception of relationship between parent and subsidiary of case study firm(s). 
• Perception of background to the relationship. 
• Perceived benefits of relationship. 
• Perceived problem areas. 
• Perceived impact of relationship on future strategies. 
 
Exhibit AII.1 Format of case study interviews 
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Key informants 
[ Name, Position, Company (Interview location), Interview date ] 
• Adachi, Motomitsu, Senior Researcher, Fujitsu Laboratories (Japan), 19/8/93. 
• Aida, Motohisa, Business Development Manager, ICL Business Group, Fujitsu (Japan), 
14/3/96. 
• Akao, Yukitoshi, Manager, Nikko Bank (UK), 27/5/96. 
• Davison, John, Director, Interactive Services, ICL (UK), 28/2/96. 
• Godfrey, Simon, OEM Manager, Kao Infosystems (UK), 25/4/96. 
• Goto, Daisuke, Manager, Strategic Planning Department, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation 
(Japan), 15/3/96. 
• Goto, Takashi, Deputy General Manager, Strategic Planning Department, Mitsubishi Electric 
Corporation (Japan), 15/3/96. 
• Hasegawa, Junichi, Deputy Foreign Editor, Yomiuri Shimbun (Japan), 17/8/93. 
• Hines, Richard, Managing Director, Elco Europe (UK), 23/5/94. 
• Horne, Peter, Group Managing Director, Mitsubishi Electric PC Division (UK), 20/2/96. 
• Hurley, William, Manager, Mergers & Acquisitions, Industrial Bank of Japan (UK), 16/11/95. 
• Hyugaji, Akira, Engineering Manager, R&D Group, NEC Corporation (Japan), 16/8/93. 
• Imamura, Tetsuya, Board Member & General Manager, Kao Corporation (Japan), 18/3/96. 
• Ishiguro, Atsuyoshi, General Manager, Technology Affairs, Mitsubishi Corporation (Japan), 
18/8/93. 
• Ishii, Akira, Senior Co-ordinator, 3DO Planning Department, Matsushita Electric Industrial 
(Japan), 23/8/93. 
• Ishioka, Sachio, Head of R&D Office and International Relations, Hitachi (Japan), 17/8/93. 
• Kitazato, Koshiro, Director, ICL (UK), Fujitsu (Japan), 11/1/95 & 14/3/96. 
• Matsuoka, Toshio, Former Director, Matsushita Electric Industrial (Japan), 12/3/96. 
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• Matsuura, Yasunari, Manager, Corporate Finance, Japan Desk., Coopers and Lybrand (UK), 
26/2/96. 
• Molakola, Srikanth, Associate, Corporate Development Services, Nikko Securities (Japan), 
14/3/96. 
• Nakamura, Hideyo, Manager, New Product Development, Kao Infosystems (UK), 19/12/94 & 
18/4/96. 
• O’Toole, Thomas, Staff Writer, Nikkei Weekly (Japan), 18/8/93. 
• Sawai, Hiko, Deputy Group Managing Director, Mitsubishi Electric PC Division (UK), 20/2/96. 
• Shigiya, Tomoko, Manager, Corporate Advisory Department, Kleinwort Benson (UK), 
6/11/95. 
• Shimpo, Ichiro, Director, Business Development Centre, Matsushita Electric Industrial 
(Japan), 23/8/93. 
• Takeda, Yukio, Manager, R&D Planning, Fujitsu Laboratories (Japan), 19/8/93. 
• Takigami, Shinji, Manager, Corporate Development Services, Nikko Securities (Japan), 
14/3/96. 
• Tosh, Malcolm, Operations Manager, Kao Infosystems (UK), 18/4/96. 
• Watanabe, Hideo, Director, ICL (UK), Fujitsu (Japan), 16/11/95. 
• Yoshizawa, Masamitsu, Assistant Manager, Technology Affairs, Mitsubishi Corporation 
(Japan), 18/8/93. 
• Yurino, Toshio, Senior Manager, ICL Business Group, Fujitsu (Japan), 14/3/96. 
 
Exhibit AII.2  Key informants 
 
• APT Data Group • FTBR Technology 
• Asahi News Service • Investor’s Business Daily 
• Associated Press • Investor’s Chronicle 
Japanese innovation strategy and the acquisition of UK IT firms                                                                                           Appendix II 
 275 
• Birmingham Post • Lloyds List 
• Business Computing News • McCarthy Company & Industry Information 
• Business Week • McGraw-Hill Computing & Telecom 
• Chief Executive • Newsbytes 
• Communications Week International • Newsweek International 
• Computer Weekly • Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei) 
• Computergram International • Nikkei Business 
• Computerworld • Nikkei Weekly 
• Computing • PR Newswire 
• Daily Express • Reuter News Service 
• DataQuest • The Economist 
• Edge Internet Access • The Guardian 
• Educom • The Independent 
• Electronics Weekly • Upside 
• Extel • Wall Street Journal 
• Financial Weekly • Which Computer? 
Exhibit AII.3  Key publications used as secondary data sources 
Note: A number of the secondary sources listed above are actually combined archives, 
e.g., McCarthy Company and Industry Information includes a wide range of specialised 
publications. 
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Appendix III  Case study company information387 
                                                 
387 All data drawn from company reports. 
 
Fujitsu  
Communication Systems 
Digital switching systems, carrier transmission equipment, optical fibre systems, optical submarine cable 
transmission systems, multiplex radio communication equipment, satellite communication equipment, 
telephones, corporate information network systems, communication application systems, mobile 
communication systems, software, network consulting services, network integration services and 
maintenance services. 
Computers and information processing systems 
Supercomputers, general-purpose computers, business servers, workstations, personal computers, financial 
terminal equipment, PoS systems, medical systems, communications controllers, disk drives, magnetic tape 
units, hand-held terminals, printers, word processors, fax machines, software, system consulting services, 
system integration services, outsourcing services, VAN services, maintenance services. 
Electronic Devices 
Logic ICs, microcomputers, analogue ICs, hybrid ICs, memory ICs, compound semiconductors, relays, 
connectors, keyboards, plasma display units, liquid crystal displays. 
 
ICL  
Systems and services 
Retail IT solutions (services, hardware, software, systems management), systems and services to financial 
sector, systems and services to central and local government, utilities etc., systems and service consultancy, 
outsourcing business, facilities management, provision of multivendor hardware and software products. 
Hardware 
Assembly of PCs and servers (now managed by Fujitsu), contract manufacturing.  
 
Mitsubishi Electric  
Space Development 
Satellite and communication systems and equipment, satellite systems and subsystems. 
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Communication and Information-Processing Systems 
Information network systems and equipment, radar and guidance systems, mobile telephone communication 
systems and equipment, facsimile machines, computers, peripherals: flexible-disk drives and printers. 
Electronic devices 
Semiconductors: ICs, LSIs, VLSIs, power semiconductor devices, optical semiconductor devices, transistors 
and diodes. 
Energy 
Generators: steam turbine, hydroturbine, diesel, motor and high frequency AC and DC types, nuclear power 
equipment, substations: transformers, rectifiers, circuit breakers, gas insulated sub-stations, switchgear, 
surge arresters, control centres, controllers, un-interruptible power supplies, modular and mobile-type 
substations. 
Transportation 
Electric propulsion equipment: traction motors, main drive gears, traction-control gears, main transformers, 
rectifiers, main alternators and VVVF inverters, electric locomotives, rail-system auxiliary electrical 
equipment, automatic train-control equipment, train air-conditioning equipment, electronic automotive 
equipment, car audio and information systems. 
Building equipment and systems 
Elevators, escalators, moving walks, building management systems, services modules for buildings, air-
conditioning, ventilating and refrigerating equipment.  
Industrial and Factory Automation Equipment 
Electrical-discharge machines, laser processing machines, computerised numerical controllers, 
programmable logic controllers, AC drives and robotics, circuit breakers, magnetic contactors and starters, 
timers, electrical measurement devices and transformers, induction motors, electromagnetic clutches and 
brakes, industrial sewing machines. 
Visual information equipment 
Colour and projection TVs, VCRs and home theatre systems, ‘Diamond Vision’ mammoth display systems, 
multi-screen projection systems, display monitors, CRTs and TFT LCDs. 
Home electronics 
Air conditioning and heating systems, kitchen appliances, laundry and cleaning appliances. 
 
Apricot 
PCs 
High performance multimedia and business-use PCs. 
Network servers 
Severs for workgroups, small office and departmental use. 
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OEM products 
PC motherboard production. 
 
Kao 
Personal care and cosmetics 
Cosmetics, soaps, facial cleaners, body cleansers, skin care products (including Nivea-Kao range), hair care 
products, oral care products. 
Laundry and cleaning 
Laundry detergents, laundry additives, household cleaning products and deodorisers, dishwashing 
detergents. 
Hygiene and bath additives 
Granular and other bath additives, nappies, sanitary products. 
Fatty chemicals and edible oils 
Various raw materials for industrial markets including palm oil, palm kernel oil and fatty alcohols. 
Speciality chemicals 
Environment-friendly cleaning agents for electronics industry, antistatic additives, fragrances, concrete 
additives. 
Food products 
Edible oils, cake mixes. 
IT products 
Production of floppy disks, MO disks, DAT and CD-ROMs, value-added user services including software 
duplication, packaging and customer support. Recent moved into direct electronic software distribution. 
 
